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SUPPLEMENT
28th CPSU Congress

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Moscow TV Reports 5 July Congress Proceedings

Vlasov, Lukyanov at Sections

LD0507183390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 5 July begins carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow. The announcer says work was done in sections today and lists the subjects of seven sections.

At 1801 GMT begins a correspondent's report from the section on cooperation with soviets and the public and political sections. An excerpt of an address by Vlasov is shown, focusing on problems affecting the work of soviets and their relations with executive committees. He notes that from 1991 there is to be much more responsibility in local bodies for dealing with their own problems in conditions of financial autonomy. He says splits in the CPSU will not be helpful.

Vlasov focuses on the idea of the socialist option as mentioned in the program statement for the congress.

At 1807 GMT an excerpt of Lukyanov's address is shown. He recapitulates his recent involvement in party work and the strategy for political reform. Much work has been done in the Supreme Soviet commissions and in the Presidential Council, he notes. Lukyanov makes some observations concerning the congress. The variety of views now being expressed is something new for our party. Given the variety of opinions in society as a whole, the position of communists must be all the more firm, he says. We are faced with a vacuum of authority, so we must get the soviets working properly.

At 1813 GMT the announcer introduces to another extract of Lukyanov. On the subject of the move to a market economy, he says the attempt to raise bread prices was a mistake. Even so, there is no other path than that of the regulated market. An economy of a country the size of ours cannot be run from one center.

Agricultural Affairs Section

LD0507185590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1814 GMT on 5 July continues carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, which met in sections. The announcer introduces an excerpt of an address by USSR Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev. Yakovlev recalls that in the past a firm juridical basis for society was lacking, whereas a law-based society is recognized throughout the world as one of the highest manifestations of civilization.

At 1816 GMT the video switches to an excerpt of an address by a Delegate Sazhnev, second secretary of the Bukhara party committee, on the need for support for informal organizations.

At 1818 GMT the video switches to an excerpt of Polikarpov, first secretary of Onezhskiy city party committee. This one-minute excerpt is followed by a one-minute excerpt of an address by Godunov, of Leningrad.

At 1819 GMT the announcer introduces an interview with delegate Kuptsov, who talks about the many requests coming in from sections for appeals to other parties and organizations.

At 1820 GMT correspondent Khatayevich reports from the hall where the agrarian affairs section is meeting. He recalls recent demands by collective farm organizations for more and improved provisions, then introduces an excerpt of an address by farm chairman Chertayev, who thinks the command system is still operating, providing hefty salaries to local officials and bureaucrats. Paperwork does not solve the problems; this is achieved by proper attitudes to people, Chertayev notes.

At 1829 GMT the announcer notes Gorbachev's presence at this section. The video shows a platform; Gorbachev and Ligachev are present. The announcer says the section was chaired by Starodubtsov. The video goes on to show a brief clip of Gorbachev speaking informally to members of the section during a break; there is no audio.

At 1830 GMT a recorded interview with farm chairman Chertayev and others who attended the agrarian section meeting is broadcast. The interview was given during a break in the agrarian policy section's meeting. In the interview Chertayev elaborates on some of his comments concerning the problems with leasing arrangements. An unidentified speaker praises Chertayev as one of the few people who really knows how to speak as a master of the land.

At 1835 GMT a correspondent presents a recorded 4-minute interview with Moscow delegate Lapshin, who speaks of the need to recognize the true role of the peasant and to make him feel he is master of the land, if the move to the market is to succeed. He compares this with the situation in the United States, which he has visited. The most important thing today, he says, is to give land to the peasants, perhaps through issue of shares in a farm.

Interethnic Affairs Section

LD0507190990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1839 GMT on 5 July continues carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, which met in sections. At 1840 GMT begins a report from the section on interethnic problems. The video shows the section at work and a brief shot of Usmanov, among others. The correspondent says Usmanov spoke of the position of the Germans and of Russian self-awareness.

At the 1841 GMT the voice of Usmanov, off-camera, is heard warning of the danger of an upsurge of anti-Russian feeling.

At 1842 GMT begins an excerpt of Girenko's report to the section. Girenko notes that in recent times it has been necessary to set up special institutions to study interethnic matters. But, Girenko warns, bringing in union authorities whenever there is a local problem risks trampling the very sovereignty about which everyone is talking.

At 1844 GMT the correspondent notes there was a flood of delegates wishing to speak. Clips are shown of people lining up at a microphone. Next is a clip of an address by Academic (?Tishkov), highlighting the fact that ethnic feelings and aspirations are not uniform even within individual peoples. Expansion of civil rights and lateral ties among republics are needed.

At 1847 GMT a clip showing Estonian delegate (Alek) is shown. He notes the prospects for a new union treaty and the areas it needs to cover. Republics need to be accorded the rights envisioned by international law, he notes.

At 1849 GMT an interview with Delegate Oleynik, recorded during the section's break, is shown. Oleynik notes sovereignty needs to be real, not merely declarative, for each republic. He notes writers have played an important role in the past by preserving people's awareness of their culture.

Party Renewal Section

LD0507193190

[editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1850 GMT on 5 July continues carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, which met in sections. At 1853 GMT begins a correspondent's report from the party renewal section, which was addressed by candidate Politburo member Boris Pugo and Yuriy Manayenkov, among others. The correspondent says we are now presenting their addresses, "somewhat abbreviated."

At 1854 GMT Pugo is shown addressing the section. *[Text of Pugo's recorded remarks is published below]*

At 1901 GMT the video clip of Pugo's address ends.

At 1903 GMT is shown a video clip of Manayenkov's address to the party renewal section. *[Text of Manayenkov's recorded address is published below]* Video clip of Manayenkov's address ends at 1907 GMT.

At 1908 GMT a correspondent says some 30 delegates spoke in all; some brief clips of unnamed delegates follow, discussing the role of oblast committees and depoliticization of the army and other subjects. A military delegate says the Army cannot be outside politics.

At 1912 GMT Volkogonov, in uniform, is shown addressing the section on the communist ideal going down in history as a great utopia, an ephemeral goal.

Foreign Policy Section

LD0507194990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1913 GMT on 5 July continues carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow, which met in sections. At 1914 GMT a correspondent's report on the work of the foreign policy section, which was chaired by Gumbaridze, begins. One of the main speakers was Yevgeniy Primakov, who is then shown speaking. *[Text of Primakov's recorded remarks is published below]* At 1920 GMT the video clip of Primakov ends.

At 1921 GMT the announcer sums up the remainder of Primakov's speech. The announcer says delegates then discussed the party's international activities. Berdeyev, of Surkhan-Darya, spoke of involvement in Afghanistan, says the announcer.

At 1922 GMT delegate Mikhaylov is shown speaking of the ground the party has lost, and he criticizes Yakovlev's views.

At 1924 GMT Delegate Mikulin, of the Southern Group of Forces, is seen addressing the section, speaking of a betrayal of the principles of socialist internationalism. As for the "Common European home," it is early to take this for granted, he notes.

At 1926 GMT begins an excerpt of an address by Dzasokhov, who says he is encouraged by the efforts underway to bring Soviet troops home, yet at the same time one needs to consider whether our security is jeopardized. Close contacts are needed between the diplomats and the Armed Forces in all these matters. There can be no doubt that disarmament is a process making headway and enjoys wide public support in both the USSR and the United States, Dzasokhov says.

At 1930 GMT Delegate Vaino Iosifovich Valjas, chairman of the Estonian Communist Party, is shown speaking. The changes in the world have brought undoubted dividends, he says. One of these is that we have now owned up to our past errors and have gained a reputation for honesty, Valjas notes.

At 1932 GMT there is an excerpt of a speech by Kvitsinkiy: The overall evaluation of our international policy is positive, he says. Relations slowed down a little toward the end of last year due to our internal problems.

At 1934 GMT an excerpt is shown of an address by Academic (Melovedov), praising the achievements in international policy thanks to the efforts of Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Primakov.

Ideological Section

LD0507204690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1936 GMT on 5 July continues carrying a video report on the 5 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress

in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow. At 1937 GMT begins a report on the work of (?ideological work) section, showing an excerpt of an address by PRAVDA editor-in-chief Frolov, tracing his involvement in recent years, focusing on the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the new mood of mentioning names from the past: Bukharin, Khrushchev, and others. We now have to provide an impulse for the party to develop toward the concept of humane and democratic socialism. This is a very different concept of socialism from, for example, that of "advanced" or "developed" socialism in vogue a few years ago. He goes on to elaborate his ideas of how the party Central Committee and commissions should be structured.

At 1943 GMT a correspondent summarizes the remainder of debate, then presents a clip of an address by Air Force Delegate Stolerov, talking of the importance of communists stating that their personal positions and of the danger of state dogmatism intruding into too many areas of life.

At 1948 GMT begins an interview during the break with Popov, editor of the party journal DIALOG, who warns of the danger of emotions boiling over into strife. Civil harmony must be preserved. Party splits there may be, but society must be preserved.

At 1950 GMT begins an interview with Viktor Ryabov, secretary of an unspecified committee.

At 1951 GMT begins an interview with Grigoryev, secretary of Vitebsk party committee, who highlights the problems of people being given independence without responsiblity. There follows a two-minute interview with Safronov, of Donestk. This is followed by a two-minute interview with Luchinskiy, of the Moldova party committee, on the procedure for reporting back from sections to congress plenum.

At 1956 GMT the correspondent reports from the socioeconmic policy section. A video clip of an address by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Biryukova is shown. She says the chronic shortage of capital investment has been a major problem, which she has striven hard to solve. The transition to the market cannot be painless and we should not try to portray it as such. The basic tenets and direction of perestroyka are correct, she says.

At 2001 GMT an excerpt of an address by Baklanov is shown. He deals with cost of armaments. But we have not yet had a fitting response from the West to our reduction, he says. We have heard much talk of "conversion" as the way to saving the country; for me this is another of those myths like the opening up of the virgin lands or the turning back of the northern rivers, Baklanov says. He goes on to list proportional spending on civilian and defense spending over the years.

At 2004 GMT the correspondent says debate continued and was mainly constructive, though some speakers focused too much on local issues. A video clip of Bunich's speech is shown.

At 2006 GMT begins an excerpt of an address by Maslyukov, taking up the argument over whether prices should go up, explaining how prices are interlinked. Prices have to be set at the correct level and then there has to be compensation for all except the highly paid, he notes.

At 2008 GMT the video shows delegates interrupting, arguing over the prices issue.

At 2010 GMT the video shows interviews with Zarubin, Seliverstov, and Ryabukhin, who mphasize the need to find a mechanism to unify communists at the local level to deal with the market issue. These interviews are followed by a foyer conversation with Pakhomov, who says he believes the congress may not find the necessary consensus.

At 2013 GMT the video report on the congress ends.

Vlasov Report

LD0507204490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1801 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vlasov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at "Party, Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress on 5 July at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow; introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] The delegates and guests of the congress who took part in the work of the "section on the party, the soviets, sociopolitical organizations and movements" right at the start of the sitting heard reports from two candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

Delivering a report, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vlasov said in part:

[Vlasov] I will dwell in particular on questions of political reform, the separation of the functions of party and soviet power. It must be admitted that in questions of transferring functions of power from the party to the soviets and of separating legislative and administrative power, we turned out to be unprepared. The actual concept was not worked out. The work was carried out without any system; we were groping our way, as the saying goes. The structures and functions of soviet bodies in the localities were not worked out. They copied the former structure of party committees without taking account of the economic reform and the changeover to self-management and self-financing.

This undoubtedly affected the work of the bodies of executive power, starting from rural soviets and right up to the republican councils of ministers. The structures that were created during the course of the work were worked out in various regions and various oblasts and krays as applicable to local conditions. The positions of the chief planning and economic directorates that have been created in the localities are still virtually unconfirmed. There has

been delay in preparing the law about local self-government and the local economy. In short, the party transferred economic functions to the executive committees, but the soviets were not ready to take them on. "All power to the soviets" was at the crossroads.

The same thing happened with the separation of legislative and executive power of soviets of peoples deputies. The principle itself does not arouse any doubts. However, we have approached it in a formal manner, and at the level of rural soviets I would say the lengths we have taken it to are absurd. The town and rayon level is also in question. Such a separation of powers will not bring anything except an increase in bureaucratism and extra friction in the relations with executive committees.

Naturally, we did not wait for instructions. Life required a solution. There was the elaboration, as I have already said, of the structures of executive bodies and the preparation of a legal base, namely, the status of the republics and the status of the autonomous areas. The main thing is that we handed over the functions for the solution of all structural matters relating to the local staff, so that the executive bodies, the local soviets, and the soviets of people's deputies might themselves tackle these matters proceeding from the transition, from 1991, to new principles of self-management and self-financing. It is up to them to make the decisions. They can see more clearly what structures to set up and what their number should be.

Evidently I, as an individual directly connected with the work of local soviet bodies, should here have displayed more initiative, drive, and consistency. Indeed I think that as a whole, on these issues, the Politburo adopted an insufficiently energetic and, I would say, an indeterminate position.

I consider that the drafts drawn up with the involvement of the party masses will be a platform that will make it possible to ensure the cohesion of the CPSU, avert the split that has become discernible in its ranks, and restore its unity with the people.

It is of fundamental importance that the CPSU not accept a nihilistic negation of the ideals of the October Revolution and that it remain the party of socialist choice and communist perspective. There is no doubt, either, that a renewal of socialism is possible only on the basis of the humanization and democratization of society and the granting to every individual of a broad range of political rights and liberties. We have firmly embarked on this path, but it must be bluntly stated that not everything has yet been finally determined and much remains, as they say, still clad in scaffolding.

Forces hostile to socialism have naturally not been slow to take advantage of this situation. Under cover of popular slogans of perestroyka, they have been attempting to destroy its very foundations. This is why it is necessary to have total clarity in the program statement of the congress, and particularly to stress that in general socialist choice, socialism, its scientific understanding, and all its characteristics are not in question. In general, I consider that perestroyka requires that we pay exceptionally serious attention to questions of Marxist-Leninist theory. This is even more important, seeing that of late there has been open preaching of various opportunist theories, including a theory about a so-called spontaneous movement towards socialism. All this has, in effect, not been receiving any rebuff.

I am in agreement with the criticism of the Politburo on these issues. The criticism is absolutely just, and I, as a candidate member of the Politburo, also answer: I bear the carry personal responsibility for this.

Lukyanov on Supreme Soviet

LD0507202390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1807 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Anatoliy Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman at "Party Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July; introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, paid much attention in his report to issues concerning the party's work with the soviets and with public organizations.

[Lukyanov] For a year and a half following the January 1987 plenum of the Central Committee, I worked as a secretary of the Central Committee of the party and I have been a candidate member of the Politburo for nearly two years.

As is known, this was a time when difficult political decisions were maturing and being made. A reassessment of many values was taking place. Ways of renewing the life of society on a democratic basis were being mapped out. Then the formation of approaches toward radical reforms began, including approaches to a reform of the political system. On the instructions of the Politburo, my work was mainly concentrated on precisely this sector.

What can one mention here?

I think the period of preparation for the 19th Party Conference, which occupies a key place in determining the strategy of the political reform, was particularly interesting and productive. Much effort was afterwards put into the fulfillment of its resolutions and decisions, and it seems to me that our society felt the fresh wind of change in a real way at that time.

While even the very mention of the possiblity of platforms, factions, and corresponding groups in parliament seemed like the end of the world at the First Congress of People's Deputies, today we accept perfectly calmly the fact that more than 10 groups of deputies express their opinions in this hall, and that many groups have been registered and recorded in other links of the soviets.

I will tell you frankly: It is very, very difficult to organize the work and be the conductor of this kind of orchestra; it is becoming ever more experienced and professional. It has to be said that the whole corps of deputies is learning now. I, too, am learning alongside them, by my mistakes and stumblings. I am learning first and foremost what is involved in ensuring joint action by the different social, political, ethnic, and professional groups, movements, and blocs operating today in the Supreme Soviet. Work in the Council of the Federation, in the Presidential Council, and in various commissions both within the USSR Supreme Soviet and within the party framework has become ever greater in volume recently.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet has many concerns of an international nature.

Last year alone there were no less than 100 meetings and rounds of talks with parliamentary delegations, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign countries. However, in general, comrades, I am critical of what has been done. I cannot be otherwise. I consider that many things could have been tackled and implemented far better and far more effectively. There have been mistakes. There have been imperfections. There has been, quite simply, a failure to think through decisions that have been made. All this is so. However, to be fair, it has to be said that all of us have been literally deluged with acute and sometimes completely unexpected problems that have had to be resolved in constant haste. We have tripped up and learned from our mistakes but, all the same, made progress.

Now I want to say a few things about the work of our congress and our section. The point, comrades, is that right now, in my view, the CPSU is beginning to enter what I would call the dense layers of political pluralism and the multiparty system. Yes, this is a new atmosphere for the party. But this is the sole atmosphere in which our political party, as the bearer of certain ideas, can possibly live and work from now on. I wish to express one firm conviction ever more clearly. The broader the spread of views and opinions in society, the clearer and firmer, I would say, must be the position of communists.

Half of all our misfortunes over the last two years, both in the center and in the provinces, have occurred, in my view, mainly because party committees have virtually ceased to govern and the soviets simply have not been able to master the functions of government, no matter what we may say about them. In other words, verbally, in the heat of their debates, they appear to be demonstrating their authority but, in actual fact, in real life, a power vacuum is developing. There is a power vacuum, comrades.

For this reason our most important task is to overcome as soon as possible this anemia of the soviets and turn them into genuine, not nominal, working corporations.

The democratic potential of the current soviets must be used to the maximum. Hundreds of thousands of active peple, who are not indifferent, who value the trust of their electorate have entered them. They are wanted and, most importantly, they want to act.

[Correspondent] The delegates asked Anatoliy Ivanovich many questions, particularly about the switch to a market economy.

[Lukyanov] In my view the formulation of the question of the market, the regulation of the market together with the question of prices for bread and bakery products was a mistake. It seems to me that it was necessary to discuss the question of the market with all the pluses and minuses, and to show the country the pluses and minuses, so to speak, and what the market gives and what it takes away, and then discuss this problem seperately. When this problem was imposed, we had an inverted pyramid of public opinion, and now try and get out from under that pyramid.

[Kuptsov—position not specified] Anatoliy Ivanovich, end please.

[Lukyanov] And second, on whether, if the CPSU does not adopt the idea of the market, it will stand in the way of public developments. I am convinced of this. We have no other way, comrades, apart from the regulated market—in one form or another, but a market. Otherwise we will never have a civil society or advancement in the economy. It is impossible to regulate with any force from one center such a huge country of 300 million people, it is impossible to allocate everything from the roof to the cellar. [applause]

Yakovlev Address

LD0507202890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1815 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by USSR Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev, at "Party, Soviets, Sociopolitical Organizations and Movements Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] I would like to dwell on one very major program demand—the party's statement, which it should, it seems to me, now unswervingly implement. In this sense, my speech links up with that of my predecessor, I mean the formation of a law-governed state.

Notice that the idea of a law-governed state seems to have been taken from somewhere or other, but it instantly gripped public opinion. That is a sure sign that the requirement has ripened. Our society really has suffered from lawlessness, and still does today, and, I think, not only in the form of the mass repressions or the persecutions of dissidents in the past.

The most important thing is that laws meant little in the activities of our state and the organs of power and administration, whether that affected the federation or the economy or the endorsement of human rights and freedoms. We didn't seem to know—and many people still pretend that they don't know today—that a civilized

market is a market that is regulated by law, and so it is not a speculators' market, but a fair and honest market. We don't seem to know that democratic state power is power based on the law and managing society exclusively through the law; and that, in general, without law there is no democracy and no basic order.

Our society—and we have to get rid of this—was in the past ruled not by law but by people with not only all their merits, but also their faults and sometimes vices too. Politics did not have a firm legislative foundation, and, for that reason, it was often libertarian and unstable. And the side that suffered in this whole matter was, naturally, the people, and it paid for everything.

Today too, it is no rarity to tackle very difficult problems of life and society in an adventurist, extremist way, without reckoning with the laws that are in force. Incidentally, it has long been recognized by the world community that one of the greatest values of human civilization that is used by the whole world, and the rejection of which inevitably condemns our country to political instablity and lagging behind in historical progress, is precisely the law-governed state. The law-governed state is a particular way of life in a society whereby his majesty the law is rightfully dominant.

Usmanov at Interethnic Section

LD0507230790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1841 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of Address by Gumer Ismagilovich Usmanov, CPSU Central Committee Secretary, at the "Interethnic Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July, introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] As decided last night, the session began with reports by party leaders who did not speak at the general session, and whose range of issues was close to the theme of today's agenda. For Gumer Ismagilevich Usmanov, it was relations between the peoples inhabiting the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. [passage omitted] For the Volga Germans, said Usmanov- - and there are several million of them, of whom at best 300,000 will agree to return to their old regions—it is proposed to set up an extraterritorial association with rights of autonomy. If the congress of Soviet Germans, which is now being prepared, approves the idea it will be possible to develop it for many nationalities that are dispersed over the whole country, for example, for the Soviet Koreans. And again, about Russian self-awareness: Until recently it was seldom spoken of, yet it is also a problem—and what a problem!—concerning the most numerous of the peoples of the federation.

[Usmanov] I take an understanding attitude toward the unanimity with which the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation adopted a declaration of state sovereignty. At the same time, comrades, I am deeply convinced that this idea, in the sense of its practical realization, needs to be handled with extreme caution. Otherwise, we could be faced with an unprecedented outbreak of anti-Russia and anti-Russian feeling, and that would be bad for everyone. [passage omitted]

Girenko at Interethnic Section

LD0507231190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1842 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by CPSU Secretary Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, at the "Interethnic Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July; introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] A report was delivered by secretary of the CPSU Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko. He began [as heard] the difficulty of the current situation is the fact that for long decades ethnic issues were regarded as unimportant. In the developed capitalist countries with mixed multiracial populations, the problems of coexistence have been studied by experts whereas in our country, as we have become accustomed to seeing, from the very beginning everything was as in a close-knit and harmonious family. Only now is it proposed to set up an all-Union research institute of interethnic relations and inaugurate a chair for the study of this subject at the Academy of Social Sciences. More than 70 proposals have been prepared for the Central Committee of the CPSU in order, said Girenko, not to suffer another political defeat as occurred, say, in the Baltic and Western Ukraine.

[Girenko] Analysis convinces us for the nth time that probl ms pile up and conflicts arise where on various levels and by various bodies and leaders, unfortunately including those of the party, there are deviations from the party's political line on the ethnic question. This allows me to stress today the responsibility not only of the center, but also of the leaders of the republics for timely measures to ease the tension and remove the contradictions of interethnic relations. This does not in the least mean that the center will cease to be the guarantor of protection of the rights, honor, and dignity of every citizen. But it is surely quite obvious that to pin one's faith on the Union bodies in every local conflict is to belittle the very sovereignty of which we talk so much today. There can be no calm in the state until each republic finds ways to protect its ethnic minorities.

Pugo on Party Contol Committee

LD0507221190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1854 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by alternate Politburo member Boris Pugo, at "Party Renewal Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Comrade communists, I have been head of the Party Control Committee [PCC] for a year and a half,

and a candidate member of the Politburo since last September. As you know, the PCC of the CPSU Central Committee suffered from the same ills as the whole of our party, and was a mirror image of it. The party interfered in the economy and culture and at times in people's personal life; and the PCC did likewise. That is how it was, comrades, and I must speak about that. For many long years the committee—and I stress this once again—exercised what was in essence supervision of the economy. It took over the role of various organizations.

At the same time, the main questions of the state of affairs in our party, its purity and health were moved into the background. I was faced with the task of providing a qualitatively new character to the work of the PCC. Now we say openly that the party is sick. It has been undermined from within by instances of corruption, parochialism, bureaucracy, servility, and lies. That is why the problem of curing the party has come to the forefront. What has been done?

First and foremost, we carried out a radical reorganization of the committee. We eliminated the subunits that supervised the ministries, departments, and various economic services. This provided the possibility of a sharp return to internal party problems. We started to study how democracy, glasnost, and collegiality are being practiced in party work.

The committee conducted a resolute fight against various abuses by communists, especially leaders, against violations of party discipline, suppression of criticism, and bureaucratic phenomena. Here we resorted to all measures of party influence, up to and including expelling the guilty from the party. In this way, the degenerates Medunov, Churbanov, and Nasriddinova were deprived of their party cards. As a result of checks, the PCC sacked Nevalov, first secretary of the Chernovtsy Oblast Committee [obkom] of the Ukrainian Communist Party, four secretaries of the Volgograd Obkom; 56 leading communists from Amur Oblast were punished, and so on. I think the congress delegates know about this aspect of our activity, since all decisions of the committee were published in the press.

A most important aspect of our work is restoring the good name of communists, of those who were driven out of the party and were dragged through the dirt in the years of stagnation—and while we are on the subject, in our time too—defending their honor and dignity, and returning them to full-blooded life. This is our party and professional task. Incidentally, not infrequently decisions by the committee on restoring people to the party have been greeted with fierce local opposition. We are convinced that the germs of anything-goes and arbitrariness have penetrated all links of the party.

I am often asked what the PCC has done to strengthen the unity of the party. I shall say right out that I categorically disagree with those who would like to turn the PCC into a party inquisition, into some sort of party bludgeon that can be used with impunity to beat the heads of dissidents. We have already had this sort of thing in the history of the party and it is well known what consequences followed. Personally I am opposed to that iron unity which deters people from the desire to think and act.

You know what trends there are now in the CPSU. All of us sitting in this hall are a living embodiment of this variety. We really differ on the most major issues; we have our own views of the party policy. But there is much that unites us. We are in favor of a strong party, of perestroyka finally accelerating its pace. So is it necessary to deliberately aggravate the situation and lead matters toward a split? Of course, it is not a question of unity at any price. What we need is the sort of unity that can only be achieved by renewing the CPSU.

The party can no longer act in the way that it did even quite recently. The monopoly of power has ended and it is wrong to cling to power for the sake of narrow party interests or possibly even personal interests. It must be recognized that many of the former functions of the party are simply no longer necessary. They have become outdated and are even slowing down perestroyka and democratization.

I understand how excruciatingly difficult it is to create a new image of the party, but unless we do this we shall never become the party of the consolidation of the working people, the party that unites around itself all the healthy forces. This is the deep purpose of reforming it.

And now a question that, I know, worries very many people. Why have the people who are to blame for the stagnation not borne responsibility for it? Names are named: Grishin, Aliyev, Kunayev, Romanov, and a number of others. What can I say about this as chairman? We are party control. We carry out only party checks. We are not investigators, judges, or procurators. The USSR Procuracy, which I personally approached on this subject, reported that they do not have evidence of mercenary abuse by these individuals. If there is no evidence, then what basis is there for bringing in personal cases? There were real mistakes in policy. A politician should bear responsibility for his mistaken decisions or for his lack of action. But what sort of responsibility? Political responsibility. I consider that the congress could, in the first place, instruct the future Central Control Commission [CCC], which will have more rights and more opportunities, to elaborate a mechanism for making people responsible to the party for political mistakes. Second, it could instruct the CCC to determine the degree of political responsibility of those party leaders who led the country into stagnation.

And finally, what is my personal contribution to creating the CCC? First, I have championed this idea at all levels, the idea of its autonomy and independence. I went out into the localities, held meetings with the party aktivs and persuaded people of the necessity for precisely this sort of body. Second, on our initiative, control and auditing commissions were set up in a number of kray, oblast, town, and rayon organizations by way of an

experiment. This form of control justified itself. It gained new supporters. Third, I headed the working group to draw up the statute on the CCC. It is up to you, delegates, to judge this. I shall say just one thing: This statute contains my personal understanding of control.

I shall pick out the two most fundamental aspects. The CCC is being set up to directly strengthen control by communists. I consider that the backbone of it should comprise workers and peasants. The CCC is being set up, first and foremost, to check on the activities of the central party bodies. Of course, there can be no question of any duality of power. The CCC should not be constantly hanging over the supreme party bodies, interfere in their work, or pester them with minor fault-finding. I think that the CCC should fulfill the role of a sort of constitutional supervision in the party, by checking on the extent to which the decisions of the central bodies are in accord with the provisions of the program and the rules, and on the extent to which democratic principles are being observed in their activity. In essence, previously the control bodies were not set all of these tasks.

I am in favor of creating a CCC whose members, to quote Lenin, without respect of persons should ensure that no one's authority, neither that of the general secretary nor of any other member of the Central Committee, can prevent it from carrying out an inquiry, checking documents or, in general, achieving the unconditional provision of information and the strictest probity of affairs. I am in favor of a strong and independent control body for our party.

Thank you for your attention.

Manayenkov at Party Renewal Section

LD0507225890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1903 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Yuriy Alekseyevich Manayenkov, at the "Party Renewal Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades, I was elected a secretary of the Central Committee at the end of September last year. I have not held the post long. However, I am well aware of my share of the blame for the shortcomings and mistakes in perestroyka that you know about. However, I have striven to ensure that authoritarianism does not draw breath again from an atmosphere in which the shoots of democracy have not yet consolidated themselves in the life and work of the party and the state.

Since December last year, when the Russian Bureau was established, my duties have included the coordination of the activities of kray and oblast party organizations in the Russian Federation. The outcome of this could not have been positive since the Bureau had no powers whatsoever or sources of information. Furthermore, it was operating to all intents and purposes on a voluntary basis. I called attention to this fact as often as I could. However, the situation required and continues to require that we make rapid progress toward tha exercise of power by the masses and individual freedom, aiming to create a society where the law and morality are supreme, where the people can take a direct part in the adoption of decisions.

I feel that local party organs should be a more influential force in the party. But primary party organizations must really be placed at the top of the list of priorities. One of my main concerns has been that the Russian Federation should acquire political and state sovereignty. An important step on that road is the creation of a republican Communist Youth League and independent republican trade unions, as well as the Communist Party. That is an important event, although the reception given to it so far has been mixed. However, it would be correct to say that the majority of my plans and ideas have not been realized and, in this respect, it should be noted that perhaps the greatest weakness in the functioning of the Secretariat has been the fact that we have not learned to work in anticipation of events.

The emergence of a multiparty system has become the inevitable concomitant of socialist democracy. But it should not be allowed to squander or shred those things that have been inherited from previous generations. If the different parties cannot agree on this most important principle, then one will be forced to ask what kind of progress this is. This is not progress. This is something else. For as long as the moral and intellectual priorities of the individual are divided, swayed by the elements and governed by passions, we will not be able to guarantee social upsurge.

I consider that the party needs to gather and integrate all the assets accumulated over many centuries, the entire cultural and historical experience of the USSR. It is time to remember the human soul. Unfortunately for our ideology, the party failed to sound the alarm properly on very many occasions in history. We sowed our material seed not in the seedbed of enlightenment and education of the people, but in the surrogate field of dogma and formalism. Unless we think again about the problems of ideology and morality, we will go on living in debt as each new moral harvest failure comes and goes.

Our predecessors associated truth with a few names. But the truth, as Marx and Lenin saw it was devoid of this suicidal isolation and pollution. Now is the time to spell out the ideals and philosophy of perestroyka. It is an abnormal state of affairs when the localities are starved of organizational and ideological reference points, while the center tells them to act independently. These should be two strands in the activities of the party, which head in the same direction and meet each other but which relate to each other in the same way as theory and practice.

What's more, there should be personal responsibility for both practice and theory, when it is adopted in our work. For the party the philosophical foundation of perestroyka should be the broadest possible pluralism of ideas, but pluralism in its primordial socialist sense. The

humanitarian principle must always underly civilized behavior and progress and the present-day organization of society. Otherwise, a catastrophic squandering of its ideas and moral principles will occur. That, in fact, is what is already happening.

Finally, in an epoch of social upheaval and revolution there are always many doubtful and hesitant people to be found, many who are hysterical and ready to give up. It is not for us to add to their number. Thank you.

Primakov at Foreign Policy Section

LD0507214590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1914 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Yevgeniy Primakov, at "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed friends, your decision to give me the floor precisely at the meeting of the section for party international activity is somewhat symbolic, I would say. In my previous capacity of the director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute, in my capacity as member of the CPSU Central Committee International Commission, and because of my personal scholarly interests, I indeed happened to take part in the preparation and the staging of some major events in this sphere, namely the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva and in Washington and the summit meeting in Beijing and Delhi.

However, this activity is not part of my direct responsibilities as a Politburo candidate member and now in addition as a member of the Presidential Council. Therefore, I have reason to confine myself to making this statement: I am a consistent and profound supporter of the new political thinking. As a Politburo member I have supported actions and initiatives aimed at putting it into action in the international arena. I share the views and provisions of comrade Gorbachev's report and of the report-backs of comrades Shevardnadze and Yakovlev.

I am profoundly convinced that during the period covered by the report the party international policy was not only correct but truly victorious. This victory is that of commonsense over recklessness, over the fear of universal annihilation, over the dead end nature of confrontation, over the emasculating squandering of enormous resources, over dogmatism and over the split of the world into two blocs which are eternally in confrontation.

Of course the processes of the stabilization of the military and political situation in the world have not yet become irrevocable. Trust is still being accompanied by internal apprehensions and suspiciousness. But it is becoming every more obvious that the stability of interstate relations based on the new political thinking depends in many respects upon the way in which perestroyka will be developing inside this country. And from this viewpoint at this section meeting today I believe it is correct to speak about the internal problems of the state and the party and about my understanding of the processes which are under way.

My political biography is relatively short and it is wholly connected with perestroyka. The 27th CPSU Congress elected me as CPSU Central Committee candidate member, in April 1983 I was elected as Central Committee member, and in September that year I became a Politburo member, while having been by that time chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I wish to put it frankly that the transition from scholarship and academic work to the professional and political career was by no means easy.

I opted for it only because I was deeply convinced that a qualitative transformation of society was needed and believed in perestroyka without reservations and shared its ideas. The party's future depends fully on the way it fits in the process of society's qualitative renewal. A party which is strong in the organizational and political aspect, free of ideological dogmatism and sectarianism, but faithful to the Marxist methodology will be a major lever of perestroyka. Yet there is a plausible possibility that not renewed or democratized party structures can, like a magnet, attract those forces which, objectively, despite their intentions, or subjectively, will work against perestroyka. Proceeding from this dilemma facing the party, a dilemma which is real, not imaginary, I support, for the current stage in our development, the combination of the posts of president and party leader. However, combination of this kind should be maintained, perhaps, only at the level of president. I firmly believe that members of the Presidential Council, for instance, should not join the Politburo and I will act accordingly. I have worked in the highest political organ of the party for nine months and I have had the opportunity to learn the process of decisionmaking from within. Today, with hindsight, one can say that not all of them were perfect: our time is complex and contradictory, changes in the political leadership's views are a natural process, and also unprecedented tasks were being solved. But what I see as the main and most important thing is the following. Without going to extremes, the Politburo and, first of all, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee have rid society of extremist solutions which could have ruined from the outset the peaceful nature of a most difficult historic transition and could have dealt a mighty blow to the intention to carry out this transition through political means.

The process of democratization in the party depends directly on the attitude that is arising toward various tendencies within it. In this case, naturally, I am speaking about tendencies that are devoted to the socialist choice and that simultaneously condemn the totalitarian distortions of socialism in the past. In my view the possibility of preserving the unity of the party rests precisely upon such a two-in-one world outlook foundation.

And should one really let this—the main thing—take second place behind differences over organizational issues and issues pertaining to the rules? What are differences of that kind worth when one is faced with the danger of the political destabilization of the country, when one is faced with opposition activity by new parties and movements, some of them openly anti-Soviet?

It is precisely from these positions that I defend the unity of the party, a unity based upon the consolidation of forces that think in different ways but which bear equal responsibility for perestroyka. There can be no unity inside the party with other tendencies which either reject the socialist goal or shamefully close their eyes to the distortions of Stalinist socialism under the pretext that one mustn't put on sackcloth and ashes. Representatives of various parties, not members of one, can be fellow-travellers.

Mikhaylov Criticizes Yakovlev

LD0507224490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1922 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of Address by Delegate Mikhaylov, secretary of the Shchigrovskiy Party Rayon Committee in Kursk Oblast, at the "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] We all know that from the moment of its foundation our party's leading slogan has been Marx's words "Proletarians of the world unite!" and the party always honored that slogan and cherished it as the leading link in the international communist and workers' movement. So what has the party Central Committee done in this area over the past five years? I have to say that in my opinion the CPSU Central Committee's activities in the period under review in strengthening and developing the international communist and workers' movement provoke surprise and bewilderment. In my view, the contribution made by our party and its Central Committee in recent years to what, for Leninist communists of the past was the holy of holies, amounts to practically zero. And there has been crass failure inside the country, leading to the events in the Baltic and the Transcaucasus and other regions.

It is therefore reasonable to ask: What is the role of CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yakovlev? I believe that Comrade Yakovlev is one of the Central Committee secretaries whose activity merits a negative assessment, and it needs to be seriously pondered whether he can be entrusted further with this area of work. I believe that we need to make an immediate review of our approaches in this matter. We all know how Vladimir Ilyich Lenin held dear the unity of communists in all countries, how he and others among our party leaders took an active part in the activities of the Comintern and various forms of cooperation among the world's communists, and how they stuck at it and, it needs to be said, achieved benefits.

Who gave the current Central Committee and its Politburo and Comrade Yakovlev the right to move away from this? We cannot today avoid making this assessment; it is our moral duty to those communists who elected us to the congress and to the fraternal communist parties.

Mikulin on Foreign Policy

LD0507224690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1924 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Major General Ivan Ivanovich Mikulin, of the USSR Southern Group of Forces, at the "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] As far as the improvement in the international situation is concerned, I think we have an example of how in a number of cases what is wished for is taken as having been achieved. Of what, allow me to ask, does the shame in this improvement consist? Is it not that we have lost practically all of our allies in Eastern Europe? Is it not that today the European military balance has been seriously disturbed, a balance that has for long years served as a reliable basis for security on the continent? Well, and let me finish, as a communist, is it not that we—our comrades in the Communist Party, in particular in Hungary, who have remained in insignificant number—speak about our actions and call them a frank betrayal of the idea of proletarian internationalism?

The impression is being formed that we are currently misconstruing the principles of the new political thinking and the long-term aims just formed within it as being already the current reality. One such illusory element is, in my view, really declared in the idea of the so-called common European home. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts matters in such a way as if this home had already been built and the Soviet Union had been entrusted with the keys to one of the rooms in it. All that remains is to clear, as quickly as possible, the obstructions formed from tanks and missiles that are no longer needed so as to move into the new room.

Dzasokhov on Disarmament

LD0507225290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1926 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of Delegate Dzasokhov, at the "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Comrade delegates, this is not the time or place for economic speeches, and for this reason I would like to say at the very beginning that a number of the opinions that have been heard are in my view of a serious and debatable nature. When, for example, the subject is how to ensure by the efforts of Soviet diplomacy and of our Armed Forces, as well as of our state, the necessary prerequisites for bringing about the major and important process of the return of our Armed Forces to the territory of the Soviet state, this evinces both confidence and the

desire to join actively in this work. But on the other hand, when judgements are expressed on changes in the international arena so radically and negatively, under the cover of great doubts, as if they are allegedly inflicting damage on our national security, then this is an issue so fundamental that it demands more profound and attentive consideration.

As brief comments, I would like to present to you the following details. First, all steps taken in the military and political sphere are based on close cooperation between Soviet diplomats and representatives of the Armed Forces. Second, the consolidated results of the extremely important talks which have taken place recently at summit level between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, our country's head of state, and President Bush do not leave any doubts that the disarmament process has become progressive in nature. Of course danger remains, but failure to see several impressive tendencies means to put oneself in a position of at least isolation and delusion. What is the point at issue? In principle, putting forward for signing in Washington an agreement on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, 50 percent, has been confirmed for the month of December. Well, it is possible that this will fluctuate between 45 and 50 percent. If this is channelled into the interests forecast that we will receive additionally, at the disposal of our economy, around 15 billion rubles [R].

It seems to me that the changes also occurring among our partners need to be seen as well. Among American public opinion, for example, which is cited today and which is sufficiently authoritative for conclusions to be drawn, 74 percent of citizens actively support the position of the Soviet and U.S. leadership directed toward disarmament.

Valjas at Foreign Policy Section

LD0507215790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1930 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Vaino Iosifocich Valjas, Estonian Communist Party chairman, at the "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July; introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] And here is what Vaino Iosifovich Valjas, chairman of the Estonian Communist Party, had to say about his attitude to the polemics which have been raging in the country over recent years and which have flared up afresh at the Congress.

[Valjas] I would like to dwell on just a few aspects, because I am still, up to this time, a member of the Central Committee commission for elaborating international policy. I must say with complete responsibility that what began in April 1985 has provided us with our orientation, or ideology, our prestige, and dividends. And these are unarguable dividends.

I would like to mention here a second aspect about which we have not said much today, because indeed the emotional background is at times too hot for us to look back, to see what lies behind. The second dividend we have received fairly quickly from the new thinking in foreign policy is that we have become honest in the eyes of world opinion. Yes, it has been painful and difficult, but we have been harsh on the errors we committed. Unless we freed ourselves from this burden we would be unable to win the standing which we need so much and which indeed determines the future of the ideology, of the socialism about which we are talking today at the congress.

Kvitsinskiy Views Foreign Policy

LD0507211490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1932 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of speech by Yuliy Aleksandrovich Kvintsinkiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, at the "Foreign Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July; introduced by unidentified correspondent—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] The foreign policy activity of the party and the state was analyzed thoroughly by Kvinsinskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. Here is an excerpt that can serve as a summary of his speech.

[Kvitsinskiy] Since the April 1985 plenum we have gone over to a broad attack upon the international arena. We have improved the image of our country. We have deprived the Western world of the opportunity to depict us as the enemies of peace and a permanent source of military threat. True, over the past year and a half or two years our offensive has slowed down somewhat and has become more difficult—and I see the source of these difficulties primarily in the difficulties that we are encountering in our country's internal development.

If I am to speak about our foreign policy in overall terms and give an assessment with pluses and minuses, then I think that the assessment must nevertheless be a plus.

Frolov on Ideological Work

LD0507215590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1937 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Ivan Frolov, PRAVDA Editor in Chief, at "Ideological Work Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] I would like, first of all, to say that, of course, although I have been working as a Central Committee secretary for six months, I was elected to the Central Committee at the 27th Party Congress and started to work immediately as editor-in-chief of the journal KOMMUNIST. Then, for two and a half years, I worked as an assistant to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, dealing with problems of science, culture, and education. And, since the end of October

last year, I have been the editor-in-chief of the newspaper PRAVDA. It is very awkward for me to speak here. When it is a matter of drawing up very important documents of our party, of course, I took part in drawing them up. But, as for what my contribution is, everything is so complicated, since the work really is very collective, with the clearly delineated leadership of our general secretary, to whom, after all, no one ever writes anything. One needs to discuss things with him. One has to explore things with him. And this is what my work was like. It was rather more like the work of an adviser.

I think that the celebration of the 70th anniversary of October was very important at that stage and for me personally. I noticed later a great undervaluing of all the documents connected within the 70th anniversary of October, and I have my own opinion as to why. It seemed to me that some people were deliberately concealing that initiative talk by, I stress, the party.

I stress that. An enormous number of pseudo-theoreticians have come on the scene who are so terribly brave; I call them the fellow- travellers of perestroyka; they have only been born in the course of perestroyka, and they never refer by a single word...[changes thought] and yet it was in the report that there was mention for the first time at such a high political level of whole periods in the development of our history, of such people as, say, Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin. This was first stated in the report. Or, say, the whole period of activity associated with the name of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushshev: This was first so stated in the report, you understand?

That's where it all began, and then afterwards it is all forgotten and becomes blurred, and it is as if they had thought of it themselves. I refer, comrades, to those pseudo-theoreticians, as I call them, who become brave after 1985. And I consider that it was that active work of the party that led to the formulation of the specific stages of perestroyka, and the most important of them was the 19th Party Conference. It was there, essentially, that the approach was formulated according to which we must follow up our economic reforms by vigorously engaging in political reform. Political reform and the reform of the party itself.

The 28th Congress itself, inasmuch as I was also involved in the preprations for it, I regard mainly, comrades, for this point of view: What is the main thing at the congress? The reforming of the party, the renewal of the party; the consciousness of what is essentially a new party. I do not think we shall resolve all this at the congress, that is not a serious possibility. But we shall give a certain direction to the development and create stimuli—above all—stimuli for the development of the party in this direction.

In my work I have for a long time proceeded from the premise that the problems of humanism, the problems of democracy, the problems of the human being, as I have said, are central.

Therefore it is natural that I should have taken an active part in formulating this concept of a humane democratic socialism. There is at present a great deal of controversy over this. That's very good. I consider that it is worth discussing. One cannot regard this as—we have had new epithets at the plenary session: it was advanced socialism, now we call it humane, but these are incommensurable things, comrades. These are incommensurable things. We now—after all, how do we characterize this new image of socialism? We do, do we not, resolutely reject what went before? In other words, this barrack-room communism, as Marx called it, which sweeps aside the individual. This is a part almost no one ever quotes, you know? Yet Marx himself emphasized this. So this concept really must be associated with the person.

I see the party, the new party, as renewing itself as a living, working party, as a mainly ideological and political force mobilizing the masses, among other things for active work in all spheres of our life, from the economic to the spiritual. That is my understanding of the role of the party and I have tried, as it were, to stand up for it. That the central bodies should no longer be in the nature of an apparatus, and the setting up of commissions—I have also been involved in this, I must tell you. But it is true that I envisioned these commissions rather differently. I thought they would be something that would exist in place of the departments. There would be only the commissions, drawn from members of the Central Committee, and, as I said, it would be a living, working Central Committee. Under it we would need—and this really is necessary—an apparatus to serve the commission, and so on and so forth, and the commission, comprised of working members of the Central Committee—that is how I see the structure of those bodies. Well, and then we all discussed this and decided that perhaps we would now enshrine this and set up a commission, and then, as the development of the renewal of the party proceeds, perhaps we will get around to this.

Moldavia's Luchinskiy Interviewed

LD0607003190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1955 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Interview with Petr Luchinskiy, first secretary of Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, by unidentified correspondent in the lobby at the 28th CPSU congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Petr Kirillovich, could you give your assessment of today's work in the section: the proceedings have been conducted in a new way, replacing the plenary session?

[Luchinskiy] I'd like to say first of all that it seems to me that the idea of holding proceedings in sections has proved itself, because around 20 people have already

spoken, and you will have noticed that the actual atmosphere in the section is, I think, better than at the congress.

This is both from the point of view of a certain tolerance that people are showing towards each other and the fact that there is more argumentation, that's how I'd put it, and calm in the way people are expressing their views.

As for the method by which we shall be informing the congress of our proceedings, we are agreeing to sum up today, and someone from the section, whoever is entrusted with this, will report to the congress tomorrow. A certain number of minutes will be allotted.

Aside from that, minutes of the proceedings are being kept. The section will no doubt have an opportunity, when the congress results are being summed up, to set out all the speeches, both those that are actually delivered and those that are handed in in written form. so on the whole I assess our proceedings positively, it can be said.

Biryukova on Socioeconomic Policy

LD0607002890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1956 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Aleksandra Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at the "Socioeconomic Policy Section" at the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Over these five years it has been possible to carry out the main thing—to lay the real foundations of the process of the social reorientation of the country's national economy, and to channel its development more fully into improving our people's living conditions. What specific problems did I have to address this period? What was, in my view, possible to carry out, and what did we fail to do and why?

I wish to begin with the most acute issue which, perhaps, most complicates the lives of the people and the economic and the financial situation in the country. I have in mind the consumer market situation. What was undertaken to rectify it? With my direct participation as CPSU Central Committee secretary, analytical work has been carried out to transfer to new conditions of economic management the industries producing consumer goods, and above all the light industry.

While tackling matters connected with it, we have carefully analyzed the condition of this industry as a whole—it produces 40 percent of all nonfood consumer goods. It turned out to be simply dreadful, as a matter of fact, critical. The main cause is a chronic shortage of capital investments which are necessary for a full development of the material, technical, and social bases.

Judge for yourselves: light industry output makes up about 14 percent of the general volume of the industrial output. At the same time the specific gravity of the investment in this sphere has been falling every five year period and at the beginning of this five year period reached two and a half percent.

That is why I have done my best to see through the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Council of Ministers determining the program for the technical modernization of light industry enterprises in 1988-95.

Another important section of my work included issues concerning the social security of Soviet people. Conducting the party policy aimed at the practical formulation of an integral guarantee system for the individual's social rights that would meet modern criteria, I took a direct part in elaborating a whole range of legislative and normative acts and in seeing them through the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Certain costs for the population are inevitable in my view during the transition to a market. The obligation of the state and the government is to reduce them to a minimum, and to take special care to prevent those on a low income, children, students, and young people, from being affected in any way and to distribute justly the hardships among all the strata of the population.

It is not just dishonest but also dangerous to promise that the transition will take place completely painlessly, since the realization by the population of the illusory nature of their hopes can lead not only to disappointment in market reforms but also to resistance to them.

There is a general problem in the social sphere that was especially acute in the first part of this five-year period.

The stereotypes of technocratic thinking have not yet been eliminated, nor have the attitudes of a large number of cadres, including party cadres, to social questions as being of secondary importance.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that I am convinced of the correctness of the aims and basic content of perestroyka. Democracy, glasnost, economic and political reforms, and the renewal of the USSR are our most valuable, and I think, irreversible achievements.

Baklanov on Peace Initiatives

LD0507221890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2001 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Central Committee Secretary Oleg Dmitriyevich Baklanov at the "Socioeconomic Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] On the one hand, Soviet peace initiatives have led to real steps in reducing armaments. On the other, the military danger has still not vanished and concern needs to be displayed within the framework of defensive sufficiency for fitting out the armed forces with effective

combat equipment under conditions of reduced allocations for defense. At the same time, the tasks of using the defense complex to tackle key national economic problems have come to the fore.

I am a supporter of the new thinking and the peace initiatives in international relations, but I consider quite definitely that there have not yet been matching actions on the part of our Western partners. This is evidenced by Panama, the attempts to draw a unified Germany into NATO, the efforts to obtain one-sided advantages in the process of reducing strategic and conventional armaments, and in the process of the negotiations that are being held.

I consider that our Army should be reformed in accordance with present-day scientific and technological possibilities and organizationally restructured, taking account of the democratization of our society.

I am certain that one must not forget the wise saying that one's powder must be kept dry. Of late there has been much talk to the effect that the defense complex is in a special position, swallowing up much money and giving little return to the national economy. Various myths are also to be heard about conversion and about the fact that it alone will be able to save the country and that it will lead to the salvation of our country. I must say that this is similar to the myths about the virgin lands, when we were saying that as soon as we had developed the virgin lands we would immediately be feeding the whole country with grain and also selling some abroad. It is similar to the myths about the creation of agrotowns and the destruction of hamlets. It is similar to the myths about diverting the northern rivers.

In this connection I should inform you that the industrial potential of the defense sectors amounts to 6.4%, I repeat 6.4%, of the country's overall production potential. In the recent past, that is in the year 1988-89, this potential, if we regard it as being 100%, was used as follows: 40% went to producing for the national economy, and 60% went to the production of weapons. Now in 1990 the ratio has become 50:50. Shortly, in accordance with the plans we have for 1991, it will be 40:60.

Conversion goes far beyond the framework of the defense complex alone. In effect, conversion is a task for everyone and the whole nation. A draft state program for the period up to 1995 has been drawn up, considered by the government, and submitted to the Presidential Council. I must say self-critically that this document was due to have been prepared last year, but by virture of the fact that we apparently were unable to get ready as required, the matter has been protracted now for six months.

Bunich Assails Economic Policy

LD0507222390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2004 GMT 5 Jul 90

["Excerpt" of address by Pavel Bunich, pro-rector of the USSR Academy of the National Economy, at the "Socioeconomic Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] Even bourgeois parties that do not have multimillion state planning committees and ministries of finances capable of calculating everything—when these parties address the working people they address them not with twaddle, but with the following: Today unemployment is, say, eight percent but we promise that after a given time it will fall to 3.8%.

Just a short time ago, people asked me whether the government had done serious calculations. Had some models been used, had the government tried its calculations on some models? I assert that the government has not tried them on any models. Nothing has been tried out or tested. Therefore, the results that can emerge may turn out to be very dangerous socially and undermine trust in the market and in all our plans in general. I think we have to wait during these two months. Meanwhile, at the congress today, in the resolution we are to adopt, including on the general program, we must reflect the necessary premises without which the market will perish, we must create such premises with which the market—as is the case throughout the world, we do not need to discover America in this respect—performs efficiently. [applause]

Maslyukov Responds to Bunich

LD0507223190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2006 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Excerpt" of address by Politburo member Yu. D. Maslyukov at the "Socioeconomic Policy Section" of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses in Moscow on 5 July—recorded]

[Text] For the pro-rector of the USSR Academy of the National Economy to use the word "twaddle" in describing a governmental program is simply disgraceful, in my view. In any case, one should show restraint. Second, to assert that this program is the antithesis of a market program is also rubbish. One should not behave that way, you see. [loud laughter in audience] But the main thing, comrades, is the following: Look where Comrade Bunich is pushing us. He is against raising prices. I am against price rises, too, but our hidden inflation is eight percent today. We all pay.

All right, let us not speak about us, but people who live from paycheck to paycheck. So the proposal is as follows: Let us pay no attention to this, let them pay as they used to, and let us all pretend that everything is fine. Let free prices flourish. You remember what he said: If free

prices of cars had been introduced two years ago, everything would have been fine. But who would have paid these free prices? Again: the people. So prices would have started to rise, and you know that when the prices of cars go up, other prices will follow suit. The difference in approaches consists in the following...[noise in audience]. One minute, comrades, I am finishing...the difference in approaches is that, first, one has to bring prices into conformity, structural conformity, and fully compensate everybody except the highly paid. The highly paid will have only 70% compensation.

TASS Summarizes CPSU Congress Sections' Work

LD0507183790 Moscow TASS in English 1825 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—Delegates to the 28th Communist Party Congress which opened in Moscow on Monday, worked in groups today after three days of plenary meetings. Work in groups is a new feature for party congresses.

Delegates concluded that this would be the best way to take into account the greatest possible number of proposals expressed by party organisations when drafting the congress's final documents.

The debate in the "party's revitalisation" group was interesting. Delegates made numerous amendments to the drafts of a policy-setting statement by the congress and the party rules.

Speakers said that these amendments would help develop party democracy.

The fact that party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov participated in the meeting of the "agrarian policy" group, shows the great importance attached by the CPSU to the agricultural problems.

Addressing the meeting, Gorbachev favoured the pooling of efforts in this field by "the left" who resolutely advocate changes and by "sober-minded conservatives".

It is necessary to step up the CPSU's influence among the popular masses and in soviets at all levels at the present stage of perestroyka. This idea key-noted every speech at the group "party, soviets and public organisations".

The "ethnic issues" group discussed why ethnic conflicts plague the country and ways of settling them.

Virtually all participants in the debate recognised that it is necessary to adopt a new union treaty which will stabilise the political situation and normalise economic relations in the country.

The party's flagging ideological influence is responsible for the party's falling prestige among people, believes the majority of delegates at the "ideological work" group.

The party's prestige in society will largely depend on a social and economic programme which it will put forth. This idea expressed by leading Soviet economist Pavel Bunich predetermined the trend of the debate in the "social and economic policy" group.

According to many speakers, the old economic mechanism has been broken up during the years of perestroyka, and the new one has not been established.

Delegates in the "international policy' group debated the priority areas of the Soviet international policy, where mistakes were made and how to undo these mistakes.

Speakers (30 delegates took part in the debate) discussed diverse issues, ranging from problems of ensuring peace to living conditions of Soviet specialists abroad.

Ten top party officials who had no time to speak at plenary meetings, made reports about their work at various groups.

Foreign Policy Section Proceedings

LD0507172890 Moscow TASS in English 1716 GMT 5 Jul 90

[By TASS Correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—The congress's working group "Soviet Foreign Policy Through the Eyes of Delegates to the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress" focused on high priority issues in foreign policy, mistakes in dealing with them and ways to rectify errors.

The section's work began with a report from Presidential Council Member Yevgeniy Primakov, a non-voting Politburo member. He told delegates that "the party's international policy during the period under discussion was not only correct but also truly triumphant. It helped overcome the universal fear of the holocaust and total annihilation. It spelled victory over confrontation, which led nowhere."

Many delegates disagreed with Primakov. Thirty delegates discussed a wide array of issues—from securing peace in the world to the living conditions of Soviet specialists working in other countries.

The tone was very sharp in the speech by Military Council members General Ivan Mikulin, chief of the Political Department of the Southern Army Group. "Where do you see improvement in the international situation?" he queried. "Is it in our loss of allies in Europe?" The general charged Soviet diplomats with "looking at the world through rose-coloured glasses" and stressed that "the West is building up its own security exclusively at our expense."

Crimean writer Oleg Kirillov echoed some of the general's statements and said the success of Soviet foreign policy was largely accounted for by the ability to give in.

General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, foiled many invectives when he said that

the Soviet position in all disarmament talks is formed with due account taken of the country's defence sufficiency.

Many delegates raised the issue of East European developments and the Soviet Communist Party's attitude to these developments. The range of assessments was extremely broad: party chief of Soviet offices in Mongolia Mikhail Nazarov insisted that "Eastern Europe must provide our outlet into an integrated Europe." Admiral Khvatov, commander-in-chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet stated that "we have lost allies in the West, we have no allies in the East, and as a result we have returned to the 1939 situation."

Participants paid great attention to speeches by career diplomats, including Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinsky, who stressed that "the peace offensive of our country in the international arena after April 1985 deprived the West of the possibility of painting our country as the enemy of peace."

Head of the Central Committee International Department Valentin Falin responded to numerous questions from delegates. Speaking about developments in Eastern Europe he denied that the changes in the political landscape there were the direct consequence of perestroyka. He said it was rather "the Stalinist model disintegrating."

Georgian Communist Party chief Givi Gumbaridze, who chaired the discussion, told TASS, summing up the results, that the main message of the discussion was a call "to make our international policy still more effective."

Political Organizations Section

LD0507165290 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 5 Jul 90

[By TASS Correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—The Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) at the current stage of perestroyka must increase its influence among the masses and in soviets (councils) of all levels—this was the keynote of today's discussions at the "Party, Soviets, Public and Political Organisations" section.

Speaking at the session, Arnold Klaucen, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, said "one should not question the expediency of combining leading posts in the CPSU and state power bodies under one person, but should think of ways for communists not to lose soviets."

He said the "topicality of this issue is particularly manifest in Latvia's negative example."

Military officer Andrey Godunov of Leningrad, a member of the Democratic Platform within the CPSU, said party committees "should help soviets, rather than undermine them."

Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev focused on the creation of a rule-of-law state in the Soviet Union. He said "the possibility of losing control of society during the transfer of power from the party to soviets poses the gravest threat."

Candidate Politburo Member and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Anatoliy Lukyanov emphasised the seriousness of the "power vacuum" in the country.

He said "fifty per cent of all our misfortunes—in the centre and the provinces—over the last two years took place because party committees have practically ceased to rule and soviets have yet to master administrative functions."

Another candidate Politburo member, Aleksandr Vlasov, who until recently held the post of Russia's prime minister, pointed to the need to increase the efficiency of the party's theoretical work.

He said the "struggle against revolutionism should be reflected in the congress's policy statement."

Economic Policy Section

LD0507180390 Moscow TASS in English 1747 GMT 5 Jul 90

[By TASS Correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—the Communist Party's prestige in society will depend mainly on the social and economic programme it puts forth. The recognition of this thesis, formulated by Soviet economist Pavel Bunich, set the tone to the discussion of the party economic policy here today.

Nearly 800 delegates to the 28th Soviet Party Congress assembled at one working group to debate the proposed policy and suggest alternative programmes for economic reform and ways to overcome the country's deep economic crisis.

Many speakers stressed that the old economic management mechanism has been fully dismantled during perestroyka years, while a new mechanism has yet to be created.

Society, Uzbekistan metallurgist Anatoliy Anokhin said, "is facing a dilemma: Whether to go back to centralised diktat, or to speed up the transition to a market—there is no third option".

Despite strong anti-market sentiments among many delegates—some of them even called on the government to "denounce the market as incompatible with Marxism-Leninism"—the majority favoured the second variant, focussing on ways to make the transition shorter and less painful.

One of the most interesting proposals was made by Lev Golyas, a car builder from Togliatti. He proposed creating for the duration of the transition "a two-tier

economy". The first tier will combine the state order, funds and stable prices, the second which must gradually expand, according to Golyas,—free prices and entrepreneurship.

Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology Nikolay Laverov said that proceeding from the experience of "new industrialised countries, success can be reached only by concentrating on the creation of "tomorrow's technologies". There is no sense in imitating Western economies of the eighties, he insisted, or else the country may find itself bringing in the rear of civilisation.

Delegates were very near unanimous in their critical attitude towards the government's attempts to stabilise the economy and overcome the crisis.

"The credit of confidence in the country's leadership is almost fully exhausted," said Vyacheslav Serov, head of the assembly trust from Udmurtia (a central Russian autonomous republic). The government's plan for the transition to market, he said, "boils down to spiraling prices under the smoke screen of the yet-unused slogan 'forward to the market', or else testifies to the fact that the Council of Ministers does not know what to do, and hence offers only what it has on hand."

The atmosphere at the session somewhat calmed down after delegates talked with Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin in the lobby: Abalkin's circumstantial and patient explanations and replies to interminable queries clarified many issues.

The working group was addressed by Central Committee Secretaries Aleksandra Biryukova and Oleg Baklanov.

The results of the section's work will be reported to the Congress by section chairman Stanislav Gurenko, Ukrainian party chief, on Friday.

Gorbachev, Ryzhkov Stress Solving Food Problem

LD0507185290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1707 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 July (TASS)—TASS correspondents Leonid Vorontsov and Yuriy Sizov report from the Kremlin:

The great importance that the CPSU attaches to agrarian policy was once again underscored by the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Nikolay Ryzhkov, head of the USSR Government, took part in today's session of the section of the 28th Congress of Soviet Communists devoted to this question.

Speaking at the section, Mikhail Gorbachev said that resolving the food problem will remove two-thirds of the country's socio-economic problems. In this connection, he stressed the importance of the correct definition of the role of the peasantry; relations between town and countryside; and the need for an equivalent exchange between them. Having spoken out for a diversity of economic relations in the countryside, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed to the need to display the potential of collective farms.

Stressing that the congress has to adopt decisions that are most important for the fate of the country, Mikhail Gorbachev called on agrarian delegates to ignore slogans such as "adventurist ultraleftists" and also those who want to put everything back. He spoke out in favor of uniting the efforts of healthy forces in society in the main direction of perestroyka, including both "leftists," who are resolutely geared for better changes, and "reasonable conservatives," who save us from plunging into adventures.

Mikhail Gorbachev welcomed the statements of agrarian delegates heard at the section, that the CPSU can count on the support of the peasantry and that they do not see the need for creating a separate peasant party.

In his speech Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, said that the food problem should be tackled by the social reorganization of the countryside and the development of the processing industry. He supported a proposal that a ministry of agriculture be created, saying that the government will submit this issue to parliament.

Expressing his conviction that agriculture needs a market economy, Nikolay Ryzhkov at the same time emphasized that the transition to it must be gradual. He proposed that centralized distribution of 40% of the material resources for the countryside be maintained for the coming year. This would in his view serve to protect the key sectors of agriculture until new economic relations have been organized in this area.

The section debate, which lasted many hours, reflected all the acuteness of the food problem in the country and the economic and social situation of the 40 million-strong army of agricultural workers.

Many of the speakers noted that the priority development of the agrarian sector of the economy, which is supported by all sections of society, is so far only being proclaimed. The material and technological base of the countryside and the processing industry are not being organized and strengthened, and the quality of the agricultural equipment reaching collective and state farms remains low. All this is having a negative effect on production.

Delegates were critical in their appraisal of the speech by Ivan Skiba, head of the Agrarian Department of the CPSU Central Committee. They were not satisfied on the whole with the optimistic tone of his speech. "One gets the impression that the CPSU Central Committee is absolutely not in command of the situation that now exists throughout the country," stated, for instance, a note from the hall read out by the chairman.

However, besides criticism, the speeches contained many constructive proposals on fundamentally improving the situation in agriculture. Many speakers at times became carried away by local issues.

PRAVDA on Party Renewal Section Session

PM0607125990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition p1

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondents A. Ilin, I. Podsvirov, L. Pyatiletova, V. Khatuntsev, A. Shinkin: "Congress News, Day Four"]

[Text] With every day, more and more delegates are becoming directly involved in the dynamic work of the 28th CPSU Congress and in the impassioned, lively discussion of topical problems concerning the life of the party, its restructuring, and renewal. This was a characteristic feature of the fourth day when the congress split up into sections to get down to the nitty-gritty, so to speak, and have in-depth discussions on the main aspects of CPSU policy and the drafts of the most important documents. In short, the discussion at the congress is gaining depth as well as breadth in its subject matter and is concerned with the objectives, tasks, and methods of party activity and with movement in the direction of humane, democratic socialism.

On 5 July at 1000 hours, all seven sections began their sittings: on party renewal; the CPSU's ideological work; socioeconomic policy; the CPSU's agrarian policy; the party, soviets, and sociopolitical organizations and movements; the CPSU's nationalities policy; and the CPSU's international activity. Delegates have had to decide where their knowledge and experience can be used to the best advantage and which problems they should bring to the special attention of their comrades in the all-party forum. Leaders of the CPSU Central Committee have also had to choose between the different sections. M.S. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov have been taking part in the work of the section on the CPSU's agrarian policy which is now perhaps one of the most heated, key areas. Following a congress decision, reports by candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee were also continued in the sections.

So today's account is concerned with the discussions at the section sittings of the congress.

The Renewal of the Party

Some 1,200 delegates have been taking part in this section's work which is natural because, after all, the way to restore the CPSU's authority and strengthen its ties with the masses lies in renewing and democratizing the party. Heated discussions on the party's future have been held since the first day of work by the congress. Indeed, long before the party forum even began this problem generated a collision of opinions and polarized points of view which have even gone as far as "threatening" forecasts and predictions.

From the moment the section sitting opened, the chairman, I.K. Polozkov, was literally deluged with contradictory ideas on how to brainstorm this problem most effectively. An appeal through the microphone in the auditorium by V. Tikhonov, secretary of the "Kommunist" Association party committee, possibly came at exactly the right moment: Let us not state the obvious but look for a way out of the crisis! However, they did not manage to avoid fuss over procedural issues, irrelevant arguments, and going over "old ground."

Quite a good tone to the discussion was set by two apparently routine points on the agenda: the reports by B.K. Pugo, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, and Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. They were distinguished by their self-critical approach to the assessment of their own performance and by the specific nature of their proposals on independence for party control, the involvement of ordinary communists in party control, and the development of internal party democracy. The party needs to adopt new work forms and make a decisive break with the stereotypes of the past, but it would be dangerous to assign it the role of an eternally repentant sinner.

Which questions prompted the most lively polemics? We will name just a few: democratic centralism—for and against; the party and the Army; the territorial and production principle; the size of membership dues and who should have control over them; and others. Various opinions, sometimes mutually exclusive, were expressed on all these matters, but without doubt attention mainly focused on the questions of the party's authority, the role and place of its various links, cadre renewal, and the drafts of the new CPSU Statute and Programmatic Statement on the 28th CPSU Congress.

V. Levchenko, head of department and part-time secretary of the "Voskhod" Research Institute party committee from Moscow's Leninskiy Rayon, did not take any notes with him to the rostrum. But the impatient clapping and uproar which immediately arose in the auditorium as soon as any speaker with specific proposals lapsed into general phrases and appeals did not interrupt his speech once. So what prompted this interest? In the interval, Vladimir Aleksandrovich said to us:

"I had not intended to speak at the section sitting but I was spurred on by General D. Volkogonov's speech and, in particular, by his proposal to change the name of our party. There is no way that I can agree with him: Surely the people would not have confidence in a party that is prepared to rename itself just like that?

"What is more, there is no reason for us to abandon our objectives, the socialist choice, and the communist ideal, which is a moral ideal. It has two aspects: social justice and strong social protection for the working people.

"And finally, we must eliminate the strange paradox that exists in our country. On the one hand, concentrating the best of the country's policies and the best of its intellect within itself, the party is capable of acting as a powerful consolidating force and as the locomotive for pulling society out of its very difficult moments of crisis and chaos. But on the other, this same party is dramatically, tremblingly defenseless before the policies of the top men. We must create a democratic mechanism that will exclude the possibility of arbitrary rule by anyone in the party, irrespective of the office they hold and even if the person concerned enjoys universal love and respect.

"How is that to be done? In my view, the draft CPSU Statutes with which we have now been presented omit very important points contained in the interim drafts. I am mainly referring to the fact that the term 'self-governing'—which defines the absolute power of the party masses—has been dropped from the party formula. And in the section which states that 'party committees of various levels are obliged to set up commissions to develop policy,' the words 'set up commissions if necessary' have suddenly appeared! A very subtle change, but what a strong blow at the heart of the party masses' power!"

In conversations with us, a number of delegates returned to the meeting held the day before between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the first secretaries of rayon and city party committees, and they told us how they feel about the serious questions raised at that meeting. That is no coincidence. The meeting has aroused a strong response among delegates.

"The discussion was extremely frank on both sides, without diplomatic niceties, and therefore useful to us. It cannot be denied that some comrades lost their sense of moderation and sometimes lacked self-restraint and cogent arguments," said G. Skokov, head of the Orsha City CPSU Committee Organizational Department in Vitebsk Oblast, who took part in the meeting. "Emotions became overheated, but the vehemence is explained by the crisis in the party and the country. Communists are seriously alarmed: What does the future hold for the CPSU and will it be able to consolidate healthy forces and overcome negative phenomena? Success now depends on the principled stand taken by party organizations and their ability to anticipate events.

"I fully agree with Mikhail Sergeyevich that we must make every effort to preserve and strengthen the rayon and city levels of the CPSU. The elimination of these structures would essentially mean the elimination of the party."

"Gennadiy Grigoryevich, the sittings of the section on party renewal have very keenly debated the question of the advisability of combining the posts of USSR president and general secretary of the Central Committee. We would like to hear your opinion on this."

"I will be frank: When delegates left for the congress in Moscow, many of them—and I am judging by confidential discussions I have had with my colleagues—had been inclined to reject the idea of combining the two top offices. However, as far as I can see the majority of delegates have changed their view on the problem during the comprehensive discussions and particularly since their meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. The country is going through a difficult period. In order to avoid confusion and hesitation and not weaken the CPSU's role any further, Mikhail Sergeyevich—recognized by everyone as the leader of the party—must not let go the helm of the party ship at this transitional point, because otherwise the ship will start pitching heavily. I am sure that the all-Union forum of communists will give him their support, despite the criticism we have heard."

Our conversation was joined by other congress participants from the Belorussian delegation: Igor Nikolayevich Sushchevich, secretary of the "Izmeritel" Plant party committee in the city of Novopolotsk, and Viktor Petrovich Goncharov, a worker from the "Legmash" Plant in the city of Orsha.

The thoughts of our interlocutors were of a piece with the discussion which flared up at the section sitting on the role and place of party committees in a society undergoing renewal and on the need to enshrine the status of primary organizations in the CPSU Statutes. We must learn to defend the party, and in order to do this we must decisively extricate ourselves from the cadre incompetence crisis, G. Kazmin, first secretary of the Khakass Oblast CPSU Committee, stressed.

It was repeatedly proposed from the rostrum that the powers of the 28th CPSU Congress delegates be extended for the whole of the next five-year period, which would give them the right to monitor implementation of the decisions taken. Advocates of a permanent congress point to the experience of the soviets of people's deputies. But even V. Lenin warned of the danger of modelling party bodies on state bodies and vice versa. In short, the discussion was a stormy one. Delegates A. Seleznev, V. Shved, Yu. Sychev, V. Khalturin, Yu. Yurchenko, A. Viktorov, A. Kavsadze, S. Bekbosynov, and others, suggested a number of proposals in their speeches, for example. The editorial commission set up in the section will generalize them and submit them for discussion to the congress.

Lebedev Gives Briefing on 5 July Proceedings

LD0507201290 Moscow TASS in English 1952 GMT 5 Jul 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandras Budris and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—Deputy Head of the Press Centre of the 28th Soviet Communist Party Congress Aleksandr Lebedev today began a briefing on the results of the fourth day of the congress with a request to consider this information as "unofficial".

He warned that he based his statements of "rather sketchy" records made by "press centre staff", which, possibly, reflected their "subjective likes and dislikes".

Lebedev said "fuller and more weighed and balanced information" on the fourth day of the congress will be presented to delegates of each of the seven sections tomorrow.

Answering questions, Lebedev said 3,166 delegates voted for the election of Mikhail Gorbachev head of the commission on draft rules of the Soviet Communist Party, 1,046 delegates voted against him and 120 abstained from vote. He said 53 delegates did not vote. Gorbachev needed to get 2,193 votes to be elected.

Lebedev focused on the work of the international section. Speakers at the section included member of the Presidential Council Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Soviet parliament's Committee for International Affairs Aleksandr Dzasokhov and head of the Soviet General Staff General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev.

Lebedev noted that in the majority of sections the work was "calmer and more profound" compared to discussions at some plenary meetings in the previous days.

Lebedev announced that a meeting with a delegation of the Russian Communist Party headed by its leader Ivan Polozkov is planned to be held at the press centre on Friday.

'Information Report' on 5 July Proceedings

PM0607090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition p1

[Unattributed "Information Report on the 28th CPSU Congress Proceedings"]

[Text] On 5 July 1990 the 28th CPSU Congress continued work.

The sections formed at the previous congress sitting discussed questions concerning the party's organizational and political renewal, improvement of its ideological work, collaboration with the soviets, and sociopolitical organizations and movements.

Questions concerning the CPSU's nationalities policy at the present stage were discussed with great concern and in a considered manner.

Sharp polemics developed around the problems of the party's socioeconomic and agrarian policy in the perestroyka period.

The CPSU's international activity, which aims to develop and strengthen its ties with progressive foreign parties and movements, was comprehensively discussed and analyzed in depth.

The recommendations and proposals drafted by delegates will be discussed at a plenary sitting of the congress.

Delegates Attend Plenary Meeting 6 July

LD0607063190 Moscow TASS in English 0626 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 6 TASS—Delegates to the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), which opened in Moscow on Monday, today gathered for a plenary meeting after discussions in seven working groups on Thursday.

The groups considered major areas of party policies. Today deputies are expected to sum up proposals made in those groups.

Commissions drafting the congress's documents also worked on Thursday. These documents include a policy statement and the party's new rules.

The last four days have shown that delegates disagree, sometimes sharply, about the party's future.

Addressing participants in a working group on Thursday, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called for the "unification of society's sound forces, both left-wingers intent on achieving changes for the better and sensible conservatives preventing us from embarking on the road of adventurism."

Morning Session Described

LD0607070890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0630 GMT on 6 July carries a six-minute report by Marina Novitskaya on the CPSU congress session in Moscow.

Noitskaya begins her report by saying that the morning session of the CPSU congress was chaired by Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee. Discussion of the reports presented earlier was then resumed so that all representatives of the republican parties would be able to speak. It was then planned to hear reports on yesteday's work in sections.

The first speaker was Petr Kirillovich Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee. He anounced that his contribution might seem to clash with the prevailing view, since he did not intend "to call the Politburo and the general secretary to account." Novitskaya reports that Luchinskiy said: "in his view, it is more important to understand whether what is happening is an inevitable phenomenon [zakonomernost] or an error. Despite the mistakes made, which have, of course, occurred, the present situation results from the transfer to a humane, democratic socialism, a transfer that is essential. The later the party embarked on such a transfer, the more difficult its position would be. So it is simply not right to blame Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and his policy for everything."

Novitskaya says Luchinskiy went on to ask: "What must the party be like in these conditions of political instability? It must be, in his view, a party of action and civic

harmony. It must set an example of civilized mutual relations. The speaker proposed that, after the 28th party congress, there should be a meeting of the Central Committee and party representatives with all public movements, and, perhaps, a joint document could be signed concerning the principles for establishing civic society based on civic harmony." He went on to say that such a meeting had taken place in Moldova, and "some kind of compromise" had been attained.

Novitskaya continues: "This is not to say that comrade Luchinskiy refrained completely from criticism in his report. Not at all. He criticized the party Central Committee's style of work. He said that, unfortunately, the party was very often tardy in its decisions. It firmly says no, although, nevertheless, some time later, it is necessary to say yes. That is what happened, for example, with Article 6 and in other cases. Logic shows, Luchinskiy said, that it was necessary to adopt a law on parties at the outset, to register them and to proceed to the elections in accordance with party lists. But we did the opposite, and, as a result, now we cannot sort out who is who."

On the subject of interethnic relations, Luchinskiy said that the Central Committee could have gathered together the representatives of the various movements long ago. Such a meeting was essential, Novitskaya quotes Luchinskiy as saying.

The next speaker was Yevgeniy Maksimov, a writer from Smolensk, she reports. "He devoted most of his speech to the plight of the Smolensk countryside and the Russian countryside in general. Over the past ten years, the Smolensk area had lost 900 villages. That fact was quoted by the speaker. He also read out a telegram from the people in his area: 'Convey our kind regards for the founding of the Communist Party of Russia. We have waited 50 years for it, while the CPSU kept forgetting about us.'" He went on to compare the situation of writers in 1913, when there were over 575 publishers and 235 literary journals in Russia, and there was no paper shortage, with the current situation. Today a writer in Smolensk can only turn to one publisher, Sovetskaya Rossiya, which is cutting book production at the moment, Maksimov continues. Cooperatives publishing "dubious literature" seem to have no trouble finding paper. He called for unity on the part of cultural workers, who were so necessary for the spiritual regeneration of Russia, Novitskaya reports.

(Valentin Alekseyevich Grayev-Voronskiy), an electric welder from Donetsk Oblast, is speaking at the moment," Novitskaya concludes, promising further coverage later.

Radio Cites Speakers

LD0607131690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0830 GMT on 6 July broadcasts a 17-minute report by Correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinsky from the 6 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress at the Kremlin.

Ruvinskiy begins by saying: "Let me familiarize you with the Congress diary. A plenary sitting is again taking place today, but in no way can it be compared with what we have been seeing over the past few days. There has been a clear turning point in the atmosphere at the Congress, in the sharpness of the speeches heard from the rostrum. Let us, then, listen to excerpts from some of the speeches. The first to take the rostrum today was Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee."

An excerpt of Luchinskiy's speech is then broadcast. He says:

"The very course of our life has shown that the renewal of socialism is directly linked with creating a multifaceted spectrum of political organizations and parties. However, again we were seriously and substantially late. Logic told us that, to begin with, it was necessary to have the Law on Parties adopted, to have them registered and to hold elections according to party lists. A clear picture would then have emerged of the force and the influence each party has among the people. In our country, this time too, everything took place the other way around. We first held elections to the soviets at all levels and subsequently we began to sort out who was who, to what party, or movement, he belonged. We again turned out to be in a situation of a party that is too late, but I think that this cannot go on indefinitely. I regard this question as being so fundamental that it must be examined by the whole of the people. Let us, just once, hear what the people have to say."

A two-minute excerpt of a speech by writer Maksmiov is broadcast next. Over the past 16 years, 259 schools were closed in Smolensk Oblast and the number of pupils declined by 14,500, says Maksmiov. In the 1970's and the 1980's, he says, the number of Russia's schoolchildren declined by 20%. Over the past 10 years, Smolensk Oblast has lost 990 villages and 95,000 countryside dwellers, while the figure for Russia is 4 million. Life expectancy of those who live in the countryside is below the country's average. Maksmiov concludes by saying that when Meshkhetian Turks were given hospitality by the villagers, they lived there a bit and then went on their way, saying that not even Ethiopians, let alone Turks, would live in such poverty.

A two-minute excerpt by welder (Grayev-Varonskiy) is broadcast next. He emphasizes the importance of discipline in the conditions of a multiparty system. "The people will follow a party whose deeds do not diverge from what it says. We heard Comrade Ligachev's impressive speech—but things are not going too well in his area" says (Grayev-Varonskiy). The media keep accusing the party of more and more things and the party's prestige, which began to decline some time ago, is unlikely to pick up in this atmosphere, he concludes.

Introducing the next speaker, Ruvinskiy says: "Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, drew attention to the serious problems the

republican communists have come up against." The following excerpt of Rubik's speech is then broadcast:

"Our delegation has arrived at the congress with the status of envoys from an opposition party which is under a threat of being banned in the republic. Yes, a distortion of the course of perestroyka led us precisely to this situation. The tactic of endless compromises and retreats pursued by the previous leadership of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, the reports of Comrades Yakovlev and Medvedev, members of the Politburo, which fail to reflect the true state of affairs—and they did visit the Baltic Republics during this period—and the unjustifiable wait-and-see position of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo with regard to the events in Latvia and the Republican Communist Party—all these are factors that helped the antisocialist forces introduce a gradual replacement of the Soviet system by another system—the bourgeois order in accordance with the 1922 Constitution.

"Unfortunately, we have failed to hear a principled political assessment of the state of affairs in the communist parties of the Baltic republics, nor have we felt support in our struggle for socialism in the region, and this also goes for the Central Committee's political report delivered at this congress. [applause] But the separatists are vigorously at work. [loud applause]"

Introducing the next speaker, Ruvinskiy says: "Marina Terentyevna Kabelkova, head of a faculty of the Abakan Teacher Training Institute, spoke of the problems of autonomous formations, the problems of small peoples, in particular in Khakassia. In general, she devoted much attention in her speech to ethnic problems."

The following excerpt of Kabelkova's speech is then broadcast: "I want to say something about the Russian people, too. As far as the questions of national consensus are concerned, hopes are placed on the Russian people. However, I am not surprised that an attack should be launched from this rostrum on the chairman of Mossoviet; there are probably grounds for this. But I am awfully surpised by the fact that when attack is launched from this rostrum on Grek, the esteemed congress applauds it. [applause] Reality has left its mark on the Russian nation, too. The aggressive economy has engendered a peculiar type of the Russian language bureaucracy, especially economic bureaucracy, which is indifferent to the fate of small peoples and their culture; but they are perfectly indifferent to the Russian culture as well. I think that this is one of the reasons for the Russophobic sentiments, but it is a bad thing that bureaucracy is being equated with the Russian nation."

Ruvinskiy then reports that Gumbaridze, who chaired the sitting, read out an anonymous note to the effect that the Council of Representatives had decided to give the floor to those who represent various platforms, and Gorbachev did say that they would be given the floor.

A recording of the note read by Gumbaridze is broadcast. When will this promise be fulfilled, the note asks. "If the representatives of the Marxist platform, the Democratic Platform, and the Leningrad Initiative Congress fail to be given the floor at the Congress, the talk of the ideological pluralism and democracy in the party will remain hollow promises," says the note. This was put to a vote and representatives of various platforms in the party will have their say, says Gumbaridze.

A recording of the remarks by writer Kugultinov is broadcast next. Kugultinov says: "We are currently in a situation in which we must be bold and speak the truth. But even now we are fearful of this truth. Have a look at what is happening outside the walls of the Kremlin. Have a look at what is happening in the depths of our country. What a brilliant speech was delivered before me by a colleague, the writer from Smolensk: The thing is, one should cry one's eyes out, one should cry one's eyes out, but we applaud, one should cry one's eyes out, but we rejoice at the fact that things are no worse in the depths of Smolensk Oblast than in Ethiopia! I think that the diagnosis by a doctor always leads to the illness being treated. At any rate, for an illness to be cured, a diagnosis must be made. It is perestroyka that has turned out to be such a doctor for our country and, from the bottom of my heart, I say this: Long live perestroyka!"

Correspondent Ruvinskiy then introduces the next speaker, Masaliyev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizia, who spoke about those guilty for the Osh tragedy.

The following excerpt of Masilyev's remarks are broadcast: "I wish to report to the Congress that one of the reasons for the interethnic conflict, along with the fact that socioeconomic problems have not been solved, was also that informal associations are hatching ideas about autonomy and whipping up people's emotions with arguments about which people is the more ancient, whose culture is more valuable, etc. Qualified staff of the USSR Procuracy are now conducting investigations. Dear comrades, in this tragedy we have seen once again the extreme need for a strong center and a united Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During the period under review, haste and inconsistency have been manifest in the activity of the Central Committee and the government. Serious errors have been permitted in the realization of the cooperative movement, economic reform, and agrarian policy. Do you recall the March plenum of the Central Committee which we awaited with impatience? And we all know what its results were. The CPSU Central Committee has taken a passive position to such questions of principle—around which public opinion has raged—as problems of ownership, land, and the market economy and has not made public its precise attitude toward them. And this has had an effect upon the prestige of the party."

Continuing his report from the CPSU congress, Ruvinskiy notes that the speech by Deputy Zakovryashin, a section leader at an Altay collective farm, "seemed to have percolated through to this Congress from some bygone time—the 27th congress, for example—although,

of course, it also contained elements of criticism as a tribute to fashion." Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party Central Committee, also spoke.

The speech by Mikhail Ulyanov, a well-known Soviet actor was, Ruvinskiy says, probably the culmination of the morning session. During his speech, Ulyanov says: "When you look back at our past, it is agonizing to think: Where does the reason for our failure lie? The ideas are splendid it would seem, and the dream is a noble one—to make everyone happy and to make everyone equal. How much blood have we shed in the name of implementing this idea, and how many good people have perished! Yet, it seems that in real life everything has turned out wrong. Far from everyone is equal and far from everyone is happy. Why? How should we renew socialism, which has not yet brought success, although there has been plenty of time to implement what was promised—more than 70 years?

"Perhaps we shouldn't renew the socialism of unbending dogmatism, the socialism of despondent leveling down, the socialism of the destitute, the socialism of silent cogs, the socialism of unquestionable leaders and silent masses, the socialism of people ground down into a dense pack and levelled down in their poverty and global dependency, who are prepared, through their anguish and hopelessness, to trample upon anyone who is different from them; who dares to think differently from everyone else; who dares not to subordinate himself to the norm which they have created after their own model, and so on; a socialism which was at some time turned away from its true path and began to serve not people but the leaders and a bare idea? This turn didn't start today, but today these norms which have become customary are blossoming luxuriantly. Do you recall the clamor and cries of the majority at the First Congress of People's Deputies against Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov? Do you recall how the majority were prepared to trample upon this obstinate person, who was absolutely incomprehensible and therefore annoyed the majority? The roots of this murderous aggressiveness gained strength in the threshing mill of Stalin's collectivization, in the perpetual captivity of the gulags, and in the general physical extermination of the personality. The system of this kind of socialism knocked out of people the slightest manifestation of spirituality. The whole policy of exterminating the personality and spirituality was savage and merciless."

Concluding his report, Ruvinskiy says: "I should say that not all the delegates liked the speech by Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov, judging by the subsequent reaction from the hall."

TASS Summarizes Morning Session

LD0607151990 Moscow TASS in English 1503 GMT 6 Jul 90

[By TASS Correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow July 6 TASS—Serious concern for the fate of the Soviet Communist Party and perestroyka has increasingly often been voiced from the podium of the 28th CPSU Congress, which is in its fifth day here today.

Virtually everyone who addressed the congress today has used the words consolidation, unity and cohesion. "We need to preserve the party as a single entity, to consolidate the party's wholesome forces and surge forward along perestroyka's main lines," said Vladimir Potapov, first secretary of the Irkutsk regional party committee (East Siberia). "I am certain that accord is possible."

Turkmenian party chief Saparmurad Niyazov agreed with Potapov and said that the unity of the party and the unity of the country provide the only way out of the crisis to a new level of democracy and humanism. He said that theoretical differences, as they now stand in the party and in society, put the brakes on perestroya in the party.

Some speakers made specific proposals to promote consolidation, although different understandings of the term were obvious in various speeches.

"We will not go along the same road with those who insult Lenin and the Leninist party. We want to join forces with those who respect the party, while differing in viewpoints," said general manager of Siberian Metallurgaical Plant Boris Kustov. In the same breath he called on Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to unite, as they are the "manifest leaders" in the country.

According to Kustov, their joint efforts would help stabilise the political situation in the country, strengthen confidence in the Soviet Communist Party and rally various trends in the party around key tasks.

The speech by Vladimir Zyukin, leader of the Leninist Communist Youth League Central Committee, stood apart from other speeches at the congress. He said that interminable calls for consolidation sounded somewhat naive against the background of stronger "conservative-dogmatic tendencies, attempts to start a witch-hunt and severe criticism of the political leaderhsip's reformist part. Is it not utopic to expect the left-wing to move to the right and the right-wing to shift to the left?" He queried. The Soviet Communist Party, he said, should take three steps forward at this congress. Otherwise, perestroyka will keep moving ahead, but without the party."

Armenian party chief Vladimir Movsesyan also spoke about the dramatic situation in the country and the party. According to Movsesyan, "the actual renewal of society lags behind the growing social expectations. As a result, the idea of socialist choice is beginning to lose its attractiveness". The leader of Armenian Communists focused on the nationality issue in the country as a whole and in Nagorno-(?Kakabakh in particular).

Representatives of two trade groups at the congress—railwaymen and metallurgists—appealed to the country's miners from the congress rostrum, calling on them

to display good sense and patience and to cancel the announced stoppage on July 11.

Discussion continued in the afternoon.

Afternoon Session Begins

LD0607120290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] At the 28th CPSU Congress. Over to the all-Union radio correspondents' center in the Kremlin. At the microphone is Marina Novitskaya.

[Novitskaya] The afternoon session of the congress began half an hour ago. But I want to start my brief account with a few words about the speech made by Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov, our much-loved artiste and chairman of the Union of Theatrical Workers of Russia. He was bringing the morning discussion to a close. And the main thing that our well-known master of culture was describing, with pain and bitterness, was its impoverishment and, even more deeply, the intellectual impoverishment of society, and absence in it of personalities, of which perestroyka is in such short supply. Alas! The passion of Ulyanov's speech was not supported by the hall. The speaker was interrupted by hand-clapping, but not in approval. Even so, I want to quote the final words of Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov. He said: One is amazed by the present stampede to criticize Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In the speaker's opinion, the criticism is generated, above all, by the fact that it is precisely Gorbachev who today personifies democratization, and that he is hindering a return to the past. Will it not happen that, after removing the father of perestroyka, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov said, opponents will turn on its followers and defenders?

After that, appeals to the miners were read out from conference delegates who are railmen and iron and steel workers, asking the miners to show prudence, common sense, and wisdom, not to stage a strike on 11 July, and especially not to call for an all-Union political strike. Let us hope that the call will be heeded.

Then the floor was given to Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. Naturally, he spoke about interethnic conflicts. In the speakers opinion, the party's arsenal contains no detailed political mechanisms for preventing such conflicts, even though a special Central Committee plenum was devoted to the nationalities policy. We can see our own mistakes too, comrade Movsisyan said. We are convinced that violence and intolerance are not a way toward resolving the problems, and we are ready to sit down at the negotiating table. Comrade Movsisyan also considers that an effective mechanism is required for providing assistance and eliminating the aftermath of such disasters as, for example, Chernobyl and the earthquake in Armenia.

On the rostrum now is Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. At the start of his speech, he stressed that the conservative forces have gone over to the offensive. They are opposed to economic reform, although they are still timid. This becamc particularly clear, in his view, after the elections to the soviets and after the establishment of glasnost. In the opinon of comrade Yeltsin, the onslaught of conservative forces came to the fore particularly at the Constitutent Congress of the Communist Party of Russia. At the moment, at the present congress, the 28th CPSU Congress, Boris Nikolayevich thinks, the questions of the party's fate is essentially at stake.

Yeltsin is still speaking. We shall, obviously, be able to give you a more detailed account of it. But for the time being, i'll bring my report from the Kremlin to a close.

Yeltsin Addresses Session

LD0607130190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Speech by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, at 28th CPSU Congress on 6 July in Moscow Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Having taken a defensive posture in the initial stage of perestroyka, the conservative forces later went over to the offensive. They began a struggle against economic reform, although it was timid and half-hearted, but which was creating a real threat to the sovereignty of the party. This took place at a time when the processes of democratization were unfolding, and which revealed themselves especially powerfully in the return of power to the soviets. This took place at a time when glasnost was beginning to take its first steps, and truths which had previously been unquestionable were turning out to be insolvent.

The last years have shown that it has not proved possible to neutralize the activity of the party's conservative forces. On the contrary. We have spoken too much about us all being in the same boat, on the same side of the barricades, that we are fighting shoulder to shoulder with identical thinking. This position has discredited those communists who are sincere and consistent supporters of change. This position has created a regime of security for the conservative forces in the CPSU and has strengthened their conviction that it is possible to gain revenge. This was also demonstrated by the founding congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party.

In order to understand what our congress can and should resolve, we must first of all see clearly what it represents. The Politburo did not decide to embark upon the only correct procedure for the election of delegates in conditions of perestroyka—democratically, from all platforms, and from groups which are independent of the previous party structures, so that 6,000 communists who came together could elect their delegate directly. In that event we would not have obtained this basic personnel

for the congress. For this reason, during discussions at the congress, the main issue has not been perestroyka in the country and ways for it to develop. This question is being tackled by the people outside this building and it is is being tackled in the soviets of people's deputies. The question facing this congress is primarily that of the fate of the CPSU itself. To be more precise, the only question being tackled here is the fate of the apparatus of the party upper echelons.

The question is an extremely acute one: Will the apparatus of the CPSU find within itself the strength to make up its mind on changes? Will it make use of that last chance which the congress is giving it? It is either yes or no. Either the party apparatus makes up its mind on the radical restructuring of the party, under the pressure of political reality, or it will clutch to doomed forms and remain in opposition to the people, in opposition to perestroyka.

In that case the representatives of the apparatus will inevitably be squeezed out of all bodies of legitimate authority. Such a party will not hold out in either a vanguard role or even in the role of a party which has representation in the soviets. Let us bury the illusions of those who think that once all the dissidents have left the party who do not wish to be cogs and screws in the party apparatus, it will retain all the property of the CPSU and the power connected with it. This is not so. In this event—which the conservatives are urging on incidentally—a nationwide struggle will begin for the total nationalization of the CPSU's property as a party which has gone bankrupt and which is obliged, if even by dint of its property, to make good its debts to the people. The inheritance of the party apparatus will be just a signboard bearing the title of the CPSU. It can be assumed that a struggle will begin to put party leaders at all levels on trial for the damage which they personally have inflicted upon the country and the people. I can mention just one of these cases—the damage inflicted as a result of the anti-alcohol campaign. The people will hold them responsible for everything else too—for the failure in foreign trade, agriculture, for the nationalities policy, for policy with regard to the Army, and so on and so on. The country should know what inheritance the CPSU has left it.

Such is the possible outlook for the apparatus and the party. Whoever is thinking about any other variants may look at the fate of the communist parties in the East European countries. They separated themselves from the people, they did not understand their role, and were left on the sidelines.

Is everything so gloomy? Is there another way out? Yes, there is. True, there is little chance of this being victorious at this congress. That can be seen quite clearly. But all of us who have devoted decades of our lives to the party considered it our duty to come here in order to try to say that there is a way out for the CPSU. It is hard and difficult one, but it does exist.

In a democratic state the changeover to a multi-party system is inevitable. In our country, various political parties are gradually being formed. At the same time, a radical renewal of the CPSU is inevitable. What process of modernizing the party is the most painless for the people and the most civilized?

First, it is essential to give organizational form to the various platforms which exist within the CPSU, and to give each communist time to determine his political position. I am convinced that the majority of rank-and-file communists will link the future of the party with its democratic wing. Second, it is essential to change the name of the party. It should be the Party of Democratic Socialism. Third, it is too early to discuss platforms and rules at the congress. Only a general declaration on the transformation of the CPSU should be dopted. Next, it is necessary to elect a new leadership capable of preparing a new congress in about six months' or a year's time.

Fourth, the party should free itself from any state functions. Primary party organizations should be abolished in the Army, in the state security system, and in state establishments. In the production sector, the fate of primary party organizations should be determined by the labor collectives themselves, and by the party members themselves. Members should pay only a minimum of dues to the new party or to the alliance it forms part of.

In this way a parliamentary-type party will arise. In conditions of the powerful renewal of society, only a party of this sort will be able to assume the leading role and to be victorious in elections in the person of one or other of its factions.

Any socialist-oriented factions from other parties could join the alliance of the country's democratic forces. The people will recognize this alliance and will follow it, all the more so if it submits its own economic program for getting out of the crisis, by not deluding the people or putting additional burdens on its shoulders.

The alliance will act as a federation of national alliances. It will have a form corresponding to the idea and spirit of the new Union treaty between the country's sovereign states. With the development in the country of the democratic movements and the further radicalization of perestroyka, this alliance will really be able to become the vanguard of society. This will provide a broad social basis for the renewal of society, will place a barrier in the way of attacks from conservatives, and will guarantee the irreversibility of perestroyka.

That is the second alternative. Thus, there can be either the variant of a CPSU controlled by the apparat, which will result in a split and its departure sooner or later from among the real political forces of the country, or else there can be renewed party, moving into the alliance of democratic forces and with the prospect of preserving the role of active participant in perestroyka.

TASS on Yeltsin Speech

LD0607114290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1046 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Report from the Kremlin by TASS Correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Jul (TASS)—The conservative forces that took a defensive position at the initial stage of perestroyka have gone on the offensive, Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, thinks. Taking part in today's discussion at the 28th CPSU Congress, Boris Yeltsin said: "The last few years have shown that the activity of the conservative forces in the party has not been neutralized. On the contrary, there has been too much talk to the effect that we all are in the same boat, on the same side of the barricade, in one column, and have unified thinking."

In the speaker's view, such a position "has created a regime of security" for the conservative forces in the CPSU and has strengthened their confidence that "revenge can be taken." The constituent congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party demonstrated this, too, he thinks.

It is Boris Yeltsin's view that the CPSU's 28th Congress cannot decide the fate of perestroyka; it is deciding, first and foremost, the destiny of the party itself. "To be more precise—it is only a question of the fate of the apparatus of the party's upper echelons that is being decided here." "The illusions of those who think that once all those who think differently, who have no wish to be the nuts and bolts of the party apparatus, have left the party, the party will still retain the entire property of the CPSU and the power connected with it are utopian," continued Boris Yeltsin. This will not happen.

In this case—and, incidentally, conservatives are urging on precisely in this direction—a nationwide struggle will start for the full nationalization of the CPSU property as that of a bankrupt party that has to make up for its debts to the people, at least with its property."

One can assume, the chairman of the Russian parliament warned, that "the struggle will start by bringing to court party leaders at all levels for the damage they personally inflicted on the country and the people."

Boris Yeltsin recounted in brief a program for taking the party out of the crisis. In his view, in order to modernize the party, the platforms available in the CPSU should be organizationally defined and each communist should be given time for political self- determination. He suggested that the CPSU should be renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism.

The speaker thinks that it is too early to adopt a program statement and the rules at the congress; instead, one should not go beyond issuing a general declaration on transforming the party, and electing a new leadership capable of preparing a new congress in six or 12 months.

The chairman of the Russian parliament supported the idea of abolishing primary organizations in the Army, the system of state security, and state estabishments.

"Thus there is either the option of an apparatus-based CPSU, which means a split and, sooner or later, departure of the country's real political forces from its composition, or a renewed party included into a union of democratic forces and having a prospect for preserving the role of an active participant in perestroyka," Boris Yeltsin concluded.

Gidaspov on Yeltsin Speech

LD0607131990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1130 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Report on work at 28 CPSU Congress by television Correspondent S. Medvedev, including recorded interview in Kremlin foyer with Boris Gidaspov on speech at Congress by Boris Yeltsin]

[Text] [Medvedev] At the Congress today, the delegates continued to discuss the reports-back and speeches made yesterday. There were many speeches and many prescriptions for taking the Party out of the crisis was suggested. In my view, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's proposals were the most radical ones. Here are some of his main points: To give platforms a lease of life in the CPSU, to turn the party into a parliamentary party; to remove party organizations from state organs, the Army, and the KGB; and some other proposals aimed at changing the party from an apparatus-based one into a Party of real life. I asked Boris Veniaminovich Gidaspov to comment on this speech.

[Gidaspov] Unfortunately, I did not hear the speech myself, but I have heard the response to it from many people. What I see as very constructive in Boris Nikolayevich's speech is the idea of uniting all the forces of socialist choice. All the rest is of secondary importance: how to name the Party, and so on. It is important that it should remain socialist in essence and have a clear-cut program for improving the working people's standard of living. This is the main thing on which both he and myself undoubtedly agree.

As for our Leningrad approach, we too are coming out in favor of providing possibilities for all points of view to be heard. The press often accuses us of, say, allowing the initiating congress of the Russian Communist Party to be held in Leningrad. But at the same time, they forget to mention that we did not obstruct the Congress of Socialists either. We did not stop the Congress of the Democratic Platform, rather we helped them, as we did everybody else. It is always good when people not only speak but listen, too.

[Medvedev] And the last question, Boris Veniaminovich. What is your forecast; will this Congress be able to take the Party out of the crisis?

[Gidaspov] I think that if the center and center-left forces, as it were, unite, they will undoubtedly do a good deed for the Party.

[Medvedev] Thank you. With this we end our reportage from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. [video shows Medvedev and Gidaspov with other deputies in the foyer]

Polozkov Briefs Journalists on Congress

LD0607122490 Moscow TASS in English 1121 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 6 TASS—The 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is proceeding "rather constructively," Russian Communist Party Chief Ivan Polozkov told journalists today during a meeting between a delegation of Russian communists and journalists.

Polozkov said that 611 delegates asked to speak in a debate on the political report by the party's Central Committee and on drafts of party rules and the political statement of the congress.

More than 300 delegates have already spoken from the rostrum of the congress, at sections and from the audience.

Speaking of the discussion, which he presided over on Thursday, in the working group on party renewal, Polozkov said that delegates' remarks contained "many interesting proposals, quite often diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive, though."

Polozkov believes that the work of the congress in subsequent days will proceed more actively and emotionally because the delegates are approaching the solution of the main issues [words indistinct] of party rules and election of the party's leading bodies.

"The destiny of the party and perestroyka will depend in many respects on the solution of these issues," Polozkov emphasised.

Predicts Gorbachev Win

LD0607121890 Moscow TASS in English 1211 GMT 6 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 6 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev stands the best chance of being elected general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee, head of the Russian Communist Party Ivan Polozkov told reporters here today, adding that he had "no doubt" about it.

But he said he was not sure whether or not the congress would discuss candidacies for the post on Saturday.

Speaking about the procedure for electing a leader, Polozkov said that, "Judging by the mood at the congress and by numerous speeches, the idea of electing a general secretary at the congress on a multi-candidate basis enjoys great support."

The election would be followed by the election of the party's leading bodies, Central Committee secretaries and politburo members.

The Russian communist chief said he had a "negative attitude" to the same people being members of the Politburo and the Presidential Council simultaneously.

"Practice has shown that it is very difficult to seriously work both in the party and in the Presidential Council," Polozkov said.

At the same time, he pointed out that he would advocate the combination of the posts of president and general secretary and would support Gorbachev's candidacy for the party leader's post.

He explained that the current situation in the party and society "demands exactly this. And later we'll see."

Speaking about the correlation between the presidency and party affiliation, Polozkov said that "corresponding mechanisms should be worked out not only for the president, but also for the prosecutor's office, judges and other state law enforcement bodies."

He agreed with Gorbachev's statement that, if communists holding leading posts in the party or government bodies, central or local, failed to improve the situation, above all in the economy, during the next two years, they would have to resign.

Polozkov opposed any changes in the party's name, saying that instead the party should renew itself and prove that it "is able to lead the country out of the situation in which it has found itself."

PRAVDA Carries 4 July Speeches

Leningrad's Gidaspov

PM0607111390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Speech by B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad CPSU Oblast Committee, at 4 July morning session of the 28th CPSU Congress]

[Text] Comrades, the most important task for this congress is to resolve the question of the Communist Party's role and functions in the political system of a Soviet society that is renewing itself. In fundamental terms this question is quite clear. The party has rejected the direct use of authoritarian functions and is striving to implement its program goals through communists democratically elected to organs of state power—the soviets.

However, that statement is at least inadequate and fails to reflect the essence of the party's main task at the present-day stage of perestroyka. In our opinion, the

main task is for the party to participate in shaping the soviets—organs of real and full people's power. This is not just the historic duty of the party, which was responsible for turning the previous soviets into decorative elements of the administrative-edict system. It is the only way to return to the initial ideals of the October Revolution and to win the masses' trust. Moreover, in the transitional period, when the formation of the soviets as a power structure is proceeding slowly, painfully, and with inevitable costs, effective aid to the soviets from all communists and particularly from party organs is an important prerequisite for maintaining social stability and civic peace.

We should realize that the shouldering of full power by the soviets will not automatically engender the art of competent management. It takes time to shape effective democratic institutions. The question naturally arises as to whether a party burdened by the traditions of administrative-edict administration is capable of providing constructive help in shaping the soviets as organs of people's power. I am confident that it is. In recent years the party apparatus has been joined by new people who are not weighed down by the burden of former stereotypes and who have a high level of educational and professional competence, intellectual activeness, civic courage, and the ability to seek out and find compromise solutions on a constructive basis—in short, the qualities needed to give greater dynamism and effectiveness to all existing party structures, from the Central Committee to grass-roots party components, and to focus their efforts on resolving common tasks. Professionalism and competence should be valued as a social asset, irrespective of party affiliation.

We should also take account of the fact that the structure of elective party organs is similar to the structure of soviet organs and can quite possibly be linked up to it. In both areas commissions operate with identical functions and related aims deciding common questions—from issues of economic policy and problems of agricultural development to questions of collaboration with the masses and sociopolitical organizations.

Thus, the task is merely to find the right mechanism for collaboration between party committees and soviets at the relevant level. However, this task is by no means easy. It must be admitted that currently these mutual relations in a number of parts of the country—including the Leningrad region—are complex and often changeable. This situation has been brought about by a number of factors.

It is no secret that a considerable number of deputies came into the soviets after a fierce struggle with candidates who were supported in the elections by old and sometimes even new party committees. It is well known that a certain section of the corps of deputies advocates openly anticommunist positions and sees its aim as being not to cooperate but to step up confrontation with party organs.

It is no secret that a number of party committee leaders in their turn pay mere lip service to the transfer of power to the soviets, while in practice striving to maintain the old system of mutual relations.

How can we find a road to understanding and cooperation under these complex conditions?

From our standpoint, different political forces and structures at any level can and should be united by an aim that is common and beyond dispute for all—namely, special activity to improve the people's prosperity. Any political force will be doomed to fail if it does not subordinate all its activity to this end.

In this connection one of the most important tasks for party committees at all levels is to elaborate, submit to the soviets, and agree with all groups of deputies concrete program proposals aimed at resolving urgent social programs.

Undoubtedly, during this work there will be different approaches and incompatible proposals. Perhaps even mutually exclusive proposals. In this event we must seek a compromise in conciliation commissions or even postpone the resolution of some disputed issues. But where there is mutual understanding a strategy for action has been worked out whose main aim is to implement what has been planned—through oblast, city, and rayon soviet executive committees and social self-management committees.

At the same time, party organizations will also implement jointly elaborated decisions through the system of oblast, city, and rayon committees and primary party organizations at workplaces and on their territory. Naturally, the priority of the soviets in all cases is indisputable. We should constantly emphasize that we are not infringing their priority and we are prepared to promote its strengthening in practice. Moreover, we should persistently try to persuade party cadres that this is the only path—the path of constructively helping the soviets.

But we simultaneously assert that rejection of the help proposed by us—which is in no way a tactical trick—runs counter to common sense and society's interests.

It seems to us that there is also an urgent need for change in the structure of presidential power. The Presidential Council that has been set up is the headquarters for advisers attached to the head of state. But we lack a clear-cut system for implementing its decisions at local level. As a result, the mechanism lacks a drive belt. Is this not one of the reasons for the state of our society, which has to a considerable degree lost control over the execution of laws and lost many levers of state administration?

Unfortunately, we have somehow lost sight of this issue. Insofar as I am aware, proposals on the structure of or a system for presidential rule in the country are not being worked out by the Supreme Soviet or at any other level.

Perhaps we ought to start by instituting USSR presidential representation at local level in the shape of full representatives given special powers of authority by law.

As we see it, the representatives of presidential rule should act as arbiters in the event of destabilizing conflicts. The option we propose is not beyond dispute. But one thing is indisputable: We need to think through and work out a mechanism for implementing presidential rule, otherwise we will be unable to overcome the emergence of chaos. We should not ignore the danger of parochial [udelnyy] democracy—democracy for just your own rayon, city, oblast, or republic.

Such a structure seems necessary now that our society is being shaken up by internecine conflict, that we have started to differentiate ourselves on party and ethnic grounds, and that there are calls to isolate the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the party from the people. It alone can keep us from sliding into either dictatorship or anarchy.

In this situation, as in most civilized countries, the president who wins the election should maintain his leadership of the party which he represents. Then the party will be responsible for guaranteeing the democratic and legal norms elaborated and adopted by civil society. This section is not part of the CPSU program document. We think that it should be included.

In concluding my speech, I would like to say that our party organization, guided by Leningrad communists' political statement to the 28th congress, is prepared, together with the soviets, to take responsibility for the processes occurring in the region, to travel toward the democratic unity of the CPSU, and to move from the necessary declarations to the necessary constructive action and cooperation with all progressive sociopolitical forces. Ultimately, as I have already said, the people will judge us not by the way in which we solve our problems within the party, but by the state of the country's economy, by the formation of new economic structures, by the development of the social sphere, by our store shelves, and, finally, by the price of goods and services. But to do this we also need guarantees of civic calm, guarantees of a normal civic general state. We are convinced that our party should not merely restrict itself to parliamentary activity—now is not the time to indulge in gloomy forecasts or to lose heart. We are not the only people who determine the country's fate, but we must realize at all costs that we determine it too, and that it cannot be determined without us. If we demonstrate this we will be believed and followed.

Ukrainian First Secretary Gurenko

PM0607105990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Speech by S.I. Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, at the 4 July Morning Session, under the general heading "Speeches at 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] Comrades! Our congress has to answer many questions. But the main one is undoubtedly the question of the party and its fate.

I am convinced that our party cannot revive its power and prestige without a precise, clear, and, most importantly, realistic policy which meets the people's fundamental interests. Such a policy will be the basis for consolidation, the pooling of efforts, and the strengthening of discipline and organization in the party.

That decisive moment has come when the party as a whole and each communist individually must try his strength and his abilities and change things for the better. And for that we must distance ourselves from those who have taken an openly hostile position toward the CPSU and the people's socialist choice and finally rebuff the slander against the party.

There must be an end to the self-flagellation and self-destruction [samoyedstvo]. It is time for us now to clearly distinguish between the real mistakes and omissions and the deliberately malicious lies imputed to us.

Let us ask ourselves: Who is going to follow the kind of party which endlessly sprinkles ashes on its head, states that it lags behind life, and lightly abandons one position for another? People want a strong and authoritative party as their vanguard.

If, as befits serious politicians, you make a sober assessment of the situation, it shows time and again that there is no force in the country other than the CPSU which is capable of achieving a real breakthrough in our lives rather than a breakthrough in words only.

And communists are entitled to expect our congress to elaborate and adopt documents whose implementation will ensure just such a breakthrough. This means primarily the congress program statement. Without going into details, I will talk about what I would like to see more clearly stated in such a major policy document. First and foremost, there is a need for precise and regulated tactics for the party's actions in the new sociopolitical situation, a situation in which the multiparty system has become an active factor. Here, too, it is no longer sufficient just to trot out the stock phrases about the concepts of "dialogue," "partnership," and so forth. The CPSU must take a differentiated attitude toward other parties and organizations specifying potential allies as well as clearly defined political opponents.

Questions of the transition to regulated market relations must be worked out more thoroughly. After all, people simply will not understand it if the congress does not demand the elaboration of an effective social protection mechanism for them.

It cannot be normal when proposals on radical changes in the basis and superstructure bordering on a change of social system—there have already been draft laws on ownership, the land, the radicalization of the economic reform, and others—are now presented for examination

by the supreme organs of state power without an elaboration of the ruling party's position on these questions. In April this year the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo resolutely opposed such an approach to proposals on the raising of retail prices as the starting point of the switch to the market economy. The inevitable conclusion is that the center now, as before, is counting on automatic support for all its decisions without actually consulting with either republic or oblast organizations on them. This, together with the quite abrupt changes of position on questions of principle, put party committees and many communists at local level in a difficult position.

Unfortunately, there have been quite a few mistakes in policy recently. They include the underrating of the workers movement, which formed the party's main social base in Bolshevik history. Take, for example, such historically famous centers of the workers movement as the Donbass and the Dnepr region. As is well known, infrastructure sectors of industry predominate here. In the postwar period their potential was used unsparingly with no thought for man or the future of these regions. And now, when many mines and metallurgical plants are out of date and have become loss-making, Union organs have lost all interest in them. But those enterprises employ around 2 million people whose future in conditions of the switch to the market economy is simply inconceivable without state support.

Tendencies dangerous for the CPSU have now begun to appear in the workers movement. Let us be frank: The inconsistent and half-hearted actions of union organs, the timidity and disarray of local authorities which were mentioned in the appeal from miner delegates which we fully support, and the passive stance of our party's Secretariat and Central Committee departments provide the reason for those tendencies. Of course, no one has the right to abandon people to the whim of fate. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee's position on this issue is unambiguous: We will do everything in our power to ensure that the state and the ruling party guarantee reliable social protection for workers and members of their families and fulfill their obligations to the people.

In the same context I should like to resolutely support the provisions of the Central Committee report on measures to revive the countryside. Everyone, first and foremost the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo, must show firmness in implementing these theses. Otherwise we cannot now hope for a strengthening of the CPSU's positions among the peasantry.

The Chernobyl tragedy is our eternal anguish. Indeed, a statewide program to eliminate the aftereffects of the accident has been adopted, but how are we now to explain to people why it is that our party's leading organs are tolerating manifestations of bureaucracy and callousness, and from the most diverse departments (across the broadest range, from the country's Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Defense)—callousness on questions of protecting the vital rights of people who suffered from the consequences of the accident. The time has come to show charity and make honest assessments.

Now for the nationalities factor in party policy. In a multinational state each decision by the center, particularly decisions affecting the spiritual sphere, is viewed in terms of national interests. If those interests are infringed in some way there is inevitably a sharp reaction, social tension, and centrifugal tendencies which have already assumed the character of acute interethnic conflicts. And it would be a naive delusion to seek the roots of this solely in the distant past.

The democratization of social life has intensified the question of the role and status of the national communist parties. Their desire to resolve these questions themselves and assume responsibility is clear to see. At the same time, the development of national communist parties cannot be viewed outside the context of the development of our Union in which each republic will be a sovereign and autonomous state. In that regard it seems that the autonomy of the union republics' communist parties must be broader and based on their own program and normative documents but at the same time dialectically combined with the unity of all the national communist parties on the basis of the fundamental principles of the CPSU Program and Statutes. This is an extremely difficult problem. But it must be resolved immediately in consultation with all communists.

Now a few words on ideological work. This question was raised very keenly at the 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress. It was noted, in particular, that our party has met with a furious onslaught of anticommunist propaganda while being in a state of ideological demobilization. The renunciation of the term "ideological struggle" and the imprecise and inconsistent guidelines have disoriented ideological cadres and sown a confusion among them which has been dispersed far from everywhere. Hardly anything was done to counter the attempt to din into the mass consciousness the absurd and essentially false assertion that the communist idea is virtually the antithesis of freedom and democracy.

Judging from the one phrase allocated to the party's ideological function in the congress draft Program Statement, such approaches may continue in the future, too. What is particularly alarming is the continuing underestimation of the danger of anticommunism and the absence of even a hint of opposition to its increasing onslaught. Generally speaking the conclusion that comes to mind is this. The party's ideological function in such a complex and contradictory period has been weakened considerably and the direct responsibility for that is borne by our party's Central Committee Secretariat and Central Committee Secretaries Comrades Medvedev and Yakovlev.

And finally, some questions on the organization and statutes of the CPSU. I believe it necessary to support the movement toward the democratization of the party. I

would just like to stress that generally accepted and universally pleasing declarations are no longer enough here. Communists today demand the elaboration of a specific mechanism to enhance the role of the party masses in developing and implementing CPSU policy. And this must be done without delay.

In our opinion, all categories of communists must be represented in the composition of the CPSU Central Committee. I can say that at the first stage of Ukrainian Communist Party congress the proportion of worker and peasant communists in the newly elected Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is around 38 percent of the total of Central Committee members. There are two workers in the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo.

It would be expedient, I think, to have a Politburo and a Central Committee Secretariat within the CPSU. And to elect the general secretary of the CPSU and institute the post of deputy general secretary at our congress.

Esteemed comrades! In conclusion I would like to stress that there is no task more important for us all today than stabilizing the political processes in society, preserving civil peace, and overcoming the crisis phenomena. And finally to really set to work and move forward.

Belorussian First Secretary Sokolov

PM0607154990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

[Speech by Ye.Ye. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, delivered at the 4 July session of the 28th CPSU Congress]

[Text] Esteemed comrade delegates! Guests of the congress of the party of communists! The course of the precongress discussions saw a clash between interests of a global nature—the main watershed between which was the socialist choice. Most communists in Soviet Belorussia reaffirmed their adherence to it during the discussion of the precongress documents. They advocate the unity and renewal of the CPSU, its fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, and its enrichment with the modern achievements of human thinking. They opposed ideological wavering, sluggishness, appeasement, and unprincipled compromise.

Interpreting the processes taking place in the CPSU and the country, and the ideas and provisions contained in M.S. Gorbachev's report, I ask myself: What today is of particular and, I would say, even of decisive importance for our party in its activity to unify different political forces, people with different views and aspirations, and to consolidate society and, above all, to determine the value basis of that consolidation? In my view, it could be, first and foremost, the clarity of the socialist ideal. Second, the harmonization of interethnic relations and the retention of the Union of sovereign Soviet socialist states. And, third, the realization of the need for a vitally important step—switching to a regulated market economy. I think that we should not restrict ourselves in the congress program statement to the banal observation that our ideal—I am quoting from the draft—"includes the humanistic initiatives of human culture and the eternal dream of a better life and social justice." The definition of the criteria of socialist society—particularly those associated with people as the center and purport of all our activity and the implementation of their moral ideal in the communist future—should be more clear-cut.

Advocating the adoption of a new Union treaty, the republic's Communist Party considers its task to be to bring about the state, political, economic, and spiritual rebirth of Soviet Belorussia, to safeguard individual rights and freedoms, and to ensure social protection for each of Soviet Belorussia's citizens.

And our prime concern is for our people's continuing pain and the bleeding wound caused by the Chernobyl tragedy. More than 2 million people live in the affected area. And today we rightly say that the Chernobyl sword of Damocles hangs over our republic's people. The disaster suffered by our land cannot be expressed purely in figures and concrete dimensions. It has already cost our people so much spiritual and physical effort and will continue to do so in the years ahead. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that until recently Belorussia had to all intents and purposes remained the center of the disaster and its people were alone with the disaster. Initially this was reflected in the secrecy surrounding the scale and nature of the disaster, and later in the avalanche of negative responses.

There has still been no convincing scientific work done on the safe habitation levels for people. Previously accepted work has been shown to be groundless. There is still no modern diagnostic or medical equipment in our hospitals, nor any medicines, and the flood of patients is increasing. Despite all the efforts made by the republic, the introduction of capacity at the Dragichenskiy Plant intended to produce disposable syringes and medicines specially for this zone has been undermined. Nor is there any equipment for shops where it was planned to produce special baby food—again for those living in the zone. People have also been indignant about the approach taken to discussing this problem at the USSR Supreme Soviet. It only devoted half a day to the tragedy, but spent two days mulling over whether or not to consent to the request from the Union prosecutor's office to release two of its workers. Just what kind of rule-of-law state are we shaping? What kind of humane socialism are we building if our supreme organ of state power sets its priorities like this and displays open contempt for human suffering? One way or another the black hearse of Chernobyl has touched the lives of millions of people in three Union republics. And they will not understand if our congress keeps quiet and fails to adopt a document assessing the Politburo and the country's government as having poorly participated in saving people living in the zone. I stress—saving.

As for the Belorussian Communist Party, we consider the elimination of the consequences of the accident to be our most important program goal. This was clearly and unambiguously stated in the program and normative documents at the 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress.

In defining the model of the communist party for the Belorussian Soviet socialist state, we naturally seek ways for it to interrelate with the CPSU. In my view, the best principle in this area is to maintain the CPSU's integrity and to act in unity with it. At the same time, the democratization of intraparty life and the logic of the development of certain processes presents us with a need to review established plans. The question arises of what will happen if certain communist parties of sovereign socialist states within the USSR utilize elements of federal relations with the CPSU? I stress—elements. I think that to some extent this is permissible. Time will tell which path is more progressive—taking account of the radical renewal of the Soviet Federation—and accords with the interests of both the CPSU and the Union republic communist parties.

From the standpoint of positive and negative experience and its sincere desire to put a stop to the deformations of the past and to radically restructure itself, our party is a unique phenomenon. In this respect no new political organizations can even come close to it. But all progressive ideas capable of ensuring CPSU unity could remain on paper if there is no mechanism for implementing them. I think that the transfer of power to the party masses is the main aspect of this mechanism. Our congress should support this movement within the party.

The CPSU Statutes should make all the CPSU's vertical structures dependent on primary party organizations—thereby turning them into the genuine basis of the party and the initiators and elaborators of its policy.

Our major tactical error in the precongress perestroyka period was to underestimate the importance of work at people's places of residence. It is there that destructive forces primarily emerge and that deliberate anticommunist persecution occurs.

It would be expedient to supplement the structure of party organizations with equal and full links and associations of communists at people's places of residence.

At the same time, I think that at this stage—when it is necessary to protect working people's interests and to conduct active political work among the masses—the party should not allow people to reject the workplace principle of the party's structure. Those who are campaigning for such a rejection are working to weaken CPSU influence on all aspects of our life, not least on the shaping of a multiparty system.

For me the answer to the question of whether communists can influence this process is unambiguous—they not only can, they must.

It may be a paradox, but the fact is that today in a number of places informals are more active in their attempts to influence the party's internal affairs than are party committees in their attempts to influence internal affairs in the new political formations. But we should not be indifferent to whether socialists, social democrats, and other political movements will be in power.

No, I am not calling for appeasement with all those who have abandoned our communist ship or are getting ready to. We should only have one criterion for political partnership and cooperation—the socialist choice and the communist future.

As for the market economy, our congress should state loud and clear that the market mechanism will be introduced exclusively in the interests of the people rather than at their expense.

Nobody has any doubt about the need for price reform, but, quite honestly, the logic that stipulates that we should begin reform by increasing retail prices puts us on our guard. Among the tens of thousands of different consumer goods produced in the country are there really not a dozen whose prices could be cut right now?

I particularly want to stress that prices should be identical for both urban and country people.

Defense Industry Minister Belousov

PM0607115490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

[Speech by B.M. Belousov, USSR minister of the defense industry, at 4 July session of 28th CPSU Congress]

[Text] Comrade communists! Today we are having a very difficult, but necessary discussion. A major cause has begun—perestroyka. Here, despite the positive results, we have unfortunately not reached the targets set. The implementation of a number of the 27th CPSU Congress programs was disrupted. Patently negative trends have emerged in society and in the economy. Some people have started to panic. But I am an optimist. We in the defense industry believe in perestroyka. It is well known that even a negative result is also a good basis for thoughtful analysis and correct conclusions, and subsequently for energetic actions. In our work highly complex organizational and technical situations sometimes arise for various reasons, and we resolve them with our collective intelligence. And so let us not slip into unfounded criticism alone today: It cannot be denied that we have been very successful at that. Let us study our shortcomings, problems, and omissions courageously, thoroughly, and in a principled way; let us reveal what is most important. And if we do that, they we will be able constructively to approach the formulation of concrete structures, systems, plans, and measures to eliminate the mistakes made.

Let me begin with ideology. In my view the main problem here is that the reorganization of the political

and economic systems is taking place without clear guidelines, concrete methodology, or coordination of aciton in the primary party organizations and party committees. Work is taking place under the general slogan of "Up with perestroyka!" In the stage of perestroyka the Central Committee Ideology Department has retreated from the political struggle to defend Marxism-Leninism.

Even our Higher Party School rector, comrade Shestakovskiy, is not a supporter of the CPSU Central Committee platform. He is an active organizer of the Democratic Platform, an organizer of factionalism in the party. One wonders: Whom is he training at the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School?

Of course, all this gives our opponents the opportunity to exploit the mistakes made to discredit the ideas of socialism and the communist ideal in general. We all support the Central Committee line on developing glasnost and pluralism of opinion. But why has the voice of our ideologists, both locally and at the center, become lost among this chorus? Why have they distanced themselves from work with communists and young people? The sociopolitical information media—the press, radio, television—are embarking increasingly on an apolitical path. This has a negative effect on society and breeds distrust among people in the party's cause.

Ideological work is a very important area of party activity, especially in the present complex period. Here an unprincipled approach and palliatives are unacceptable. What is needed is a theory of the perestroyka period, concrete programs of action for the party, a strategy and tactics comprehensible to every communist and every member of our society. And here I would like to recall the words of Karl Marx, who said that theory becomes a material force as soon as it takes hold of the masses.

Now for the economy. Industry in general and the defense industry in particular have in recent years been the testing ground for testing a series of contentious economic concepts, which is in itself very dangerous. I spoke about this at the Central Committee February plenum. The lamentable condition of our economy today is certainly the result of the complexity of the actual process of economic reform, inconsistency, lack of principle, and sometimes even imcompetence. It is no secret that a number of correct but unpopular economic proposals have come to nothing because economically incompetent people have molded public opinion, which has become the basis for the adoption of final decisions. What use, for instance, is the press comment by the composer Bogoslovskiy on the economic management structure? Or the statement at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies that the document on introducing a correlation between the rate of growth of labor productivity and wage increases is a "Gang of Four letter"?

Our sector is experiencing to the full all the conflicts of the present day in connection with the reorganization of the economic mechanism and economic management and the attempts to organize market relations and democratize production and social relations. Unfortunately these conflicts have recently been considerably exacerbated by the negative processes in a number of regions of our country. But despite this, in the majority of our labor collectives an active quest is under way for solutions aimed at increasing production efficiency.

This year in our sector 28 percent of the annual volume of commodity output will be produced by labor collectives working on the basis of the second model of economic autonomy, on the lease system and lease relations. A good basis is provided for this by the maximum utilization in civilian production of scientific and technical developments and technologies that are used in the production of military technology, and of course by the conversion of military production facilities.

We defense industry workers have a better view and understanding of the reserve that is available here for the people and for our perestroyka. This year alone, on the basis of the assimilation of converted capacities at USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry enterprises, the production of nonfood goods will increase by R2.8 billion, and the rate of growth in manufacturing equipment being manufactored for processing sectors of the agro-industrial complex is already 160 percent.

At the same time conversion presents us with a whole range of difficult problems of an economic, technical, and social nature.

Neither last year nor this has the necessary volume of finance been allocated for scientific research, experimental, and design work, the retooling of special production units to produce civilian output, and the compensation of the working people's material losses. For some incomprehensible reason allocations for equipment were sharply reduced for the period of conversion, and the sector found itself socially defenseless. For this reason in the past two years the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry has lost more than 70,000 people from its production and industrial personnel.

It was always considered an honor to work for defense. Now the prestige of this work is falling.

Esteemed comrades! If we want to obtain an efficient return on conversion, we must quickly adopt a law on conversion, a law on defense, and the resources released as a result of reductions in the volume of deliveries of military equipment and arms must be channeled into the implementation of conversion programs. These laws must be adopted by the fall of this year so that our enterprises can prepare themselves better for 1991.

I appeal to the communists who are USSR people's deputies: Please speed up the adoption of these laws.

A second feature of conversion. While reducing the volume of production, we must not in any circumstances lose the high technical standard of military equipment and armaments being developed within the framework of our defense concept.

For next year, the volume of budget appropriations to the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry for the creation of new equipment has been considerably reduced. I must say that the actions of our partners in the sphere of disarmament offer no grounds for pacifism. NATO spending on defense and on the development of the relevant equipment is growing as of today. Here the question arises: How are we to ensure parity in the qualitative parameters of arms and military equipment, as stipulated in the draft program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress?

Throughout the period of soviet power our party has headed military building in the country and assumed responsibility for the state's security. It is my profound conviction that the defense of the country and its security constitute a sphere of activity that must be within the party's field of vision, and not only through those communists who are workers in the industry or servicemen, but also through the communist USSR people's deputies and the leadership of the party and of its Central Committee.

A brief word about the management reform. This is another group of key questions where hasty decisions ultimately exacerbate the country's economic situation. I am talking about the reform of state organs of management. Today calls can again be heard for another restructuring of the management structure. A resolution has been adopted by the Russian Congress of People's Deputies on handing over enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry to the jurisdiction of the Union republic.

The last three years, comrades, have seen constant upheavals. We have already been reorganized three times—we have been united, divided, reduced. It is my firm conviction that the abolition of the structure that is operating smoothly today in the defense complex (if that abolition is necessary) should be natural, not forcible.

Today, in conditions of considerable instability, conditions where shortages have become universal, the defense complex has achieved a high rate of growth in the production of nonfood goods and manufacturing equipment. This was achieved on the basis of comprehensive collaboration between science and production and wide sector cooperation. The latest proposed reorganization will cause new hitches in our work. Do we need this today? The rational path here is to switch to lease relations and the formation of associations.

My conclusion is this: I am in favor of improving management structures. But I believe that in restructuring the party and state power structures it is necessary to adhere firmly to this rule: Do not destroy the old structures before you have created new, more efficient ones.

Comrades! The communists of Biysk City, who delegated me to the congress, gave me a number of instructions. While approving in the main the program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress and the statutes, they submit a number of proposals which I have conveyed to the congress secretariat. I hope they will be taken into account. I believe, comrades, that an essential condition for the success of perestroyka is a high sense of responsibility and discipline on the part of every member of society. We must move on from talk to action. The Central Committee and Politburo must operate more rapidly and resolutely in the complex, dynamic atmosphere of today.

Critical analysis, including analysis of the mistakes made in the years of perestroyka; real democratic transformations in the party; a clear and precise program and its energetic implementation—this is the path that will consolidate the party, restore confidence in it, and secure its vanguard role.

I would like to express the wish that our party's new Central Committee will respond more dynamically to all the events of our turbulent times and lead the country's communists firmly and resolutely along the chosen path.

Kazakh First Secretary Nazarbayev

PM0607152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Second Edition pp 4-5

[Speech by N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and president of the Kazakh SSR, at 4 July sitting, under the general heading "Speeches at 28th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] Comrade delegates! Assessing the path that perestroyka has traveled, each of us has surely wondered why the party, the undisputed initiator of social renewal, has begun to lose the leading positions and come under critical fire.

In my view, the main reason is that we began perestroyka without giving thought to a precise plan of future actions and without anticipating the probable negative consequences. Everyone—both right and left, even the leaders of frankly antisocialist forces—is now using democratic slogans as a shield. Amid this babble of voices people often do not know whom to follow, whom to believe, or which god to worship. And look at how many times we ourselves changed directions. Just a year ago we literally disowned the idea of the market and refused to listen to this "sedition," which no one regards as such today. The question of the sovereignty of the republics persistently raised by communists from different parts of the country, was given exactly the same hostile reception. But now we ourselves are campaigning for the creation of a union of sovereign states.

The evolution of consciousness is, of course, a gratifying fact. However, will we go far by relying on the trial and error method? Decisions taken in haste and subsequently revoked badly damage the party's prestige. Had we immediately taken a precise course toward the maximum autonomy of the republics, many of today's problems could have been avoided. At least, the center would not now be sagging under the burden of the most severe economic disorders which have long been too much for it to bear. But how, for example, can Kazakhstan help when 90 percent of its industry is under the control of Moscow departments.

Unfortunately, our repeated proposals and demands on the economic and foreign economic autonomy of enterprises remain a voice crying in the wilderness. Neither the ministries nor the government will understand that the republic's population can no longer tolerate the tyranny of the departments, which are to blame for the predatory plundering of our natural resources, people's difficult social living conditions, and the ecological tragedies of the Aral Sea region, the territory adjoining the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range, and many other cities and worker settlements.

It has to be admitted honestly that we don't have a sphere where perestroyka has been free of considerable defects. For too long we yielded to the euphoria of glasnost and pluralism, somehow forgetting that these achievements mean little without a firm economic basis. When the people felt that their living standard had fallen significantly all the trump cards were in the hands of our political opponents. Now people are quite justifiably criticizing the party and asking us, the party leaders, tough questions. But what intelligible answer can we give?

I believe that the party should have firmly stated long ago that the CPSU is the party first and foremost of the working class which not only expresses its strategic interests but protects them, too. Unfortunately, the keynote report does not take a clear position on this fundamental question. I am sure that I express the opinion of many delegates when I say that the reports that we have heard from some Politburo members did not inspire optimism. Indeed, where is it to come from when we have seen for ourselves yet again that the work style of those communists, members of the highest party staff, remains unchanged and is not in tune with the spirit of perestroyka.

Politburo members have not had the time or more likely, I think, the inclination to consult at least with the first secretaries of the republic Communist Party Central Committees. Just like before, the truth was handed down from the top alone. You don't have to look far for examples. Even such a major document as the concept for the country's transfer to a market economy was elaborated without involving representatives of the union and autonomous republics. Not only the broad masses of Communists but even CPSU Central Committee members learned of its existence solely from the Council of Ministers' report at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

This feverish and hasty preparation of the switch to market relations reminds me personally, comrades, of the desperate retreat of an army with no prearranged positions to fall back to. But the question is, where were our many scientists and entire institutes which spent decades studying market problems in the world economy?

We want a regulated market which encourages the development of businesslike initiative and enterprise in conditions of different forms of ownership and greater economic responsibility for the end results of labor. But at the same time we want a rational, balanced, and carefully calculated social risk which has nothing to do with adventurism.

It is my deep conviction that the very idea of the market in the present situation goes far beyond an economic framework and acquires the significance of a kind of consolidatory pivot. After all, the essential condition of full-blooded market relations is the unity of the USSR because in our country they can only be based on an objectively existing national economic complex.

In this connection, there is particular alarm over the economic decline and collapse in the management of the national economy. The flourishing barter trade is literally destroying the already shaky system of contract commitments. We are facing the real danger of the complete disruption of this year's targets, which means the further deterioration of people's lives. Unfortunately, the report by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, made no mention of measures to avert this danger. I want to support Comrade Yu.A. Peskov. In 6 weeks' time the harvest is going to begin all over Kazakhstan's 25 million hectares of grain. Show me the miracle worker who can harvest this grain on schedule without fuel or the necessary spares for the combine harvesters and trucks?

One more thing. I can report to delegates that in March this year Kazakhstan completed the 5-year plan target for housing construction. During these years the production of goods and services has increased considerably. The 5-year plan targets for meat and milk will be fulfilled but our stocks are still far from copious. We could lose everything that the republic has achieved in the past 4 and ½ years because the supply of material resources and raw materials in the country is completely out of balance, especially this year.

There is much that is disturbing in the sphere of ideological work. Lenin and Leninism are being greatly reviled and the party's ideological foundations are being falsified most shamelessly. But there is no one to give a fitting rebuff. In the general opinion of delegates to the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, the passive

and even cowardly actions of ideological workers headed by Comrade V.A. Medvedev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, have demoralized party forces and damaged Soviet people's ideological conviction.

The absence of a clear restructuring concept has had a particularly painful effect on interethnic relations. One can only wonder at the fact that this particular aspect, the most important in conditions of the multinational state, has been completely overlooked by the initiators of perestroyka.

Our position, which is shared by Communists and the majority of workers in Kazakhstan, is a renewed and durable USSR and a united CPSU. We oppose the replacement of the words "friendship of the peoples," which are cherished by Soviet people, by the new term "interethnic relations."

We are extremely worried by the separatist centrifugal tendencies that are intensifying in the country. People do not yet feel the civil consensus and integration of national interests that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev mentions so often. On the contrary, civil strife is exploding in various regions and innocent blood is flowing. The peoples of the USSR expect real protection, the establishment of legality, and effective measures to strengthen law and order and discipline from their president.

In order to prevent the collapse of the Union and the party we propose that the question of the sovereignty of the republics be resolved without delay. If the new Union Treaty is not adopted this year, we think that the country's fate will be unpredictable.

I think that intergovernmental agreements on economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation can and must be concluded at republican level right now. Such an agreement was signed recently in Alma-Ata by the leaders of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. And we hope that the number of parties to it will increase.

We are sincerely pleased at the goodwill of the new leadership of the Russian Federation, which is also striving to strengthen horizontal interrepublic ties. We believe that such agreements will create the basis for the new Union Treaty.

Here is another question, comrades. I have in mind the persistent desire even of some Communists to see only negative aspects in perestroyka. I think that we must not confuse the good with the bad, cling to the mistakes both obvious and imaginary, and completely nullify both the future and the indubitable achievements of the path we have covered, or imagine that perestroyka contains the root of all evils.

In my view that would be either a delusion, nostalgia for the times of stagnation, or a fear of finding oneself under the control of the party masses.

Undoubtedly, the path of renewal has proved more complex and tortuous than we at first thought. But in the past 5 years, comrades, we have acquired the skills of the democratic restructuring of society. As for the mistakes and shortcomings, we are all bound to pay tribute to the people who have led the state in the new conditions which are unfamiliar to us.

In addition, it is time for us to finally learn to respect our own country and the leaders whom we ourselves elect.

Kazakhstan people hope that the general secretary whom we elect will take into account the serious criticism leveled at the political leadership and draw the necessary conclusions.

In this connection, I consider it my duty to report to you the opinion of delegates to the 17th Kazakh Communist Party Congress, who unanimously advocated, first, preserving the institution of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and, second, recommending Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev for the post of General Secretary.

Concluding my speech, I want to express my support for the keynote report's dominant thesis that we cannot allow political confrontation to prevail or the CPSU—the driving force of perestroyka—to be split.

A sober analysis of the different programs and platforms shows that we have considerably more points of contact that diametrically opposed ones. We all support the improvement of the people's life and a socialist state which enjoys prestige in the world arena. Political compromise today is an urgent necessity and the only possible way of achieving all these goals.

North Ossetian Chairman Galazov

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[Speech delivered by A.Kh. Galazov, first secretary of North Ossetian CPSU Obkom [Oblast Committee] and chairman of the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviet, at 4 July session of 28th CPSU Congress]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! I am sure that communists' thoughts and feelings have never been so tightly stretched as now. For the first time in all its years of existence the party is forced not only to define the paths of social development, but also to think about preserving its role in society. In order to reach the correct solution, it seems to me, it is important always to remember the responsibility that rests with every one of us. And on this basis to tackle with self-possession our truly revolutionary tasks, and to look without panicking for a way out of the political and economic crisis.

We must avoid extremes. All our troubles throughout our complex history are associated with the fact that we have always drifted first to the left, then to the right. There was a time when we took administrative edict

methods and everything associated with discipline and order to such extremes that they turned into something vile, a crime against man. Now we are experiencing the other extreme, when the fine idea of democratization and glasnost has been pursued to an unreasonable extent and robbed of all discipline and culture, and in some regions has turned into anarchy and a rampage by society's destructive elements. Surely this is indicated by the fact that people who only yesterday were tumultuously applauding the "brilliant" speeches of Brezhnev and Chernenko have today exceeded all ethical bounds in criticism of the party Central Committee, its Politburo, and the general secretary and president of the country, and stop at nothing, often disregarding elementary moral norms. I will allow myself to remind you that no self-respecting party in any country permits itself such an attitude toward its leaders.

Aware of the full complexity of the present moment and forming an objective and rigorous assessment of the mistakes made during perestroyka by the party leadership and the Soviet Government, we must at the same time face up to the truth and see that there is in society today no force other than the party that is capable of taking perestroyka to its conclusion, and that there is in the party today no individual other than Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev who could lead that party and rescue the country from crisis.

The whole paradox of the situation that has taken shape in society today is that the party that proclaimed the revolution from above, declared war on the administrative-bureaucratic system, the atmosphere of mustiness and stagnation, and the ossified socioeconomic structures, and laid the foundations of democratization, glasnost, and political pluralism has become the target of universal criticism, direct attacks, and attempts to discredit it on the part of certain ideologists in emerging parties and social movements.

One reason for this situation, in my view, is connected with the fact that the party's leadership organs, from the CPSU Central Committee to the primary party organizations' bureaus, have lost the initiative. Instead of heading the complex processes of the proclaimed perestroyka and leading the attack on its opponents, they went onto the defensive. The result of these tactics is well known. A party that only yesterday was omnipotent and held undivided sway over all power in the country now finds itself impotent and has not only managed to hand over all power to the soviets, but has lost control of its own affairs.

Is there a way out of the situation that has arisen? I think there is. But there is only one way, and it involves resolute actions.

These amount, in my view, first, to a kind of review, revision, a real evaluation of the forces at the disposal of those of us who adhere to the CPSU Central Committee platform and remain loyal to communist ideals and the socialist choice.

Second, a consolidation of the party's healthy forces is needed, on the basis of a process of cleansing the party of opportunist fellow-travelers and those who still carry our party cards, but preach an ideology alien to us and regard all our history as a mistake and Marxist-Leninist teaching as utopian.

Third, there should be an end to the endless talk of handing over power. No one has taken away the party's unfailing weapon—work with the working people's masses. It is this work that must head the movement for political, economic, and social restructuring of society. The renewed CPSU is called upon to form a consolidating basis for all society's healthy forces and all parties and social movements whose banners proclaim: Man and his interests. And if we set aside political ambitions, we will find many points of contact in the platforms of the "Leningraders," the "Marxists," and the "democrats." I think a clear demarcation of functions and spheres of influence is needed here. The CPSU and other parties, social movements, and soviets that consider themselves the voice and defenders of the people's interests should follow parallel, converging courses to a single cherished goal, which is called man, with all his material and spiritual needs satisfied.

Fourth, the time has come for the party, which is under attack from the left and right, from outsiders and from its own people, to stop maintaining a shamefaced silence, and instead to mobilize its forces and defend itself, its teaching, its heroes and geniuses, its past and present, its future against slander and patent calumny. It is time at long last that we ourselves made clear what Marx and Lenin got right, and what is dubious; what is true in our history and what is false. We lost much when we gave the enemies of socialism the opportunity to distract our attention and intellectual forces from present-day problems in favor of endless digging around in the past. Our ideological opponents skillfully took advantage of this. They cunningly built a bridge from past errors and shortcomings to our difficult present, brushed aside our entire future, and, riding on the wave of the people's democratic euphoria, demand that we throw Marx and Lenin overboard from our ship of history, consign our socialist banners to the archives, nationalize our party resources and property, and hand over to the organs of soviet power our party press and other mass media. In other words, They are working toward outlawing the party. All this must be given an objective, well argued rebuff. I think one of the party's main tasks at the present stage is sharply to improve the standard of theoretical work. The party itself should write its own objective history, give a realistic assessment of the present, and map out the contours of its future. The stage that this work has reached in the party can be clearly seen from the report of Comrade V.A. Medvedev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

And, fifth, very effective measures must be adopted to remove the confrontation that has emerged between party organs and soviet power. We have plenty of scope

for activity, in which there is room for each side, only everyone must operate by means of his own proper resources and methods; we must not hinder each other, but cooperate and help each other.

The task of the party and all healthy forces in the new social movements is to find the key to people's minds and hearts and convince them of the need to leave the rallies and demonstrations behind in favor of workers' lathes and plowland. In the end we must all realize that grain and vegetables do not grow in the squares, and clohting and shoes are not made in discussion clubs. Fate has decreed that in the new revolutionary situation, during a historical phase of development that is highly complex for the coutnry, the need arose for the rebirth of the Russian Federation Communist Party. From the example of the North Ossetian party organization, I wish to say that the Communists' main doubt was associated with this question: Will the Russian Communist Party undermine the CPSU's unity, will it weaken it, will it promote the further activation of separatist forces in the USSR? But analysis of the past and common sense prevailed. After all, it was the Russian Bolsheviks who brought together the scattered revolutionary forces in the multinational Russian empire, it was they who formed the cementing basis on which the CPSU sprang up. In increasingly multiparty conditions and given the need to unite leading forces, the Russian Communist Party should not only preserve these traditions, but considerably enrich them in the light of the historic moment.

In this context I am totally unable to understand the wide campaign in the mass media against the top leadership organs of the Russian Federation Communist Party.

In conclusion, expressing the opinion of the North Ossetian delegation, I wish to say that it is necessary to retain the Politburo and general secretary in the party structure, and to institute a new office—deputy general secretary.

Army Paper Carries 4 July Speeches

State Farm Director Porutchikov

PM0507151990 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 5 Jul 90 p 3

[Speech by A.A. Porutchikov, director of the "Kirillovskiy" Sovkhoz in Zemetchinskiy Rayon, Penza Oblast: "We Believe in the Party, We Believe in the Congress"—delivered at 28th CPSU Congress on 4 July]

[Text] Comrade Communists! As a young farm leader, I awaited the analysis of the situation in agriculture in the report with particular impatience. And not only because I myself am an indigenous inhabitant of the countryside, but also because one of the party's main tasks is to solve the food problem, for it is to a great extent with this that our people associate the success of perestroyka. In my view, the section concerning agriculture in the report does not fully reflect the real situation in the countryside, clearly because of a lack of time.

As yet just one thing is incontestable, and it is reflected in the report: The development of all forms of economic management on the land must form the basis for solving the food problem. But it is irrational to underestimate and destroy the old unless you have created normal conditions for the new.

Would it not be better for the initiators of the calls for the disbandment of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], for private ownership, and for individual farms to travel out into the Russian heartland, talk with peasants, reflect a little, and draw a conclusion as to whether rural working people want this? And how many of them—both those who want it and those who don't want it—are left today in forgotten villages? And what kind of conditions they live and work in? How those who can no longer work live out the rest of their days? These initiators would probably not have enough rubber swamp waders to do this. (Applause.)

What thoughts, ideas, and concepts have been poured recently onto the festive table of glasnost regarding the countryside! But the countryside is still remaining silent. The countryside is not going on strike. The countryside is not speaking at rallies, people do not feel like this after the daily grind. But let this apparent apathy not mislead anyone. Protest is brewing. And peasants are now sick to death of "excessive pluralism and democracy" in quotation marks. (Applause.)

And you know what is a characteristic point? To this day no one from the fronts, unions, and newly formed parties has stated that their ultimate aim is to feed the country, provide people with shoes and clothes, and reliably defend them. (Applause.) They still see the countryside as a huge milk cow that grazes somewhere in the hazy distance and needs only to be milked on time so the cream can be put on the table. (Applause.) And why should they know how macaroni "grows" and what grain, meat, and milk smell like!

All the democratic intellects are still refusing to understand our exhausted and weakened agriculture and are merely asking via television, radio, and the newspapers: Is it going to feed us, and when?

The whole problem is that the countryside is still regarded as an inexhaustible reserve of manpower resources and a source of food that is obtained without particular expenditure and investment. Social inertia and group interests have proved so strong than in the fifth year of perestroyka we still lack the main thing—fair, equal, equivalent exchange between the countryside and industry.

Or take, for instance, the construction of housing and social, cultural, and everyday facilities on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. How are these problems to be solved today, given the current priority attached to construction by the own-resources method, when you have to hunt out, get

hold of, and find everything, starting with common or garden nails? But no one is bothered how you do so. Just one thing is clear: You cannot resolve the most vital problem for the countryside—the development of the social sphere—by hunting out and getting hold of everything by semilegal methods and means. It will take more than clean country air and the warbling of nightingales to keep people in the countryside.

And if you also take into account the new pension legislation, in two or three years no one will work as livestock raisers or machine operators.

Our tormented and plundered countryside cannot pick itself up on its own! And neither economic accountability nor individual farmers will solve the food problems. But there is still no real help, apart from ringing words about debts that should have long since been repaid which we hear from the loftiest of platforms. (Applause.)

The weakened countryside needs not one-shot economic injections but real economic concern on the part of the state, constant concern. While I was at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Congress I saw placards here in Moscow saying: "Call the party to account!" and "Send communists to Chernobyl!" And on the opening day of the 28th CPSU Congress, on the "120 Minutes" news program, Comrade Yemelyanov, academician of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, called on the party to repent. Has the academician forgotten that the party is above all the people and that the majority of its members are workers and peasants? So permit me to ask: How is the worker to blame, how is the rural communist to blame, what is he supposed to repent and answer for? (Applause.)

For the fact that from dawn to dusk he is stuck on his tractor, swallowing dust by the kilogram, and does not live to draw his pension? For the fact that he toils tirelessly without days off or leave, working on the sovkhoz and his personal plot in order to feed himself, his family, and another 17 people who are marching around with placards and blaming the party for everything? (Prolonged applause.)

For the fact that after 20 years' work a milkmaid's fingers, whether she is a communist or a nonparty person, simply will not straighten up and at night, during her brief hours of rest, she groans in pain even in her sleep. Believe me, comrade communists, what I am saying today is not merely words, it is a cry from the heart. No promises or forecasts from any platforms can drown it out. Specific action is needed.

Is it sensible when a six-pipe gas pipeline goes past a rural resident on one side and a three-pipe line on the other, but he is still forced to roll up his sleeves and get at least 20 cubic meters of wood ready for winter? That is just for one family. (Applause.) He can get it ready so long as he has his strength and health. But what are those who physically cannot do so—pensioners—supposed to do? It is painful to see elderly people living out their days in deserted and depopulated villages. Where people used to live, work, believe in a better future, and bear children today there is not a single able-bodied person. And there are many such villages.

I am saying this not because absolutely nothing has been done in our villages, although I come from the real Russian heartland and a single cockerel can crow to four oblasts. Despite everything, in recent years our residents have come to see asphalt roads, a good-quality cultural center, a kindergarten, an everyday service center, and a trade center. But that is just the beginning. Therefore in order to resolve the pressing problems I propose that the following measures be implemented over the next two or three years, no matter how difficult the situation may be with regard to the country's economy.

One. Gas supplies should be extended to at least sovkhoz and kolkhoz centers.

Two. The construction of hard-surfaced internal farm road should be fully completed.

Three. The question of constructing well appointed housing and social, cultural, and everyday facilities should be resolved.

Four. The delivery of good-quality technology and equipment to the countryside at accessible prices should be ensured.

Five. Equivalent and equal exchange between the countryside and industry should be ensured.

I will also mention the most important point: rural residents' attitude toward the party, toward communists. May it not seem odd to some people, but the class that has suffered most of all from the policy of depeasantization believes in the renewal of the party and the rectification of errors and does not trust the other political forces promising a "new" social system. The countryside, which the "radicals" see as servile and apathetic, can see perfectly well what kind of forces these are and can see where they are directing their aspirations. Everything indicates that a front of so-called "perestroyka" forces is emerging in the attacks on the CPSU, as the main bastion of socialism. But the countryside too reads the newspapers and soberly and very accurately assesses the direction of the main assault. I will quote part of the speech by Comrade G.Kh. Popov at the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies: "It seems to me that here too we need to adopt a norm that would mean that the activity of any primary political organizations was prohibited in state enterprises and institutions. As I see it, the point is that staffers of these institutions cannot be members of any political party. I am talking about our army, law enforcement organs, security organs, the militia..."

You see how clearly the direction of the attack is defined. Servicemen and personnel of law enforcement organs are to be prohibited from being party members and party

organizations in the production unit and in institutions are to be prohibited, which would mean driving communists out of the Army, out of plants, factories, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes into domestic kitchens and social clubs.

If this is not a course of totally smashing the CPSU, what exactly is it? I think the aim here is clear. Without quitting the CPSU and without revealing their true intentions for the moment, they want to break up and split the party from within and seize its property, created and built up by communists over their almost 100-year history. And ultimately to seize power. (Applause.)

Seeing in the creation of the Russian Communist Party a chance to preserve the integrity of the CPSU, the Russian provinces and workers and peasants adopt a firm position of trust in the party and recognize the need to renew it and to rally all healthy forces in society on the road toward people's power. The position of trust finds expression in the fact that the local soviet deputies in a number of regions have elected party leaders to be the top leaders of soviets. When a real threat hangs over the party, the peasants, setting aside their complaints, rise to its defense. After all, the muzhik cares whether he is to plow his own land, kolkhoz or sovkhoz land, or someone else's, some lord's land. Whether he is to organize his own life himself or wait on the mercy of a new lord. He still knows how to spot a wolf in sheep's clothing. (Applause.)

Therefore, Comrades, both communists and nonparty people asked me over and over again, indeed, demanded that I convey to the congress their pain and concern at the prevailing situation in agriculture since they believe in the party, they believe in our congress. Thank you! (Applause.)

Col Gen Shlyaga

PM0607114190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jul 90 First Edition p 2

[Speech by Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, at 4 July morning session of 28th CPSU Congress: "The Army Cannot Be Outside Politics"]

[Text] Comrade delegates! The CPSU Central Committee report delivered by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the draft congress documents, which, on the whole, raise major problems connected with improving the party, society, and socialism, as well as our defense building and party political work in the Armed Forces, meet with support in the Army and Navy milieu. Ambivalent and very complex processes are taking place in the Army, as also in the country. Practically the entire spectrum of assessments and views to be observed in society exists in the Army and Navy milieu.

Today our people and party have heard enough about the tight knots of Army problems. But let none of the delegates form the impression that we are not untying them. People serve. They fulfill difficult tasks of 24-hour combat duty and combat service and master military hardware and weapons. They do everything in their power not to lower the level of combat readiness and combat ability among the troops and naval forces. In defiance of anti-Army hysteria they strive to build up their moral, political, and psychological potential. And at a time of disaster they are the first to give assistance where shots ring out and tears, and even blood, are shed.

At the same time the precongress report and election campaign in the Armed Forces showed that tension created by attacks on the Army, by poor social protection domestic disorder, and lack of confidence in the future is growing among regular personnel (and 75 percent are communists).

Many interethnic conflicts have called forth a loud echo in military camps. And the essentially discriminatory legislative acts adopted in the Baltic republics, in certain parts of the Transcaucasus, and in Moldavia have literally given rise to an epidemic of desertion and are wrecking the draft for military service.

It is also impossible not to notice the following negative trend, which has made itself known recently. This is a sharp lessening of attention toward the Army on the part of party and soviet organs in a whole number of places. Army and Navy communists are seriously concerned at attempts by certain forces to belittle and shake faith in the feelings of patriotism and internationalism, which are sacred to our people. The Army was, is, and must remain a school of patriotism and internationalism. Relaxation in the fostering of these feelings will do irreparable harm to both the Army and the people. In reporting this to the congress and having enlisted the authority of the military delegation, I declare in all responsibility that there are no grounds for the conclusions of people, including the authors of today's article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, who predict a supposedly ripening conspiracy in the Army, a conflict taking place between command and enlisted personnel and junior officers and generals, conservatism of thinking, and the holding back of positive perestroyka processes in the Armed Forces.

All these are, to put it mildly, fabrications far removed from the actual situation with regard to morale and morality in military collectives and from the tasks which have been, are being, and will be resolved by the Armed Forces.

Army and Navy communists are profoundly convinced that our Army is a copy of society and a child of the people, that it serves the people, and that its strength is determined by the people's support. Precisely this fact fills the hearts of commanders and political workers with cheerfulness of spirit and courage and gives them the ability to counter all the vicissitudes of fate and to be equal to their responsibility for the defense and protection of our socialist homeland.

Army and Navy communists are concerned about the arrogant political demands being put to the supreme

organs of power for the deideologization, depoliticization, and departyization of the Armed Forces.

It is significant and, most unfortunately, a pity that this ensemble consists mainly of choir members and soloists with party cards. The Army cannot be outside politics and, as previously, party political work in the Armed Forces must be based on the Marxist thesis that the Army was and still is an instrument of the Soviet state, an instrument of politics.

Lenin called all shouts about the Army's political neutrality in the state vile and hypocritical lies. Life has confirmed the correctness of that assessment. And whoever calls for the Army's depoliticization is clearly trying to clear a space to implement his own policy.

I am profoundly convinced—and I support Delegate Porutchikov, who has spoken—that the party as the political vanguard of our society must not leave the Army.

The combat traditions of party influence over all aspects of Soviet defense building are profound and strong. And these traditions must be protected, not destroyed.

But it is also clear that in the Army today we have a new sociopolitical situation, which undoubtedly requires the fundamental restrcuturing of party political work. And this means that the political structures of the Armed Forces must also be amended and must conform entirely with the norms and principles of a rule-of-law state.

The most important thing is to transform Army and Navy political organs from leading party organs into state-constitutional organs and organs of military political leadership in accordance with the principles of separating the functions of administrative and party leadership within the framework of the reform of the Armed Forces. I would like to emphasize here, comrades, that those who campaign for the abolition of political organs have not understood that the strengthening of the troops' political state, morale, and spirit is not a spontaneous process but the result of purposeful political educational work.

In our view the renewed political organs—the fundamental difference between these and the former ones must be the fact that they will lose their duties of leading party organizations—are called upon to preserve and develop the functions of political education, ideological work, culture, the strengthening of military discipline, political and military information both inside and outside the Army, and leadership of the military press and of the sociological and psychological services. The strengthening of ties with the masses of servicemen is the chief thing in restructuring political work.

The task of being very important institutions for the social protection of servicemen and members of their families is the priority task for the new political organs. For it is clearly no secret to the congress delegates that the poverty line for many categories of officers and ensigns passed literally through their families.

The future political organs are obliged to work in close cooperation with the people's soviets both at the center and in the provinces. Military questions are concerns that intimately affect everyone, and thorough consultation with the people is needed here.

The people will be quicker to understand the legitimacy of all our steps in the sphere of the country's defense. It seems to us that on these questions too the CPSU Central Committee should also consult more frequently with military people: with commanders and political organs, with military science, with the General Staff and the Main Political Directorate.

In renewing political work in the Army we await more substantial assistance from social science, but its representatives now seem to be more occupied with the uncleared shelves of the archives, with "blank spots," and with settling scores with the past. There is a popular saying: You cannot move forward if you only look back or under your feet.

Today much can be said in criticism of the mass media. But let us not fan passions. It is our common task to consolidate and pool our efforts with all the mass media in the common struggle for the defense and security of the socialist homeland.

And one more thing. Long-standing, sincere friendship links us military people with cultural, art, and literary figures. But recently this friendship has somehow lost its luster, although we, as previously, and maybe even more today, need good books, poetry, ardent lines of journalism, lyrical songs, and stirring marches. We particularly need books and movies free of conservatism which open up the prospect of effective ideological influence on the masses. I am sure that authors will be found if the creative unions make the transition from internal disputes and fanning group passions to action, to "sowing something sensible, good, and eternal."

And, in conclusion, about party work in the Armed Forces. I believe that it is expedient to continue carrying it out through party committees and primary party organizations. It is proposed that a party structure be formed on an elected basis—ranging from the regimental party committee to the All-Army Party Committee, endowing it with the rights of a CPSU Central Committee commission.

The Army party organization is one of our party's largest and most militant detachments. Its ranks contain 1.1 million communists. In the event of our proposal being adopted, we count on the development of the initiative and creativity of the party masses, the strengthening of primary party organizations, and the further democratization of party and military life.

Mindful of the importance of the problem of military building, the delegates from the party organizations of

the Armed Forces believe that the congress must adopt a special resolution on the military question. Its draft has been prepared and forwarded to the Editorial Commission. Please support our proposals. (Applause).

Lukyanov Addresses CPSU Congress

PM0507162790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 2

["Abbreviated Account" of "Speech by A.I. Lukyanov at the 28th CPSU Congress: The Soviets and the State of Society"—no date of delivery given]

[Text] It is understandable that political reform, like any serious reform, is a **collective** affair. Through debates, the comparison of opinions, and polemic, we have arrived at new principled decisions—both in the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. And of course, as a member of the political leadership I share our common responsibility for the adoption of these decisions.

There was much work to do in the preparation of documents in connection with changing the Constitution, forming a new electoral system, improving the law enforcement organs' work, and increasing the effectiveness of state and political institutions.

At the same time a large number of practising lawyers and academics were involved in elaborating the concept of the judicial and legal reform which was subsequently approved by the party conference.

I took part in preparing certain questions to do with strengthening discipline in the **Army**, elaborating our state's **modern defense doctrine**, and defining the paths of the military reform, which will soon be examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In addition to problems of a politicolegal character quite a lot of attention was demanded by questions which I worked on **as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo Commission** for the further study of the materials on the repressions of the thirties-forties and early fifties.

Now, of course, work in the **Supreme Soviet** takes up the bulk of the time. This is a fundamentally new parliament, such as we have not had before. The new principles of its activity are being defined. Legislative and other functions are being mastered in a new way.

The experience of the work of the three USSR People's Deputies Congresses and the three sessions of the country's Supreme Soviet, as of the First Russian People's Deputies Congress and the parliaments of the Union republics and Soviets at other levels, is being evaluated here **in different ways**. Some see a majority of pluses, others liken the new organs of power to a locomotive which has used up **all its steam** largely on loud blasts of its whistle.

All this, generally speaking, has happened. But nevertheless, nothing reflects the state of our society—with its rally mania, emotional outbursts, and manifestations of right-wing and left-wing extremism—more fully or comprehensively today **than the Soviets**.

Work in the **Council of the Federation** and the **Presidential Council** and in various commissions of both the USSR Supreme Soviet and the party has been constantly increasing in volume recently. Not to mention practical daily working **contacts with people's deputies** and work with citizens' letters and appeals, the flow of which is increasing.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet has quite a few concerns of an **international character.**

On the whole I take a **critical attitude** to what has been done. I cannot do otherwise. I think that much could have been resolved and implemented far better and far more effectively. Some of the decisions adopted contained mistakes and shortcomings and quite simply were ill considered. **Now for some thoughts on the work of our congress.** Comrades, the fact is that the CPSU is now beginning to enter, I would say, the dense strata of political pluralism and the multiparty system. Yes, this is a new atmosphere for the party. But it is also the only atmosphere possible in which our political party as the repository of certain ideas will now live and work.

For more than a year now I have had occasion **to be in the very thick of the discussions** and to meet with leaders of various parties and fronts, the initiators of demonstrations and rallies, representatives of social movements and strike committees, clergy, veterans, and young people.

From those meetings and from the discussions which develop at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions and outside its walls, I am increasingly clearly deriving one firm conviction: **The broader** the range of opinions and viewpoints in society, **the clearer and more precise** communists' stand must be. And in my opinion, the **main shortcoming** in the work of the Central Committee and its Politburo is that in these completely new conditions the party's organizational and ideological cohesion has virtually not increased and in this sphere a definite gulf has developed between the center and local party committees.

Unfortunately, the atmosphere at our congress, it seems to me, is not always conducive to such cohesion either. We are hearing too many calls "not to adopt," "not to elect," and "not to support." This large number of "no's" and this negative charge are an expression, of course, of the bitterness, the disappointment of unfulfilled hopes, and the lack of faith in words and promises that have accumulated in society. **But it is well known** that energy is generated only when **there is a positive charge** as well as a negative one. And that is precisely what we are lacking—both here, at our congress, and at the recent Russian conference.

All this is even more alarming because it is happening against the background of our opponents' increasing

organization, universal populist psychosis, and the labels, both conceivable and inconceivable, pinned on the CPSU.

Meanwhile, they are constantly trying to din into us **that the party has no basis for cohesion.** I believe that this is wrong. **There is a basis. It is** perestroyka itself and the need for its continuation. **It is** the draft CPSU Statutes, which are a considerable step in the democratization of the party. **It is** the draft Program Statement which, although open to criticism, may be, I think, the most acceptable basis today for overcoming the crisis situation in the country.

On analyzing carefully the progress and the materials of the all-party debate and of the Union and Russian congresses, you arrive, above all, at the conclusion that in our society **the old ideas are still strong** with regard to the party's leadership of the soviets. However, the situation is changing abruptly, and literally before our eyes this problem is itself assuming almost decisive significance for administering the country.

Why? Because half of all our misfortunes at the center and in the provinces over the past two years stem from the fact that **party committees** have virtually already ceased to rule, while **the soviets** just cannot master the functions of management. That is, they seem to show their commanding strength in words, in the rally-like ardor of sessions, while in real life, in practice, a power vacuum is forming. This is why **our most important task** is to overcome this anemia of the soviets as quickly as possible and turn them into really, not nominally, working corporations.

What must be done for this? I would make three points:

First, maximum use should be made of the democratic potential of the present soviets, which have been joined by hundreds of thousands of committed, active people who value their electors' trust and want to act.

This is why both in the country's parliament and at all other levels of soviet power it is necessary to make more consistent and more decisive use of **the positive charge** that political pluralism carries within itself and, at the same time, to **constrict the tension** which it causes.

I will point out that in this connection I repeatedly raised at Politburo sessions the question of **the need to create within the structure of the party's Central Committee** a department for work with sociopolitical organizations. This department has now been created, albeit belatedly. And it has to make up a lot of lost time in order not to end up on the sidelines of events. This is the first conclusion. **Second**, the task of the soviets' assimilating their new economic powers and organizational potential is particularly acute today. In practice not even a document long awaited by everyone—**the Law on the General Principles of Local Self-Management and Local Economy**—is working here. Why? Because on many points it has no direct impact, and the corresponding republic laws simply do not yet exist. They must at all costs be adopted before the end of this year.

If we go beyond this specific fact, we once again see for ourselves that the failure to implement laws and the lack of mechanisms and levers of control, including parliamentary control, have become the real **calamity of perestroyka.** It should be admitted that the USSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, committees, and commissions are **underperforming badly** here—in which I see a considerable share of my own blame.

Special mention should be made of the soviets' responsibility for the observance of **legality and the ensuring** of law and order. The situation here is very acute. As the Central Committee Political Report pointed out, this is connected with the level of political and social instability in the country, with the passiveness of law-enforcement organs, and with the pressure put on them by "rabble-rousing [demofonnyy] street democracy" and sometimes even by soviets themselves.

Here we undoubtedly need a nationwide program to combat crime—it is now being drawn up. The president and the government have begun tackling it in earnest. The Supreme Soviet is also keeping it in its field of vision.

And the third point. Now that the forming of republic and local representative organs has ended, a very great deal depends on how **the relations of the new supreme and local soviets and their presidiums with executive organs** take shape. Far from everything is simple here. The soviet presidiums, which are designed to coordinate the activities of permanent commissions and deputies, are increasingly tending toward direct administration and management. And the executive committees, which are accustomed to ordering the soviets about, are also still finding it hard to find their place in the system of management.

Even here, at the congress, delegates from among soviet workers have expressed very different viewpoints to me. **Some** believe that the separation of commanding and executive functions is proving justified only at the oblast and kray level, while lower down—in rayons and cities under rayon-level jurisdiction and, even more so, in settlements and villages—it is not taking root. **Others** unequivocally state that we were altogether in too great a hurry to introduce such a system of the separation of powers in the provinces. **Yet others** complain about the inevitability of a "tug-of-war" between the soviets' presidiums and executive committees.

But common sense suggests that only a soviet acting in conjunction with a strong executive committee—a soviet where each link of power and authority does its own job with responsibility and is fully answerable for it—can really be strong.

This applies to the same, if not a greater, extent to the problem of the **correlation of powers** between representative and other USSR and Union and autonomous

republic organs. The processes of political reform have shaken up the old pyramid of the Soviet federation. Our Union is entering a stage of fundamental transformations. And now that we are on the threshold of the adoption of a new Union treaty, we must avoid extremes—the diktat of the center, the desire to redistribute powers solely from the center to the republics, parochialism impeding integration processes in the economy, and attempts to gather everything into one fist.

The renewal of our political institutions, the soviets, and other state organs directly concerns the problem of the **place and role** of the Communist Party in the **Soviet state.** A great deal was said about this during the discussion. I share the view that the development of the present-day political situation rules out the possibility of turning the CPSU into a purely parliamentary party. And, at the same time, there is no doubt that our party should persistently learn the difficult art of election campaigning and active work in parliament.

Let us state bluntly that today it is hard to talk about communist deputies as a united and organized force in the soviets. Many of them are members of opposing blocs and groupings, and some have even embarked on the path of outright confrontation with the party line. And when the chairman of the **Leningrad City Soviet,** who is present here, states that there is an anticommunist faction in the soviet but no communist faction—that should make us think hard. It should make us think about the serious threat to the party posed by the fall in communists' activeness and internal discipline in representative organs of power.

That is why the norms proposed in the draft new CPSU Statutes on the creation within the soviets of **groups and factions of communists** which will pursue in their work the line of the corresponding party committees is entirely timely. I would like to advise those who reject the need for communists to be guided in parliament by this united party line to take a more attentive look at **the way the party's opponents work** in the soviets. You can believe my observations that everything is employed there: pressure, walkouts from sessions, activeness around the microphone, and threats based on rollcall votes. That is, a kind of "dissident unanimity" and discipline is displayed of which the most hard-line defenders of democratic centralism would never have dreamed.

I believe that the congress or one of the next few plenums of the newly elected party Central Committee should adopted a **special resolution** provisionally entitled "On the CPSU's Work To Ensure the Full Authority of the Soviets." This political document could enshrine the main idea—the party's desire to work actively in organs of power, to strengthen and support them, to propose its concepts and plans to soviets at any level, to make extensive use of the right of legislative initiative, and to promote in every possible way the implementation of the soviets' decisions.

In conclusion I would like to say the following, comrades. The past five years have taught us a great deal. But we have still not learned **a great deal,** above all the fact that at a time of turbulent change we should not engage in feuding or **self-destruction** [samoyedstvo].

Now that our country has approached the most difficult ridge it is very important to do what mountaineers do—gather our strength and strive to ensure the solidity of every link between the participants in the campaign: the **links** between party comrades, the **links** within society and between the different political forces which recognize the socialist choice, and the **links** between party and people.

I am sure that our party congress can and should take a decisive step in this direction. A step toward radical party renewal and the creation of a united, mighty, **nationwide front** in the struggle for perestroyka and the revelation of the mighty potential which has been and continues to be inherent in our great country and our great people.

Roundup of 4 July Congress Proceedings

PM0607104990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondent I. Prelovskaya: "We Have Matured for Changes"]

[Text] The middle point of the 28th CPSU Congress' work is approaching. The fourth day is devoted to delegates' work in sections encompassing socioeconomic, ideological, interethnic, military, youth, and foreign policy problems.

But let's return to the third day [4 July]. And I shall perhaps begin with the 30th speech, which concluded the evening session. Academician L. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was given the floor out of turn but with a delay, after the question had first been put to the vote. And during his speech there was a grave moment which is delicately described by the phrase "noise in the auditorium." But Leonid Ivanovich was able to break down this reaction and make himself heard which, incidentally, far from everyone succeeded in doing in these cases. What did he talk about? The country has been drawn into a profound and protracted crisis and the social systems in East European countries have collapsed. The idea of the socialist choice has begun to lose its magnetic power. But the destiny of the socialist choice should not be linked with one country or several countries, the collapse of one model does not mean the collapse of the idea. In the world process of development much of what is called today the attainments of the civilized countries and primarily the system for the working people's social protection is a pointer in favor of the socialist choice. But experience has shown that the model based on the totalitarian statization of property is not competitive. We said that we had not built the right socialism but it would be more correct to say that we were not living

under conditions of socialism at all. The task of building it remains and the party must enlist the state's best minds to elaborate ways of switching to it, creating for this aim a pure, sincere, honest political onslaught. Honest above all! It is in the key of this task that we should examine the development of market structures. And we are being impeded by dogmas and myths which in society acquire the nature of a mass prejudice. Can we switch to the market without sacrifices and losses? No, that is the first myth, whoever may have disseminated it. Can we do this without touching on price formation? The second myth. We cannot go against the logic of the social process. I hope, Abalkin concluded, that the communists will have sufficient wisdom to take the correct decision.

The doors of the Palace of Congress closed, the guards dispersed, the square emptied, yet a dense circle of delegates would not let Leonid Ivanovich go for at least an hour or so. Some 50 people inundated Abalkin with questions. And if the switch to the market turned out to be another theoretical mistake? And questions of a different kind: When would men's socks be on sale? And cigarettes? Skilled workers are leaving enterprises for the cooperatives yet they receive free of charge social benefits from enterprises from the social funds: What is to be done? What will happen if the congress nonetheless expresses itself against the market?

But there are already the decisions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Second Congress of People's Deputies, Abalkin reminds them—the decisions of the country's supreme organs of power on the transition to a market economy. A journalist from Kuybyshev asks: But do you not despair? No, I work,—Abalkin patiently discussed with deputies entirely specific economic problems. They only let him go at 2100 hours.

I remember what I was told during the break by a delegate from Yakutiya, Viktor Yeremenko, a construction worker team leader from the "Nerskiy" mine. He is in favor of the market, but would like to have a thorough understanding of what dangers lie in wait for us on the path toward it. Not out of fear, but in order to take the risk with understanding. There is world experience, yes. Yet it was only recently that people in our country began to speak of it without blackening it, and we spent too long trying to persuade people that we were ahead of everyone and proceeding along the most correct path. And we should not be in a hurry to make enemies out of those who have still not understood the thrust of the innovations and are at the crossroads.

V. Perov, secretary of the Kaliningrad party gorkom [city committee], Moscow Oblast, also noted that "humane democratic socialism" for many people is so far also an obscure concept. It should be explained so that it does not retrace the path of its "developed" predecessor. "The stage which has been traveled has not yet been a stage of renewal for the party. We set about resolving new tasks with old methods."

The party has so far not yet digested all new ideas. For that to happen it is important that ideas should not be handed down from above in readymade form but should undergo discussion from below. That official and alternative documents should not be set against each other but that different views should be equally represented.

It is true that life leaves us no time for vacillation. After all, as one delegate noted, we are now doing what should have been done 50 years ago, if not the full 70 years ago. On the other hand a whole series of speeches expressed a direct and sharp protest against a critical attitude toward the works of the classic Marxist writers and against "defamation of the party." The following phrases were also heard: "There should be a reasoned refutation...", "who is responsible for the five years: the scientists and economists? To whom do the people owe their plight?" The auditorium greeted with approval the speech delivered by A. Shutyleva, secretary of a rural party raykom [rayon committee] from Kirov Oblast, who fiercely criticized the CPSU Central Committee for its ideological work strategy: "Its positions are not suitable even for defense." Incidentally, she also expressed herself in favor of not handing over to anyone the sanatoriums constructed by the party but of sending rank and file communists and CPSU veterans there on a broad basis. Several delegates criticized the mass media: television, IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, OGONEK.

It was said at the congress that an opportunity to speak should be given to representatives of various platforms in the party and not only to representatives of various regions and strata of society. What did V. Polokhalo, secretary of the Kiev University party committee, and Yu. Chekhovoy, leading scientific staffer at the Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics, both representatives of the Democratic Platform from the Ukraine, want to say? Both resolutely oppose the monocentrist interpretation of the principle of democratic centralism and advocate freedom of platforms within the party not only before congresses. They are perturbed that the sentiments of the primary organizations, in which different passions are seething, are poorly represented here at the congress. After all, some communists are waiting for the results of the congress to determine definitively whether they will remain in the party.

According to sociologists, trust in the Democratic and Marxist Platforms has declined as a whole. Does this reflect a regrouping of forces to the right of the center? I do not want to be hasty in drawing conclusions. At any rate, in assessing Gorbachev's position on the basis of his report there was agreement among Viktor Yeremenko, a Siberian and member of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee; V. Polokhalo, a Kiev inhabitant and member of the party gorkom; and the U.S. political scientist Steve Cohen, who said: "Gorbachev has again shown the world that he remains the boldest leader of perestroyka. After the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] party congress many people believed

he would move to the right, but the opposite has happened—he has moved to the left."

Yeremenko received a mandate from the voters to oppose the combination of posts. But after mature reflection, like Polokhalo, he concluded that in the present grave times he sees no leader in the party other than M. Gorbachev.

But a characteristic detail was that notes warning against praising the general secretary were sent to the presidium.

Let us recall that at the 26th party congress praise for Brezhnev occupied almost a page of every speech without surprising anyone.

Among the speakers in the debates—and here tribute was paid to previous traditions—the majority consisted of leaders of republican and oblast organizations. But it should be noted that their speeches differed markedly from former speeches by their critical mood.

Boris Guseletov from Sverdlovsk spoke on behalf of the "Young Communists" group. The process of democratization is gathering momentum, he said, but the destructive period has lasted too long. Yet the experience of foreign countries shows that priority must be given to radical economic transformations. Guseletov used figures for Sverdlovsk Oblast to note a dangerous trend: Fewer and fewer young people are joining the party. Common sense and a sense of self-preservation, he said, should persuade us of the irreversibility of the course toward democracy. Even if the right conservative wing succeeded in gaining the upper hand, that would be a Pyrrhic victory, because we have matured for radical changes.

The "13th MICROPHONE" newspaper which is being published at the congress asked Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev: How does the auditorium look from the presidium?" He replied: "The same as the country. The same anxiety, perturbation, and exactingness. And nonetheless the country and the auditorium are identical in every respect. In the country there is perhaps a greater desire to move forward without shifting from foot to foot but to change, change, change."

To judge by the talk with the congress delegates in the corridors and primarily with those who work directly with people—whether at a plant or in a university—that is an accurate description.

Gorbachev Interviewed on Congress

PM0507174190 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 4 Jul 90

[Interview with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Russian with superimposed English translation, by correspondent David Smith on 4 July in Moscow on the channel 4 "News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Smith] In the circumstances, can Mr. Gorbachev turn this congress around? This afternoon, we spoke to the president.

[Gorbachev] This is a political process, and there are two stages to it. First, the republics and the soviets: We have to give them more power, new laws, their own budgets, and this—establishing strong soviets—is something the party can do. Then there's the party itself: I think the party's still the most powerful political organization we have, and what we're talking about here is how to make it more effective, more dynamic at this stage of perestroyka. All these measures will help us bring changes because our primary task is to ease the social and economic crisis in the country.

[Smith] Do you think that you can work with the conservatives at this congress?

[Gorbachev] I don't see this congress as conservative: I would use different criteria to evaluate what's happening. I'm looking at all aspects of this congress. I think it's brought to light the concerns we all have—not just communists but the people, too—concerns about the situation in the country. The people are worried about what's going on, and they want to find solutions to the problems. So, too, does the party: That's why I don't think this congress is conservative. Talking to people here, they all ask that same question, but I haven't heard anyone at this congress question the political course we're on: the course of perestroyka. If nobody doubts it, but instead they talk about how it can work more successfully, that's great!

Comments on Unity

PM0507175390 London ITV Television Network in English 2100l GMT 4 Jul 90

[Interview with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Russian with English subtitles, by correspondent Tim Ewart on 4 July in Moscow on the ITV "News at Ten" program—recorded]

[Text] [Ewart] Mikhail Gorbachev was taking a break from the tribulations of the party congress today and reflecting on the threat to party unity: A split, he said, would be a gift to those who want to blow up perestroyka. And he told ITN that if the economy didn't improve, he would resign.

[Gorbachev] I think if there are no changes in two years, this leadership has to go of its own accord. People wanting to cast a cloud on us or on our plans or intentions, people like that say: "You've got hold of power and you're holding onto it." No, I tell you: We had more power before perestroyka. I don't know anyone in the world who had more power than the general secretary. If that was all I wanted, there would be no need for reforms, no perestroyka.

Ryzhkov, Lukyanov Meet Lithuanian Delegates

LD0507174390 Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Text] Moscow July 5 TASS—Nikolay Ryzhkov, member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Anatoliy Lukyanov, alternate member of the Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met on Wednesday [4 July] with delegates to the 28th party congress from the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU).

The delegates were told how the USSR Supreme Soviet and Government assess the situation in Lithuania.

Due to the introduction of the moratorium on the March 11 independence act by the Lithuanian parliament, they exchanged views on possible approaches to overcoming the crisis in the republic, stabilising the situation and protecting civil rights of the population without any discrimination.

PRAVDA Carries 3 July Speeches, Reports

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PM0507135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jul 90 Second Edition p 2

[Account of the report given by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, at the 28th CPSU Congress in Moscow 3 July under the general heading: "Reports by Politburo Members and Candidate Members and CPSU Central Committee Secretaries"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! As you know, foreign policy is my area of work. As a Politburo member who has taken part in discussing all the most important questions in the life of the party and the country over the last five years, I bear complete personal responsibility for all the decisions that have been adopted on these questions. On all questions, for all decisions without exception! I especially bear full personal responsibility for decisions in the foreign policy sphere. I will also talk about it. Although, to be honest, I do not have a totally clear idea of the purpose of these reports. People can ask how I will act after this report and before the elections to party organs and so on. I make no secret of the fact that I am prepared not to run for the party's leading organs. I do not consider it essential for a minister to work not only in the Politburo, but also in the Presidential Council, in the Defense Council, and in various international bodies.

Let me say something else about the report. What is the purpose of the reports? Is it to determine one's stance? I have never concealed my standpoint. I have been, am, and will remain an advocate of perestroyka—Gorbachev's policy, as people call it in our country and the world—the renewal of society, a rule-of-law state, and complete democratization. Is it to give an account of specific matters, conversations, meetings, and visits? There have been hundreds of them over the past five years. Surely that is not the crux of the matter. The main thing is what ideas we have brought the world and how we have helped the country cope with its problems.

Believe me, it is very hard for me to use the pronoun "I." It is also impossible for me to claim that yesterday's party official can become a professional diplomat overnight. The choice that fell on me exactly five years ago to the very day is the choice of like-mindedness and comradeship. Party comradeship that binds us together through our realization of our personal responsibility to people who entrusted us with their destinies.

I am sure that it is this feeling—the feeling of personal responsibility—that renders party officials, diplomats, and Soviet officers true professionals. Along with other feelings, it has determined the course my life has taken. Among these feelings are the most profound torments over the flagrant discrepancy between reality and our avowed ideals and slogans. It was as a communist who was clearly aware of the ruinous nature of our path before April and who realized that we could not go on living like that, that I accepted perestroyka and my appointment as foreign minister. In this capacity, without claiming to be the author of the model for our foreign policy strategy and concept—you are well aware to whom this right and the concept of the new political thinking belong—I was, am, and will remain their active proponent and champion.

You are aware of how the conclusion was formulated that world development in the last quarter of the 20th century is not proceeding in the context of a struggle between two opposing systems and that it is not solely subordinated to the dynamics of the conflict of class interests. Having concluded that we had been driven into an impasse by dogmatism and an ideological straitjacket that kills living thought, I have long been vigorous in championing and putting into practice the idea of the primacy of panhuman values over class, group, or other interests. I did not hide this and am not hiding it now. Because I realized quite clearly that apart from distorting aims and substituting concepts, pseudoideology also has clout, a cost, and a clear material dimension.

Thus, on arriving at the Foreign Ministry and gaining access to the relevant information, I learned that over the last 20 years alone ideological confrontation with the West has added R700 billion to the cost of military confrontation. This is over and above the money needed to attain military parity with the United States and the West. I know that foreign policy and I myself are both being reproached and of late—let us be blunt and say it—bad-mouthed for no more and no less than concessions in the security sphere. I am more than sure that our power needs strong Armed Forces. But everything cannot be reduced to that. You can arm to the teeth and fear being attacked, or you can be confident that you won't be attacked since policy can ensure conditions whereby the country has no adversaries and enemies.

Soviet foreign policy has done a great deal to ensure that we have no enemies and have normal, mutually beneficial relations with all countries. I remembered Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's historic words to President Bush on Malta: "We in the Soviet Union are prepared not to regard the United States as our military adversary." I was struck by this phrase at the time. Then President Bush said the following at the Washington summit: "You can proceed on the premise that the United States will never threaten Soviet security."

So far these are just words, but the prospect has opened up of entering a new era, beginning a totally new phase and new relations between the two great powers. Only in these circumstances has it become possible to talk of a transfer to the principle of defense sufficiency. Not any kind of defense, but reliable, contemporary defense, based on the most progressive technological and scientific achievements.

This "sufficient defense" will also require funds and considerable resources, but it will require to an even greater extent attention to those people who guarantee it and concern for their conditions of everyday life and service.

But obviously if we continue to do as we have done before and use up one-fourth of our budget on military spending, we will ruin the country once and for all. We will simply have no need of defense. The army will not defend a system that has brought about economic and social collapse. There is one way out—policy must take on the task of creating a security reserve while cutting defense spending.

Comrades, we waged the war in Afghanistan in order, among other things, to allegedly secure our southern borders. That was the logic of the time. But they have become much more secure now that a political settlement has been secured around Afghanistan. Politics ultimately produced quicker and cheaper results in this case. But the war—you are already familiar with this figure—cost us R60 billion in addition to the human casualties and other sufferings.

Incidentally, I could have reported to you today as head of the Politburo's Afghanistan Commission, but it was disbanded some time ago since it had fulfilled its set task of bringing our guys back from Afghanistan and keeping that country as our friend. This was all done under the Politburo's leadership.

Many comrades will remember the grave situation that developed in the Far East and in the country as a whole when confrontation with China developed into armed conflict. We may ask ourselves when did we feel more secure. Then, when we had created a military infrastructure of confrontation by spending R200 billion, or now, when we have normalized our relations with our great neighbor and begun talks on eliminating this confrontation? These talks are now being conducted by Soviet and Chinese representatives. Today we are developing mutually beneficial trade and spending money on things that benefit both the Soviet and Chinese peoples.

I would also like to answer a question put to me yesterday by one delegate: "Isn't the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe a serious defeat for Soviet diplomacy of which you are in charge? Should I answer this?

Voiçes: Yes.

That would be the case if our diplomacy had endeavored to prevent the changes in neighboring countries, if our relations had deteriorated and worsened with them as a result of this. Soviet diplomacy did not and could not aim to counter the elimination in other countries of administrative-edict systems and totalitarian regimes imposed upon them and alien to them. This would have run counter to the logic of our own actions and the principles of the new political thinking. Moreover, even if what is happening in Eastern Europe were at variance with our interests we would rule out any interference in these states' affairs. This is impossible since we acknowledge not just in words but in actual deeds today the equality of nations, the sovereignty of peoples, noninterference in their affairs, and the right to freedom of choice. Any other position involves a return to total chauvinism, the imperial great-power mentality, and conflicts with those principles that true Communists have always avowed.

In my view, Soviet diplomacy, along with our entire policy, has played a definite role in ensuring that at this dangerous turning point in the fate of the peoples of the allied countries we remained together nonetheless and are continuing to advance side by side. I do not associate with the idea of a political defeat the fact that the allied states' new democratically-elected leaders came to Moscow for the conference of the Warsaw Pact's supreme body. I see this as respect for our perestroyka and the new thinking in foreign policy.

Another question: Did diplomats know, did the minister know, and did the top political leadership know how events might develop in Eastern Europe. We certainly did predict the changes in principle and sensed that they were inevitable. A time will come when it will be possible to pick up recordings of Mikhail Sergeyevich's conversations and study cables from these countries' capitals. We felt that if there were not serious changes and reforms, tragic events would ensue. But we were unable on the basis of the principles of the new political thinking to interfere in other people's and other states' affairs. I think that we acted correctly.

One can understand the concern with which people in our country view the process of German unification. It pains all of us deep down. That is natural in view of our past experience and the huge casualties that our country's peoples sustained during the struggle against fascism. It would be strange if people did not exhibit heightened sensitivity on this question. We have, certainly, gotten accustomed to certain "German" realities.

We saw them as a guarantee of our own security. But let us ponder the following: Can a guarantee founded on the artificial unnatural division of a great nation be reliable? How long can this last?

Were there really no dangerous crises in the postwar period over German affairs and Germany? Perhaps it would be better to find different means of guaranteeing our own security—by securing a definitive international-legal settlement in Europe and resolving the external aspects of the German unity so as to guarantee that the threat of war never again emanates from German territory.

I would remind you that the German question is being settled with our direct participation and cannot be adopted without our country's consent. The agreement secured by the four great powers and the two German states will be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet for ratification. It implies and will be based on a falling level of troops and arms in Europe. This process of overcoming military confrontation is already under way. The numerical strength of the Bundeswehr will be considerably reduced within the framework of these reductions. The army of the future "Greater Germany" will be smaller than today's FRG Army. What is best for us? To deal with the 500,000-strong FRG Bundeswehr or, say, an army half that size belonging to a united Germany? We must not disregard the fact that Europe today is a fairly "transparent" continent and this openness in the sphere of military activity will be further increased. Nor can one discount the fact that the transition to new democratic, collective security structures has already been started. They will become a reality at the end of this year, or early next year. There is an agreement regarding the institutionalization of the Helsinki process. I predict that the blocs themselves will change, along with their doctrines, strategies, and levels of troops and arms. Relations between blocs, between states—now democratic states that will cooperate with and not oppose one another—will also change and be normalized.

We will thus live in a completely different, new Europe, in a different military-political situation in which a repetition of 1939 would be impossible. That can be ruled out. I am also sure that the Soviet Union will have extensive, wide-ranging, mutually beneficial cooperation with a united Germany both in politics, in the economy, and in all other spheres. I will say frankly, comrades, with supreme responsibility that it is not in our interests to drag out the resolution of the external aspects of German unity within the framework of the overall settlement.

The new political thinking has brought us to dialogue, cooperation, and interaction with most states of the world. This situation also enables us and others to boldly embark on reappraising priorities in domestic and foreign policy, to give precedence to peaceful needs and joint quests for solutions to the ever-worsening global problems that Mikhail Sergeyevich mentioned yesterday. The fact that it has happened like this is a credit to all states, a manifestation of their willingness to trust one another more and match their partner's steps. There are no doubts today that the new thinking in foreign policy born of perestroyka is actively working for perestroyka and enabling it to resolve the tasks of renewing and reviving our society and transferring it to complete democracy and the dominion of law. Our calculations show that in the current five-year plan period the "peaceful dividend" from the implementation of our foreign policy course based on the new thinking may total R240-250 billion.

Our country has no future outside integration into the general world system of economic and financial institutions and relations. We need to get out of the self-isolation from the world and from progress into which we have driven ourselves. I am saying this so categorically because no one now—this is an axiom—can exist and develop on principles of self-sufficiency—neither the United States, Europe, or Japan. The technological revolution in the world is advancing by the combined efforts of all peoples, all progressive countries.

But at the same time I want to say that we do not think that the Soviet Union will "attach" itself to anyone. Our country will take its own place as a center of economic power, alongside Europe, the United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific region. We have every reason and all conditions for becoming a connecting link between these economic powers. All our republics, krays, oblasts, and rayons stand to gain from this.

Over the last few years Soviet foreign policy has been able to remove on the whole or significantly reduce the obstacles in the way of our country's access to financial resources and progressive technologies.

I think that everybody can imagine the difficulties we would encounter in connection with certain events in our country if Soviet perestroyka had not received a vast sound credit of trust and goodwill from virtually all countries of the world. They have shown understanding in areas where they could have behaved quite differently. We must, without doubt, do a very great deal to avail ourselves of the favorable international atmosphere and begin to reap the real benefits and fruits of our cooperation with other states.

Naturally, I cannot separate my work from the Foreign Ministry's work. Comrades, if we have been able to do things in foreign policy, this has to a considerable extent proved possible thanks to the supreme receptiveness of Soviet diplomacy and diplomats to the ideas of perestroyka and the new thinking. Now when some of our critics are trying to put the words "foreign policy successes" in quotemarks, one should remember that foreign policy is not only a matter of diplomats, it is primarily the top political leadership, the country's president, it is parliamentarians, our party organs, military men, security personnel, military-industrial complex workers, it is all of you here in this hall, all our country, and all our people. The fact that we conduct talks with

our partners as one body, as one team. It is this single united team that brought about the conclusion of the recent highly important agreements.

The profound democratization of society, the humanization of domestic legislation, and the restoration of citizens' rights—liberty for those who suffered wrongful imprisonment; Soviet citizenship and the chance to return home for those who were denounced and expelled from their own country; churches and the right to pray according to their beliefs and conscience for believers—if we are accused becuaee of this too, then we accept the charge. Because it is out of such gestures and acts of humanity that the new complexion of our country, which now enjoys respects in the world and for whose future people tremble in fear lest perestroyka should perish, is taking shape.

If I said that our successes are successes achieved by all of us together, I must say that we must also fight for the victory of perestroyka together. We cannot do without consolidating the healthy forces within the party on the platform of its renewal.

Secretariat Head Explains Functions

PM0507132590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report delivered by Congress Secretariat leader A.N. Ilin at 3 July session of 28th CPSU Congress: "On the Work of the Congress Secretariat"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! The 28th CPSU Congress Secretariat which you have elected has embarked on the fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to it. We see our task, in general terms, as being to comprehensively promote the precise and well-organized staging of congress sessions and the implementation of the demands of the standing orders approved by the congress. The congress Secretariat is housed in the left wing on the third floor—in the Diplomatic Hall and its adjoining foyer. It is signposted.

Allow me, comrades, to brief you on the organization of the Secretariat's work and its makeup. Working groups have been formed to cover individual areas of work—namely: the examination of delegates' requests to speak, the study of proposals and requests, the dissemination of official and alternative congress documents, the examination of delegates' written appeals and citizens' correspondence addressed to the congress, and the provision of information and procedural advice to delegates.

A duty office of Secretariat members has been set up to ensure its constant work. Duty officers can be found in three places: here in the auditorium, to the right of the Presidium; in the Diplomatic Hall; and by the entrance to the Secretariat service. Delegates can quickly settle any matters arising with the duty officers.

An information and procedural advice service has been set up under the Secretariat and has started operating with a view to providing information support to congress delegates on the varied problems of party building, ideological work, socioeconomic policy, and a number of other questions. It includes skilled specialists who can advise comrades on matters of interest to them.

To the same end, special literature, necessary reference works, and other documents have been selected. Congress delegates are able to obtain information without let or hindrance on the corps of delegates, the country's socioeconomic development indicators, the country's various regions, the work with delegates' letters, and other issues. The permanent reference service set up under the Secretariat is designed to carry out these functions.

The "Syezd" ["Congress"] sociological group is operating at our congress. You have already received special questionnaires. Delegates will be informed of the results of the poll.

If delegates need to print any items or texts of speeches, they can use the services of the typing bureau; the necessary help will be provided.

The Secretariat is taking account of and analyzing the appeals and requests coming in from delegates. They are all promptly examined and directed to their destination. Delegates can learn of the results at the Secretariat's reference service.

Telegrams from citizens are starting to arrive at the congress. More than 100 have already been received. They have all been registered and examined at the Secretariat. Some of the telegrams have been passed on to the congress Presidium to be read out. Moreover, delegates can familiarize themselves with them on the stands set up in the foyer and other generally accessible areas. The Secretariat will provide detailed information on the letters from citizens coming in to the congress.

Following the reports by Politburo members a large number of requests asking them to answer certain questions had arrived by the start of the morning session through the Secretariat alone. For instance, Comrade V.A. Medvedev was sent 112 such requests, Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov was sent 40, and Comrade A.N. Yakovlev was sent 82. There have also been notes to the Politburo members who presented reports today.

On the first day of the congress alone delegates made more than 100 proposals and comments on procedure and procedural matters.

Now permit me, comrades, to state a few ideas whose implementation, in our opinion, will help to avoid any possible shortcomings or misunderstandings when resolving organizational, procedural, and other questions. Above all, on the drawing up of lists of speakers. Requests to speak, and in large numbers, started coming in immediately after the congress agenda was ratified. With a view to speeding up their processing and drawing up for the Presidium a list of people down to speak I would like to agree with you on the following. We

urgently ask delegates, when drawing up a request to speak, to use the special application slips obtained during registration, to print their surname and initials beside their signature, and to enter their temporary credentials number and, subsequently, their mandate number. Certain delegates have already submitted applications with illegible signatures. In order to ensure greater precision in the Secretariat's work it would be desirable for delegates to state on their applications the points on the agenda or other points on which they intend to speak—including at the plenary session and in sections.

For your information: As delegates' requests to speak are received they are all logged and entered into a computer. The list of speakers drawn up by the Secretariat is passed on to the congress Presidium. By the start of this morning's session the congress had received 406 applications from delegates requesting to speak on the report "The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 28th CPSU Congress and the Party's Tasks" delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In all, more than 600 delegates have registered to speak. Given this high level of activeness it is hardly likely that all those who want to speak will be able to. A situation familiar from previous party forums is emerging. That is why I recall that, when clarifying the standing orders, we agreed that speeches not made by the delegates would be included in the stenographic record of the congress' work.

Delegates can submit all their proposals and comments on the draft resolutions and other congress documents to the Secretariat in good time. There they will be logged and swiftly sent on to the relevant congress working commissions for further work on the documents. The extensive utilization of this form of participation by delegates in the examination of questions on the agenda will, in our opinion, promote an easing of the "pressure" to take the rostrum.

You have probably noticed that on the first day of the congress various printed materials brought in from local areas and distributed by persons unknown were actively disseminated among delegates. We ought to refrain from such initiatives. In this connection I consider it necessary to recall that, under the standing orders, along with working organs and commissions delegations from union republic communist parties, kray and oblast party organizations, or groups of delegates numbering not less than 100 people are also entitled to submit resolutions and other congress documents. That is why requests to distribute materials as official congress documents should be sent to the Secretariat for signing by the aforesaid number of delegates—congress delegates, I would stress. And we would ask you to legibly indicate the surname and temporary credentials or mandate number, otherwise it will be hard to establish the true authorship and authenticity of these documents.

The Secretariat petitions the congress to grant it the right to determine in each specific instance the optimum print run for the various documents to be disseminated. The need to restrict print runs is dictated by our technical capacity, and we should probably not ignore the economic aspect either. In our view, print runs of duplicated items could be restricted to 600 or 800 copies—that is, one copy per 10 delegates. We should also think about the distribution procedure. We propose distributing these documents via republic, kray, and oblast delegations when delegates register.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Secretariat is channeling its efforts into comprehensively promoting the creation of the appropriate conditions for fruitful work by delegates and by the congress as a whole.

Credentials Report Presented

PM0507150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jul 90 Second Edition p 4

["Congress Credentials Commission Report" delivered by Commission Chairman Yu.A. Manayenkov at the CPSU Congress 3 July]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Delegates! The Credentials Commission has examined questions that come under its jurisdiction and reports that the elections of delegates in party organizations were held in accordance with the CPSU Statute and the procedure laid down at the March (1990) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. They were held mainly in party electoral districts, and in the majority of cases, on a contested basis.

Altogether, around 80,000 candidacies were discussed in the party organizations. A total of 2,968 single-seat and 497 multiple-seat districts were formed in territorial party organizations. Some 63.4

of delegates were elected in the former type of district and 10.6% in the latter. A total of 26% of delegates were elected directly at congresses of union republic communist parties and at kray and oblast conferences.

The norms of representation were observed in the main, and one delegate was elected from each 4,000 CPSU members.

The Credentials Commission examined the credentials of the 4,683 delegates elected to the congress and deemed them valid.

Delegations from the union republic communist parties are made up of the following numbers of members: Russia—2,574; the Ukraine—804; Kazakhstan— 207; Belorussia—171; Uzbekistan—162; Georgia—98; Azerbaijan—97; Moldavia—49; Armenia—48; Latvia—41; Kirghizia—37, Tajikistan—31; Turkmenistan and Estonia—28 each; and Lithuania—10.

The following party organizations are represented by large delegations: Moscow—278 people; Leningrad Oblast—147; Moscow Oblast 126; Donetsk Oblast—87;

Krasnodar Kray—81; Rostov Oblast—80; Dnepropetrovsk Oblast—67; Sverdlovsk Oblast—66; and Gorkiy Oblast—64.

Communists from all the main spheres of social life and from the most varied areas of activity were delegated to the congress. Of these, 1,005 people, or 21.5% of the total number of delegates, work in industry, construction, and transport and communications; and 483 delegates—10.3%—are employed in agriculture.

A total of 543 workers, or 11.6% of all the delegates, and 255 kolkhoz members, which is 5.4% of all the delegates, were elected to the congress.

The Credentials Commission believes that this representation is clearly insufficient.

Participating in the work of the congress are 350 invited workers and peasants. The Credentials Commission supports the proposal expressed here that they should be granted the right to speak but not to vote.

At the same time, we deem it expedient to grant such a right to the first and second secretaries of the All-Union Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee and also to the first secretaries of the 11 union republic Komsomols who are not delegates to the congress.

The Soviet state is preparing for a transition to the principles of market relations. Therefore it is worth stressing that a significant proportion of the total number of delegates representing all sectors of the national economy elected to the congress are economic leaders—around 17% [of all delegates]. We can hope that everything valuable that they have accumulated in the process of economic changes will be reflected in the congress discussions and decisions.

A special feature of the body of delegates to the congress is the broad representation of party workers. They make up over 40% of those in the hall. And one-fourth of them is made up of secretaries of primary party organizations.

Among the delegates, there are 392 representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, including 53 employees from the mass media.

There are 344 women delegates to the congress, or 7.3%of the total number of delegates. This is considerably smaller than the place they occupy in the CPSU. And, according to the Credentials Commission, a serious reproach must be made to party committees on this subject.

The commission sees the fact that 2,737 delegates, or almost 60%, are people's deputies, as an important sign of the times. They include 276 USSR people's deputies and 516 union and autonomous republic deputies. The activity of communist deputies has acquired paramount importance both for the party and for society more than ever before. Therefore it is important to strive together to establish trusting fruitful relations between party committees and communist deputies.

Representatives of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR KGB are participating in the work of the congress. Altogether they make up over six percent of the delegates.

The delegates include 52 participants in the Great Patriotic War.

The delegates' length of party membership is as follows: people who joined between 1931 and 1940—0.1%; between 1941 and 1945—0.6%; between 1946 and 1960—12.2%, between 1961 and 1970—37.2%; between 1971 and 1985—47.9%; and between 1986 and 1990—2.1%.

A total of 84% of delegates were not previously elected to CPSU congresses and all-union conferences.

The level of the delegates' education is high. Almost 99% of them have higher, unfinished higher, secondary, or specialized secondary education.

Around one-fourth of the delegates have party political training, and 69 delegates have an academic degree or an academic title.

The delegates' ages are as follows: under 30—1.5%; between 31 and 40—25.1%; and the largest contingent of delegates, between 41 and 50—43.7%. Incidentally, the average age of CPSU members is 46. Delegates aged between 51 and 60 make up 26.8%; and over 60—2.9%.

A total of 65% of delegates have been decorated with state awards and titles, 14 are Heroes of the Soviet Union, 64 are Heroes of Socialist Labor, and 104 delegates have been awarded the title of USSR Lenin and State Prize winners.

Our party was and is an international party, and the nationalities at the 28th CPSU Congress testify to this. The delegates are made up of representatives of 63 nationalities.

Lack of 'Common Ideological Platform' Noted

PM0407154190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 July 90 p 1

[Commentary by Pavel Voshchanov, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA observer and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, carried as part of featured under the general heading "28th CPSU Congress: Politburo Reports": "From Our Correspondent in the Auditorium"]

[Text] It has been noted that from time to time words and expressions appear in our political vocabulary which are on the lips of literally everyone who reckons himself among the ranks of public figures. Probably no speaker could deny himself the pleasure of using them. Both appropriately and inappropriately. But this is not the

strangest point. They are frequently used by people of diametrically opposed views and convictions. Hence, clearly, the impression is created that the meaning of these words does not really matter. The main thing is to demonstrate your adherence to an idea, course, or general mood.

There are many examples of this. Here is a recent novelty: "consolidation." There is perhaps no more widely used political term today. For example, almost everyone uses it at the congress. And this is understandable—the country's leading political party really is today on the verge of a split. But the question is: In the name of what should communists consolidate? In the name of defending the ideals and principles which they have professed for decades? Or in order, having united their forces, to elaborate new, realistically attainable goals which can be offered to the country as its future prospects?

Alas, so far at the congress the word "consolidation" sounds more like an incantation. A political organization which has for many years acted as an apparatus of power, not as an ideological organism, finds itself in deep crisis: a party without an ideology. I write these lines without a shadow of doubt, because the first two days of the 28th congress' work have convinced me of this.

I confess, after the Central Committee's political report I could not fathom what our party is going to be like. There was far greater clarity after the speeches of A.N. Yakovlev and Ye.K. Ligachev. But let us not rejoice: By accepting the position of each of them, we will get a completely different end result. And although we are assured of the unity of the Politburo, alas, this is a fact. Of course, it is possible to find a common practical solution by a majority of votes, but can they form the party's common ideological platform in the same way? I doubt it. I do not see, for example, how we can "splice" into a single whole the recognition and the total rejection of enterprise and private ownership. And how can the calls for a transition to the ideology of common human values be reconciled with the furious desire to defend the class approach toward solving all political problems?

Yesterday we heard all the Politburo members. There were successful speeches and not so successful ones. But this is not the point. I listened to the speakers and I truly could not comprehend: Why are they together? Why do they operate from such contradictory standpoints though they declare that they hold the same political views? For instance, I liked E.A. Shevardnadze's remark about the question of the CPSU's military doctrine: There is no sense in defending a system which has led to economic and social ruin; but how hard it must then be for him in the Politburo when his colleague in that top ruling party organ, Ye.K. Ligachev, considers such views to be attacks on the army, which, in his own words, has now been compelled to defend itself!

A party without a common ideological platform is not a party. This was not perceived when, having crushed the state, it simply held sway, deciding absolutely everything in the country. But today this paradox, like a cancerous tumor, condemns the party organism to a terminal prognosis. The CPSU, however terrible it may be to realize this now, has yet to become a party. And it is possible to begin this journey only at the start—with ideology.

But at the present time the contradictions are innumerable. At yesterday's session alone, we were able to sense far more differences than similarities. Ethnic, geographic, and professional contradictions are all realities of intraparty life. There is no getting away from them. They are more acute today than ever before, and they must be resolved. Otherwise the CPSU will not become a genuine political organization uniting people of the same views and respecting diversity of opinion as the condition of self-development. But incantations such as "People believe in the party and expect a lot from it" can lead only to an impasse. Not even to a split, but to disintegration.

Comparison—Ryzhkov 2 July Congress Report

PM0407091390

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 4 July 1990 carries in its Second Edition on page 2 a report given by USSR Premier N.I. Ryzhkov at the opening session of the 28th CPSU Congress in Moscow 2 July. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, under the general heading "Reports by Politburo Members and Candidate Members and CPSU Central Committee Secretaries," with the translation of the Moscow Television Russian version published in the 3 July 28th CPSU Congress Soviet Union DAILY REPORT supplement beginning on page 21 reveals the following variations:

Page 21, column two, PRAVDA begins: Comrades! Our congress... (deleting first paragraph of item);

Page 21, column two, second paragraph, first sentence PRAVDA reads: ...Soviet people. Expectations of this event of enormous political importance... (rewording);

Page 21, column two, second paragraph of item, fourth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...think that the underlying basis of the... (rewording);

Page 21, column two, third paragraph, fourth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...first was to speed up economic development, making... (rewording);

Page 22, column one, first paragraph, third sentence PRAVDA reads: ...the start on speeding up structural transformations and... (rewording);

Same paragraph, fourth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...development of democratization has fully uncovered... (deleting words);

Page 22, column one, fifth full paragraph, first sentence PRAVDA reads: ...state of affairs. At the same... (deleting sentence);

Page 22, column two, fourth full paragraph, third sentence PRAVDA reads: ...it has been examined on several... (deleting word);

Page 22, column two, fifth full paragraph, second sentence PRAVDA reads: ...demand is for almost R50 billion worth... (rewording);

Page 23, column one, first full paragraph, second sentence PRAVDA reads: ...as a whole. The countryside must become the pivot... (deleting words);

Same paragraph, third sentence PRAVDA reads: ...undertake radical steps. [new graf] One more acute... (deleting sentence);

Page 23, column one, third full paragraph, fourth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...defined in the government program for improving the economy. Of these, I... (subbing "government" for "food" and deleting "[as heard]" notation);

Page 23, column two, first full paragraph, fifth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...again to say why we chose... (deleting words);

Page 23, column two, second full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...material sufficiency and access for all to the benefits of modern civilization. How can we... (rewording);

Page 23, column two, fourth full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...relations is of a comprehensive nature. One cannot... (rewording);

Page 24, column one, first full paragraph, fourth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...a price reform. It would be... (deleting sentence);

Same paragraph, sixth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...objectively necessary task "until later." The government has... (adding quotemarks);

Page 24, column one, second full paragraph, fourth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...these problems but tackles them. We must... (rewording);

Page 24, column one, fourth full paragragh, second sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...of joint work with the union republics. Fundamental socioeconomic... (rewording);

Page 24, column two, first paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...work by the governments of the country and... (rewording);

Page 24, column two, second full paragraph, second sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...very alarming tendency. I have in... (deleting words);

Page 24, column two, third full paragraph, second sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...already carrying out concrete work in that... (rewording);

Page 24, column two, third full paragraph, seventh sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...Union laws, and often in violation of... (rewording);

Page 25, column one, first paragraph, fifth sentence PRAVDA reads: ...culture, of the skill of freely... (deleting word);

Same paragraph, sixth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...people toward a rally-oriented type of democracy... (rewording);

Page 25, column two, first full paragraph, fifth sentence, PRAVDA ends: ...freedom of our people. (deleting "Thank you.")

Comparison—Yakovlev 2 July Congress Report

PM0407110790

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 4 July 1990 carries in its Second Edition on pages 2 and 3 a report delivered by CPSU Politburo member A.N. Yakovlev at the 28th CPSU Congress on 2 July. Comparison of the PRAVDA item, under the general headline "Reports by Politburo Members and Candidate Members and Central Committee Secretaries," with the translation of the Moscow Television Russian version published in the 3 July 28th CPSU Congress Soviet Union DAILY REPORT Supplement, beginning on page 28 reveals the following variations:

Page 28, column two, fourth paragraph, fourth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...of opposing systems, bloc confrontation, and a constant nuclear threat. We will not... (adding "bloc confrontation, and a constant nuclear threat");

Page 29, column one, third full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...Over these years, I have had... (deleting "Both in a personal and in an official capacity");

Page 29, column two, sixth full paragraph, first sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...them; they were ruined by the authorities which they themselves had established. Nobody suffered such massive and tragic casualties on the altar of Stalinism as did the Russian peasantry. The dead cannot be brought back. But their good name should be restored in history.

Here too the question of morality arises. We will not move forward carrying an unbearable burden. This tragic period of history does not permit innuendo, silence, or ambiguity.

Third. One other point which is very important to me. I know that my involvement with the activity associated with the development of glasnost and democracy has produced acute interest and acute hostility. It would be conceited to ascribe this to myself, but since the critics are continuing their attacks, I will say the following: Yes, when I was dealing with these issues two years ago I actively helped to ensure that the life-giving waters of

glasnost, as a most important part of democracy, came to the surface, washed over us, and quenched our spiritual and moral thirst.

Dozens of hitherto banned works of art were published, and films which had been shelved for many years were screened. In essence, the improvement of creativity began and we left behind the shame associated with the suppression of artistic freedom. I would criticize myself only for having been insufficiently insistent in this respect in the interests of perestroyka...

Yes, today there are excesses, incompetence, irresponsibility, and drabness in the mass media and creative exploration. But, despite all these shortcomings, our intelligentsia has done an enormous amount of cleansing work and won an invaluable role in the formation of perestroyka.

Yes, it was a shock. Yes, it was unaccustomed and unpleasant. Yes, it stuck in some people's throats. But was it... (rewording, picking up on Page 30, column one, first full paragraph, fifth sentence);

Page 30, column one, first full paragraph, eighth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...must be recognized that we are doing this at a critical... (adding "that we are doing this", deleting editorial note);

Page 30, column one, first full paragraph, third sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...of the authorities, cynicism, lumpen psychology, parasitism, and careerism.

The contradiction of perestroyka also lies in the fact that the objective need to radically modernize society and its institutions is coming up against a high level of conservatism.

Blinkered thinking has various effects. The dogmatized past holds everyone back in different ways. It has become routine to accuse the Central Committee and party leadership of being tardy in elaborating and taking measures.

Much in that... (rewording, picking up third full paragraph, first sentence);

Page 30, column two, first full paragraph, fifth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...be read anew if we are to get rid of the psychology of permanent civil war, denunciation, human intolerance, and servility as a norm of life, to inculcate which Stalin so persistently cultivated criticism and self-criticism.

Let us remember... (repunctuating, rewording, deleting editorial note, and picking up second full paragraph)

Page 30, column two, seconf full paragraph, fourth sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...and the Kremlin separate us from it. People have grown... (rewording).

Lysenko Interviewed on Split in CPSU

PM0607095290 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 5 Jul 90 p 7

[Interview with Democratic Platform leader Vladimir Lysenko by Fiammetta Cucurnia in Moscow on 4 July]

[Text] Moscow—"The CPSU is the party of the past and this congress does not promise anything good. We will almost certainly leave before it is over, unless Aleksandr Yakovlev decides to side with us. Then, and only then, we might still decide to remain in the CPSU and fight alongside him." That statement was made yesterday by Vladimir Lysenko, the young leader of the Democratic Platform—the communist left—on the threshold of a historic split in the CPSU. Lysenko, who is tall, thin, speaks rapidly and calmly, and who has the typical look of the CPSU official, is a leader who did not choose to be a leader, a leader out of necessity because the founders of the group—Boris Yeltsin, Yuriy Afanasyev, and Nikolay Travkin—gave up the fight before the war began, the first because he took over the leadership of Russia, the others because they handed back their cards on the eve of the CPSU congress. It is therefore now up to him to make the difficult decision on which not even the left seems united at present.

[Cucurnia] Vladimir Nikolayevich, have we reached the point of a split?

[Lysenko] I do not know whether you can talk of a real split. In fact it is a division, a mass walk-out from the party to create a new party which is democratic and left-wing, but not communist. It is too soon to say this with absolute certainty but, judging from the way in which the discussions are going, I do not think there is any choice, I think that we will have to do it before the congress ends.

[Cucurnia] And yet, the general impression is that even you are divided on what to do.

[Lysenko] It is only a seeming division. We are forming a broader grouping here at the congress—the Democratic Union which includes different people: we from the Democratic Platform, some young people from the Communist Youth League, and a group of grass-roots officials. Inside this grouping there are many people who have joined us for political and ideological reasons but who are not yet prepared to leave the party. They may decide to stay, to continue the fight from within, even if, in my view, they have no prospects, the CPSU cannot be reformed.

[Cucurnia] Does this mean that you have basically already made your decision and there is no going back?

[Lysenko] No. There is still a real possibility of avoiding a split. If we manage to persuade Aleksandr Yakovlev to agree to run for CPSU general secretary, we will stay and fight with him, even if he is not elected, as will certainly be the case. He is now the only person who is capable of uniting the party's left wing, of rallying around him the

democratic forces and the whole intelligentsia, the only man who can split the party in two.

[Cucurnia] Do you mean that Yakovlev now offers Gorbachev the best guarantee?

[Lysenko] Yes, at present. And if our operation does not succeed I think it is inevitable that Yakovlev will leave the party leadership.

[Cucurnia] Have you already talked with him?

[Lysenko] We are organizing a meeting today or tomorrow.

[Cucurnia] Do you think that he will agree?

[Lysenko] I do not know. Many factors, including his loyalty to Gorbachev could hold him back.

[Cucurnia] Are you not afraid that the split will eventually harm you and Gorbachev, leaving him alone in the hands of the right?

[Lysenko] It is not we who are abandoning him. It is he who has chosen to remain a prisoner of the apparatus at a crucial time when the choice cannot be postponed. Frankly, until a few days ago, I hoped that Gorbachev would take advantage of the congress to leave the party and continue as president of the country above all the parties, no longer defending the interests of just one party. His prestige, which is now at its lowest point, would have benefited greatly from that. And together with the new forces inside the parliaments, he could have carried through the reform, the transfer of powers from party to state. I realize that, faced with the consolidation of the right against his policy during the Russian Party conference, he decided not to take a risk. Perhaps he will be able to neutralize Ligachev in this way, but he will lose any influence among the people.

[Cucurnia] Vladimir Nikolayevich, how many people will follow you out of the party?

[Lysenko] I am not in a position to make predictions, but I know that there will be many people. It depends on many things and above all on the name of the man who announces the split. If that man was Yeltsin, the split would be profound. But I do not know if, in his new position, Yeltsin will want to take such a step.

[Cucurnia] What real possibility do you think there is of an alliance between Yeltsin and Gorbachev within the party?

[Lysenko] I only know that after last Friday's plenum, they met and Yeltsin told me that he had made no secret of his disappointment at the report read by Gorbachev. "But do you really intend to to present such a report?" Boris Nikolayevich asked. Mikhail Sergeyevich defended himself and said that the report would be corrected. But, as you have seen, despite several real innovations, there were no serious proposals.

Report Views Party Congress Trends

PM0307140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Special correspondent P. Gutiontov report: "The Beginning"]

[Excerpts] And so, at 1000 hours the general secretary walked before rows of empty red chairs on the huge stage in the palace and came up to the microphones to say: "Esteemed comrade delegates..."

The 28th CPSU Congress began its work.

A total of 4,683 Communists were elected as its delegates at party districts and conferences, and 4,657 of them have come to Moscow. What have they come for? What instructions are they prepared to carry out? For what will they raise their hands—figuratively speaking, because there is an electronic ballot system? [Passage omitted]

Well, it would be dishonest not to say that we are perceiving the 28th party congress with a sense of serious alarm—for the future of the country, with this party having been the core of its political system for so many decades. There is one question: Where will the CPSU turn, "having finally come out of its entrenchment," where neither the left nor the right are allowing it to sit any longer? It would seem that the Russian constituent congress gave a sufficiently clear answer, because its 2,800 delegates also make up a solid majority at the all-union congress... Does this mean a policy of restoration of what we had in the past, in the spirit of the Leningrad "initiators," whose ideas, we recall, gave rise to such tumultuous applause a week ago, in this very palace, in this very hall?

And yet I hope that the 28th congress has not exhausted its potential to adopt a more realistic stance. Even if only because it is just beginning. Even if—and this is the main point, in my opinion—only because by 2 July the Russian delegates have changed their attitudes since 19 June. The unprecedented unanimous (in our pluralistic times!) rejection by rank and file Communists and by society as a whole of the course and results of the Russian congress—which its delegates discovered not just from newspapers but also through direct contacts with the collectives that sent them—could vanish without a trace. [passage omitted]

So let us renounce prevailing ideas, and let us adopt an attitude of exacting trust toward delegates to the 28th congress. Personally, I believe that they are aware of their responsibility: The party will not simply carry out a conservative about-face "by moving to the right"—it would inevitably be deprived of the section that makes up its intellectual potential and would thus wipe out its hopes of leadership in society. [passage omitted]

Lukyanov, Polozkov See No Party Split

AU0407120390 Paris AFP in English 1051 GMT 4 Jul 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, July 4 (AFP)—Both conservative and pro-Gorbachev communist leaders on Wednesday sought to dismiss talk of a possible split, as delegates at the party congress here issued urgent calls for a broad-based ruling coalition. Both Anatoliy Lukyanov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet who is a close ally of the Soviet president, and Ivan Polozkov, the newly elected conservative Russian party first secretary, told journalists they did not anticipate any splits in the party.

"I think that whoever expects a split will be disappointed," Mr. Lukyanov said.

"There shouldn't be any splits. The congress must not give rise to conflicts or emotions," Mr. Polozkov said for his part.

Mr. Lukyanov also played down reports of differences within the party leadership, saying: "It is a very complex Politburo (the party's executive body), where there are different positions. But it's a united collective". [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, Vladimir Lysenko, one of the main spokesman for the radical Democratic Platform called for a "government of coalition" in the Soviet Union. We need a government of coalition with democratic forces, like those of the Inter-Regional group (Boris Yeltsin's group). We need a Soviet Mazowiecki (the Polish premier) "to unite society" and move towards a market economy, he added.

Leningrad party boss Boris Gisdaspov, a conservative, on Wednesday also appeared to be calling for compromise as he pledged the party would work with other "constructive" forces in his city.

On Tuesday, Mr. Gorbachev called on communists to be ready to collaborate with emerging parties.

At the congress on Wednesday, the first party secretary from Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, also president of his republic's parliament, expressed disappointment that no one appeared to want to run against Mr. Gorbachev for the job of party leader.

And a delegate from northern Russia, Yuriy Arkipov, criticized the government's plans for transition to a market economy, saying "the market would be a calamity for our people". [passage omitted]

"The party is the party of the working class. We cannot agree with those who say that workers are working badly," Mr. Arkipov also told congress.

Georgian First Secretary Givi Gumbaridze spoke out in favour of a reform of the union, which Mr. Gorbachev wants to turn into a type of confederation of "sovereign republics." But he said republican communist parties should also be independent as this was "the only way for the party to retain its influence in the republics." This has been firmly rejected by Mr. Gorbachev who believes the communist party is the only cement capable of holding the country together in the face of mounting nationalist tensions. [passage omitted]

Military Delegate on Expectations of Congress

LD0507134890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2046 GMT 4 Jul 90

[Interview with B.V. Gromov, commander of the Kiev Military District and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by correspondent Igor Minayev in a foyer of the Kremlin on 4 July; from the "Television News Service" program—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Gromov, caption identified] I think the congress should determine, as its main purpose, the basic questions connected with strategy. We have said a lot about this before, but we are saying and we recognize that in general, in our strategy, as in certain areas of tactics, there is no clarity. I think the congress should engage in this. [passage omitted]

[Minayev] Of late there has been a lot of criticism and attacks against the Army. How do you explain this?

[Gromov] You know, I will answer the question like this. There are attacks in our society not only against the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole. We see them against the party, the Army, and other institutions, which as far as I see it, are hindering certain quarters from developing and implementing their own policies. We know, we can see very well, that in fact a struggle for power, political power, is in progress at the moment. And since that is so, the attacks on bodies or organisms of the state which hamper them are natural—or rather not natural, it seems natural for them. I think that this has happened with the Army as well. That is where I see the main reason for attacks on the Armed Forces; not in the press and the mass media as a whole, but in individual representatives, even personalities. The main reason lies in the fact that like it or not, the way it has happened in Russia since time immemorial is that somehow the people do not so much group around the Armed Forces, the Army, but seek to find support there, since....

[Minayev, interrupting] (?Of course) the Army is part of the people.

[Gromov] Of course, absolutely, since I am profoundly convinced that the Armed Forces have within them morality, first and foremost. After all, they are intended for the defense of their own people, their own people and peace, homes, and independence, and all the other lofty, (brave) concepts. They have morality within them, and the Russian people have always been drawn to morality. As for those who have no use for morality today, I think they, so to speak, are conducting this policy regarding the armed forces. [passage omitted]

[Minayev] It would seem strange if we said nothing about the Afghan theme in our interview, our chat. [Gromov was commander of the Army in Afghanistan]

[Gromov] You understand that the blame on those who made the decision to send us in is, in the opinion of certain people, passed on directly or indirectly to those who carried out this task. And this should certainly not happen. [passage omitted]

[Minayev] Coming back to the congress, there are many platforms and points of view and tendencies in the party now. What do you think? Will it be possible to come to an accord at the congress?

[Gromov] I would like very much for all these tendencies to find a common point of contact. I don't want to make forecasts, but I very much want there to be no split.

[Minayev] I understand that party organizations in the Army is a very big and separate theme, but all the same—please speak frankly as a military leader—do the party organizations work? And what specific help can they give?

[Gromov] [passage omitted] The party organizations are made up of communists, as we put it, communists who engage in all the affairs and problems. That is, not specialists, but people who have certain duties and are at the same time members of the party and who, as they say, wholeheartedly put their heart and soul, their thinking power, into the party's affairs. In Army conditions, to speak of the Armed Forces as whole, these are issues concerned with their structure, and to speak of any individual troop unit, these are the affairs or tasks facing this troop unit.

[Minayev] My last question: What are you expecting, at the end of the day, of the congress?

[Gromov] I am probably going to repeat myself a little, but I will say that what I expect of the congress is a definition of strategy, the basic line, a foundation so that all these platforms and tendencies of ours also make their contribution to this. And in the final analysis this strategic line should, I would say, bring us success in the near future, success in working together with the country's Supreme Soviet, the Union republics, and the local bodies. I think our party—I don't just think, I am confident of it—is not divorced from all the things that the USSR Supreme Soviet, for example, and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic are tackling. And so I think we have to do things together.

Delegates Concerned Over Army Situation

LD0507214790 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 5 Jul 90

[Text] A group of people's deputies and delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress have published an open letter to the country's leadership in connection with the situation in the Army. In it politicians, military men, and scientists express concern over the fact that the military bureaucratic upper crust is dragging its feet in the process of fundamental renewal in the Armed Forces, in the whole of the defense sphere. The letter draws attention to repeated uses of the Army that are not in keeping with its constitutional purpose. And in this respect, the serious question is posed of whom the Army will side with if a new collision occurs in society. The way out of the situation that has been created, in the opinion of the authors of the letter, lies in the immediate drawing up and carrying out of military reform. The transition is proposed to a professional, voluntary army with smaller numbers.

Armed Forces Delegation to Congress Analyzed

PM0507143390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Major General V. Kuznetsov, deputy chief of a directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, under the rubric "Briefing for Readers": "Military People at the Party Congress"; first paragraph is reader's question]

[Text] "What is the makeup of military delegates at the party congress?" Major K. Svetlov.

There are representatives of 12 nationalities among the military members of the body of 28th party congress delegates. Almost 50 percent (134 people) are command personnel, 32 percent (87 people) are political and party workers, and 12.5 percent (35 people) are communists of rear service staffs and organs or engineering and technical personnel. Four military commissariat workers, a military jurist, and a KGB special department officer were also elected.

The body of delegates from the Air Force, the Western Group of Forces, the Far East Military District, and the Strategic Missile Forces is the most representative. For example, the delegates from the Western Group of Forces include a company commander, a battalion deputy commander for political affairs, a regiment party committee secretary, a medical worker, a chief of staff, and others.

Some 30 percent (81 people) are aged between 40 and 50. Forty delegates are under 40. The majority of military delegates have higher education: A total of 82 are graduates of the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; 24 hold the academic degree of candidate of sciences; there are eight doctors of sciences, seven professors, seven senior lecturers, and six senior scientific associates; and Lieutenant General A. Kuntsevich is an academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The military people elected to the congress include five winners of the USSR State Prize and one holder of the Lenin Prize. Fifteen delegates have been elected to Union republic communist party central committees

and 63 to kray, oblast, and other local party organs. One in every seven (38 people) is a USSR people's deputy, 11 are people's deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and nine are people's deputies of other Union republics.

One delegate in every 15 is a primary party organization secretary.

The body of delegates includes eight heroes of the Soviet Union—in fact Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov has twice been awarded this lofty title—and three heroes of socialist labor.

The delegates include eight participants in the Great Patriotic War.

In their elections 87 percent won a majority in the first round of voting.

In all, 269 delegates were elected from party organizations in the Armed Forces.

For comparison: Precisely 302 people were elected to the 27th congress, 304 to the 26th, and 297 to the 25th.

Editor Chides Congress for Retreat on Market

PM0607083190 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Jul 90 p 1

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA chief editor Anatoliy Yurkov "Editor's Opinion": "Is Renewal Taking Place?"]

[Text] ...When the composition of the commission to prepare the resolution "On the switch to a regulated market economy" was put to the vote and the audience reacted animatedly to appeals at the microphone, such as "What do we want republican premiers and ministers in the commission for—we are not electing the Council of Ministers Presidium," "Abalkin is not needed here, his position is well known!" Then another speaker managed to get to the microphone.

What is this, comrade delegates, he said. Apparently, they have already decided for us that there will be a switch to the market, since that is what the resolution is called. Did they ask us?

"It was their decision on the market... The party was not consulted! It was not discussed with the communists!" The echo carried beyond the confines of the hall.

And try as he might to quieten the hall, the chairman, whose confidence had gone, could not stem the wave of willfulness that lashed the delegates.

Was there any logic in this protest? Certainly, there was. In terms of both form and substance. Obviously, it would be logical for the party congress to discuss and adopt a resolution not on the market, but on the socioeconomic consequences of this step. With the emphasis on the social protection of working people.

But the question is: Would not the party then be assuming the functions of the trade unions, whose main task is to protect working people's socioeconomic interests? There is a reservation, though: If only the trade unions did their job properly. Then, maybe, yesterday's session would not have started the way it did—with a statement by the miners' delegates to the congress on the expediency of political strikes and ultimatums. But that is a separate topic. As is the rapidly maturing workers' movement, which does not yet have the fixed attention of the party and the congress. And which has not been given a thorough and serious evaluation.

The congress unanimously accepted the new title of the draft resolution which this commission is to prepare.

But then they began to juggle with the composition of the commission, because the new form demanded a new content, too.

Then the candidacy of the chairman was called into question, then...

How should this incident be taken? As a sign of a maturing democracy? As the victory of the masses over the elected hierarchy, the apparatus? We are the congress, the supreme power! Undoubtedly so.

But the power of whom? And of what?

After all, the party, before the whole people, has solemnly and irrevocably renounced functions that are not its own but which it usurped many decades ago. And the country's economic life and the methods and forms of economic management—these are the prerogative of the government, they fall within its competence, not of some CPSU member, even a congress delegate. Nor of the congress itself. But if the CPSU congress assumes the right to dictate to the government how it should make a profit and how it should rectify the state budget, then perhaps the congress has failed to understand something? And the party, too?

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies—the supreme organ of people's power—supported the switch to a regulated market economy. And the Russian parliament, judging by the statement of its chairman, B.N. Yeltsin, also favors the market. But will the party put these conclusions in doubt? Is it not turning back after taking not even 10 steps forward in building a rule-of-law, democratic state?

In my opinion, our society's tragedy began at the precise moment one day when some party functionaries, acting in the name of the party or the people, convicted a guilty man. Or acquitted an innocent man.

Without trial.

The party had nothing to do with that epoch-making act, nor could it have—it never sought to be an organ of justice. But the functionary, appointed to watch over the interests of the working people, did not even bother to think that those interests could fail to coincide with his

own personal interests. Or that personal interest, like any social interest, furthermore, is perhaps not in keeping with the spirit and law of the law.

Then the GULAG archipelago swallowed up millions of lives.

Without trial.

In the name of the party and the people, someone deeply antiparty and anti-people built up his own personal interest.

Now the party is paying for that functionary through an agonizing penitence. We are paying those debts now at the congress, too.

But is it necessary to increase their number? Here of all places? Incidentally, Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze, as foreign minister in the government of another Politburo member—Nikolay Ryzhkov—noticeably did not feel at his best when reporting to the congress. Just like Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov. On the one hand, an innovation—let each of our leaders answer personally to us. But on the other hand, are we communists not exaggerating our significance, are we not overdoing it? After all, both the premier and his ministers report to the elected representatives of **the whole people.** Are we not using these reports to revive our claims to monopoly power?

I, as a communist of 30 years' standing, also find it hard to reconcile myself with this but it must be accepted: We made this decision ourselves when we delimited the functions of the democratic state and the renewed party. And vowed to the people, when we began perestroyka for their sake, that there would be no return to the old ways. But, clearly, the genes of that functionary have managed to encode in our hereditary mechanism the judge syndrome which comes into effect whenever it is time to give back to the people that which belongs to them by right and by birth.

Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is accountable to our congress alone, as is his colleague Yegor Ligachev, too. Perhaps that is why their reports to the congress were as brilliant as they were strikingly dissimilar, even though the hall received them in the same way: with hearty applause. Perhaps that is also why there was dissatisfaction with N. Ryzhkov's appearance on the platform and why he was sent several bundles of memorandums saying that people wanted to hear a report from a Politburo member but got a speech by the state premier with a crisis-ridden economy instead. But I think that as a member of the Politburo, Nikolay Ivanovich had nothing to say. He was elected to the Politburo ex-officio—as premier.

I think that a personal report from Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries in primary party organizations and labor collectives would be far more useful. Both for the former and the latter. And not once every five years but at least once every six months—then the lives of the "grass roots" would be permeated with the same concerns as those of the "top dogs." Then a direct and firm link will be established between the party and its leaders. I am not claiming that the innovation of reports from our leaders does not increase our party's democracy. It does—no two ways about it, I think. But does it benefit the cause?

I realize that my position will seem vulnerable to some people. I lay no claim to infallibility. And I know where I am vulnerable. Someone will object: How will the party influence the state's socioeconomic policy, after all, it is the ruling party at the moment, isn't it? Through its representatives in all organs of people's power—in the soviets, by parliamentary means. But if it tries to return to the old methods of diktat it risks losing its already shaky leadership once and for all.

In my view there was something new in the work of the congress which passed absolutely (or almost absolutely) unnoticed. I mean the memorandum sent to the presidium on cadre changes in the party leadership. The very text of the memorandum demanding an advance announcement of who is leaving the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat is evidence of the profound changes in communists' consciousness caused by the party's perestroyka. Is it conceivable—that just yesterday there would have been a demand to the General Secretary that he publish such secrets before a specified time? And Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev did the right thing in immediately naming N. Slyunkov, G. Usmanov, V. Vorotnikov, and A. Biryukova as the ones who are leaving the party's leading organs.

Describes Yakovlev Reception

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[Article by Anatoliy Yurkov, chief editor of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, under the rubric "Editor's Opinion": "Will There Be a Split?"]

[Text] The Yakovlev phenomenon—this is how I would describe this development in the country's political life. Aleksandr Nikolayevich himself is clearly unaware that for several years now he has served as a sounding board by means of which the public tests the political attitude of each one of us. If you share his views, it means that you support perestroyka, that you support Gorbachev, and consequently that you favor radical changes in the life of the party and society. That is to say that you really favor perestroyka rather than just paying lipservice to it.

While being a consistent and true supporter of Gorbachev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich has nonetheless acquired supporters of his own. They are more decisive in their political assessments.

If you do not share his convictions it means that you are merely donning the garb of a democrat while in reality you are hopelessly in the grip of conservatism. Political

talk (and fashion too) has divided all, as if with a cavalry sword, into opponents and supporters of Yakovlev. His supporters are viewed as supporters of perestroyka with a quality badge while supporters of perestroyka and Gorbachev alone lack such a badge.

What engendered the Yakovlev phenomenon? It my view it is a reaction. A reaction to the blinkered monumental isolation to which our political leaders traditionally condemned themselves. And us too by presenting to us their images on an iconostasis. Only rarely did we catch echoes of the passions which raged around them when new names appeared in plenum resolutions while old ones receded into oblivion.

Then, suddenly, a Central Committee secretary and Politburo member who was open to equal dialogue appeared in Gorbachev's team. More than that, he spoke like a human being instead of preaching from on high, and it emerged that he was not averse to using eloquent words and controversial and even risky thinking and that he was not afraid of being vulnerable.

We have seen everything in members of the Politburo during the existence of this super-closed institution of unlimited power. Apart from one thing—genuine sincerity and reckless rebellion against this unlimited power.

Yakovlev, having joined Gorbachev's team, organized this rebellion. A more profound, more revolutionary, and strategically more promising rebellion that the loud even rowdy challenge presented by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

Yeltsin was accepted without hessitation by the people.

Intellectuals rallied around Yakovlev.

Yeltsin demanded power in order to remake the world.

Yakovlev has been remaking it for a long time without being vested with any legal power. Apart from that granted to everyone by Gorbachev when he led them into perestroyka.

On the first day of the congress proceedings, at the very end of it, the whole hall applauded Yakovlev after his report as Politburo member. He received the stamp of approval from both the Democratic and the Marxist Platforms, from the radicals and the conservatives. The power of his intellect convinced opponents of the need for decisive action to save the party from disintegration and the country from ruin. If that is still possible. And the overwhelming unguarded sincerity, whose very unguardedness serves as a guarantee of protection against attack from a responsive audience, produced this responsiveness. The hall, which had been dissatisfied and irritable before, grew silent as soon as he started speaking and became so engrossed that remarks whispered to a person in the next seat reverberated around the hall. Both the radicals and the conservatives rallied to [nastroilis na] Yakovlev.

Why am I talking in such detail, and so passionately, some people may say, about Yakovlev? I am doing so in order to conclude that **a split must not occur at the 28th Congress** An audience which so unanimously succumbed to the magic of one intellect cannot split, cannot dissociate itself from that intellect and consequently from itself.

Yes, I am being partial. Toward Yakovlev too. But I cannot remain dispassionate toward anyone who is working for perestroyka and seeking to consolidate constructive forces which are working for the good. And I would advise all those who are plotting a split today to ponder what they are trying to restore and to continue.

Yes, I do mean continue since it was division which drove our fatherland to a state of semi-consciousness and made us forget truths which are as eternal as life itself. It was the division of the countryside into kulaks and the rest of the people which brought it to the current harvest of nettles which cover the wastelands that once were the ancestral lands of whole generations. It was the division into "specialists" and the working people which degraded our technical thought to day-labor at vegetable bases. It was this division which split our country into "our guys" and all the rest which had to be "dealt with." And it was superdivision that divided the party into the rank-and-file and apparatchiks on whom the whole party had to wait.

This was not described as a split, of course, but that does not change the crux of the matter. After all, in practical terms the apparatus, for instance, was not part of the party, it was above it. And at present, if the Democratic, or the Marxist, or any other platform was to engineer a split—who would stand to gain from this? What objective could there be for such a crucial step? I, for instance, can see only personal objectives—to get to the helm of a party that may be small but is at least your "own."

"No, there will be no split," Nikolay Logunov, a delegate from Moscow replied to my question. "What would we achieve by that?"

I have known Nikolay Logunov from the Moscow Sortirovochnaya marshalling yard for a long time. A first-class fitter, leader of a renowned team, in which the sons of the big bosses got their "work experience" prior to going to higher educational establishments, communist Logunov has always abided by his firm principles of life. Even today, having agreed to put forward his candidacy in the elections of congress delegates, he has not betrayed his interests. Nikolay Logunov, chairman of the marshalling yard's trade union committee, was elected as delegate from among 13 candidates at the yard and six in the district.

During the years of stagnation he told all the captains of the railways when he accepted their sons for training:

"If your son wants to become a fitter, we will train him." And he concluded in a tone which no one dared to

contradict: "If he merely needs work experience, he must not get in anyone's way in the team."

He did not seek to build his career on his acquaintance with the sector leaders, and this circumstance has helped him to retain his dignity as a man and a party member to this day.

Naturally, I deliberately chose two such disparate figures for this reportage—a rank-and-file congress delegate and a Politburo member. This is because Nikolay Logunov and Aleksandr Yakovlev are equals today. The former probably even has a slight advantage: Yakovlev has come to the congress to deliver his report and to wait for the verdict which will decide his fate, while Logunov has come to listen and to decide his political fate. Therefore I consider his opinion as no less (and probably more!) decisive than, say, the opinion of Politburo members V. Vorotnikov or L. Zaykov. After all, the power of the grass roots which perestroyka is seeking to establish must be based on the opinion of the grass roots.

Congress delegate N. Logunov is also concerned about the unity of the party. And he has his own view on this: "Neither Gorbachev nor Yakovlev can cope with a split single-handed. Even ours will not be the last word here."

So who will speak the last word? Clearly the congress. After all, there was a lot of noise about a split at the Russian party conference, which was labeled as conservative and even unlawful. Will the current 28th CPSU Congress reassure the vacillating souls of the radicals? In my opinion M. Gorbachev is doing a great deal to prevent an exacerbation of the differences. It even seems to me that he is trying to meet those selfsame representatives of the Democratic Platform halfway, reassuring them with his peace-making correct tone of voice and his readiness to satisfy their special claims.

However, what is causing concern is that the whole of the second day has involved personal reports by Politburo members. The questions put to them by delegates were carried from the Secretariat in bundles. The Central Committee Political Report, in which the strategy and tactics of perestroyka are expounded, has receded into the background. For what purpose has the congress been convened? Was it only to share out power in the party? If that is the case, it will have to accept the label attached to the Russian congress.